What the Bubble Got Right
Paul Graham reflects on the Internet Bubble and argues that despite the crash, several trends it popularized will endure: retail VC (taking companies public early), the genuine importance of the Internet, choice-driven economics, the edge of young founders, informality, nerd culture, stock options, startups built to be sold, California's innovation ecosystem, and the multiplier effect of technology on productivity. The overarching theme: good ideas will count more over time.




September 2004(This essay is derived from an invited talk at ICFP 2004.)
I had a front row seat for the Internet Bubble, because I worked at Yahoo during 1998 and 1999. One day, when the stock was trading around $200, I sat down and calculated what I thought the price should be. The answer I got was $12. I went to the next cubicle and told my friend Trevor. "Twelve!" he said. He tried to sound indignant, but he didn't quite manage it. He knew as well as I did that our valuation was crazy.
Yahoo was a special case. It was not just our price to earnings ratio that was bogus. Half our earnings were too. Not in the Enron way, of course. The finance guys seemed scrupulous about reporting earnings. What made our earnings bogus was that Yahoo was, in effect, the center of a Ponzi scheme. Investors looked at Yahoo's earnings and said to themselves, here is proof that Internet companies can make money. So they invested in new startups that promised to be the next Yahoo. And as soon as these startups got the money, what did they do with it? Buy millions of dollars worth of advertising on Yahoo to promote their brand. Result: a capital investment in a startup this quarter shows up as Yahoo earnings next quarter—stimulating another round of investments in startups.
As in a Ponzi scheme, what seemed to be the returns of this system were simply the latest round of investments in it. What made it not a Ponzi scheme was that it was unintentional. At least, I think it was. The venture capital business is pretty incestuous, and there were presumably people in a position, if not to create this situation, to realize what was happening and to milk it.
A year later the game was up. Starting in January 2000, Yahoo's stock price began to crash, ultimately losing 95% of its value.
Notice, though, that even with all the fat trimmed off its market cap, Yahoo was still worth a lot. Even at the morning-after valuations of March and April 2001, the people at Yahoo had managed to create a company worth about $8 billion in just six years.
The fact is, despite all the nonsense we heard during the Bubble about the "new economy," there was a core of truth. You need that to get a really big bubble: you need to have something solid at the center, so that even smart people are sucked in. (Isaac Newton and Jonathan Swift both lost money in the South Sea Bubble of 1720.)
Now the pendulum has swung the other way. Now anything that became fashionable during the Bubble is ipso facto unfashionable. But that's a mistake—an even bigger mistake than believing what everyone was saying in 1999. Over the long term, what the Bubble got right will be more important than what it got wrong.
2004年9月(本文源自2004年ICFP大会的受邀演讲)
我是互联网泡沫的亲历者,因为我1998年和1999年在雅虎工作。有一天,当股价在200美元左右交易时,我坐下来计算了我认为它应该值多少钱。我的答案是12美元。我走到隔壁隔间告诉我的朋友特雷弗。“12美元!”他说。他试图装出愤慨的样子,但没完全装出来。他和我一样清楚,我们的估值是疯狂的。
雅虎是一个特例。不仅市盈率是假的,我们一半的收益也是假的。当然,不是安然那种方式。财务人员似乎对报告收益很谨慎。我们的收益之所以虚假,是因为雅虎实际上是一个庞氏骗局的核心。投资者看到雅虎的收益,心想,这证明了互联网公司能赚钱。于是他们投资于那些承诺成为下一个雅虎的新兴创业公司。而这些创业公司拿到钱后做什么?在雅虎上购买数百万美元的广告来推广自己的品牌。结果:本季度对创业公司的资本投资,下季度就变成了雅虎的收益——刺激了又一轮对创业公司的投资。
就像庞氏骗局一样,这个系统的所谓回报,不过是其最新一轮的投资。它之所以不是庞氏骗局,是因为它是无意的。至少,我认为如此。风险投资行业相当近亲繁殖,很可能有些人即使没有创造这种情况,也能意识到正在发生什么并从中牟利。
一年后游戏结束了。从2000年1月开始,雅虎股价暴跌,最终损失了95%的价值。
但请注意,即使剔除了所有泡沫后,雅虎仍然价值不菲。即使在2001年3月和4月的“事后”估值中,雅虎仅用六年就创造了一家价值约80亿美元的公司。
事实是,尽管泡沫期间我们听到了关于“新经济”的种种胡言乱语,但其中有一个核心真相。你需要这个来产生一个真正的大泡沫:你需要有一个坚实的核心,这样即使聪明人也会被卷进来。(艾萨克·牛顿和乔纳森·斯威夫特都在1720年的南海泡沫中赔了钱。)
现在钟摆摆向了另一边。现在任何在泡沫期间流行起来的东西都自动变得不流行了。但这是个错误——比相信1999年大家说的话更大的错误。长期来看,泡沫做对的事情将比做错的事情更重要。
- Retail VC
After the excesses of the Bubble, it's now considered dubious to take companies public before they have earnings. But there is nothing intrinsically wrong with that idea. Taking a company public at an early stage is simply retail VC: instead of going to venture capital firms for the last round of funding, you go to the public markets.
By the end of the Bubble, companies going public with no earnings were being derided as "concept stocks," as if it were inherently stupid to invest in them. But investing in concepts isn't stupid; it's what VCs do, and the best of them are far from stupid.
The stock of a company that doesn't yet have earnings is worth something. It may take a while for the market to learn how to value such companies, just as it had to learn to value common stocks in the early 20th century. But markets are good at solving that kind of problem. I wouldn't be surprised if the market ultimately did a better job than VCs do now.
Going public early will not be the right plan for every company. And it can of course be disruptive—by distracting the management, or by making the early employees suddenly rich. But just as the market will learn how to value startups, startups will learn how to minimize the damage of going public.
- 零售风投
泡沫过度之后,现在让没有盈利的公司上市被认为是有问题的。但这个想法本身并没有错。在早期阶段让公司上市,其实就是零售风投:不是找风险投资公司进行最后一轮融资,而是转向公开市场。
到泡沫末期,没有盈利就上市的公司被嘲笑为“概念股”,仿佛投资它们天生就是愚蠢的。但投资概念并不愚蠢;这正是风投所做的,而最优秀的风投远非愚蠢。
一家尚未盈利的公司的股票是有价值的。市场可能需要一段时间来学习如何估值这样的公司,就像它在20世纪初必须学习如何估值普通股一样。但市场很擅长解决这类问题。如果市场最终比现在的风投做得更好,我不会感到惊讶。
早期上市并不适合每家公司。它当然可能带来干扰——分散管理层的注意力,或者让早期员工突然暴富。但正如市场将学习如何估值创业公司一样,创业公司也将学会如何将上市带来的损害降到最低。
- The Internet
The Internet genuinely is a big deal. That was one reason even smart people were fooled by the Bubble. Obviously it was going to have a huge effect. Enough of an effect to triple the value of Nasdaq companies in two years? No, as it turned out. But it was hard to say for certain at the time. [1]
The same thing happened during the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles. What drove them was the invention of organized public finance (the South Sea Company, despite its name, was really a competitor of the Bank of England). And that did turn out to be a big deal, in the long run.
Recognizing an important trend turns out to be easier than figuring out how to profit from it. The mistake investors always seem to make is to take the trend too literally. Since the Internet was the big new thing, investors supposed that the more Internettish the company, the better. Hence such parodies as Pets.Com.
In fact most of the money to be made from big trends is made indirectly. It was not the railroads themselves that made the most money during the railroad boom, but the companies on either side, like Carnegie's steelworks, which made the rails, and Standard Oil, which used railroads to get oil to the East Coast, where it could be shipped to Europe.
I think the Internet will have great effects, and that what we've seen so far is nothing compared to what's coming. But most of the winners will only indirectly be Internet companies; for every Google there will be ten JetBlues.
- 互联网
互联网确实是一件大事。这也是聪明人也被泡沫愚弄的原因之一。显然它会带来巨大的影响。大到足以在两年内让纳斯达克公司价值翻三倍?不,事实证明并非如此。但在当时很难确定。[1]
同样的事情发生在密西西比泡沫和南海泡沫期间。驱动它们的是有组织的公共金融的发明(南海公司,尽管名字如此,实际上是英格兰银行的竞争对手)。而长期来看,这确实成了一件大事。
识别一个重要趋势比弄清楚如何从中获利更容易。投资者似乎总是犯的错误是过于字面地理解趋势。因为互联网是重大的新事物,投资者认为公司越“互联网化”越好。于是就出现了Pets.Com这样的讽刺性公司。
事实上,从大趋势中赚到的钱大部分是间接的。铁路繁荣期间赚得最多的不是铁路公司本身,而是两边的公司,比如制造铁轨的卡内基钢铁厂,以及利用铁路将石油运到东海岸以便运往欧洲的标准石油。
我认为互联网将产生巨大的影响,我们目前所见的与未来相比微不足道。但大多数赢家将只是间接的互联网公司;每出现一个谷歌,就会出现十个捷蓝航空。
- Choices
Why will the Internet have great effects? The general argument is that new forms of communication always do. They happen rarely (till industrial times there were just speech, writing, and printing), but when they do, they always cause a big splash.
The specific argument, or one of them, is the Internet gives us more choices. In the "old" economy, the high cost of presenting information to people meant they had only a narrow range of options to choose from. The tiny, expensive pipeline to consumers was tellingly named "the channel." Control the channel and you could feed them what you wanted, on your terms. And it was not just big corporations that depended on this principle. So, in their way, did labor unions, the traditional news media, and the art and literary establishments. Winning depended not on doing good work, but on gaining control of some bottleneck.
There are signs that this is changing. Google has over 82 million unique users a month and annual revenues of about three billion dollars. [2] And yet have you ever seen a Google ad? Something is going on here.
Admittedly, Google is an extreme case. It's very easy for people to switch to a new search engine. It costs little effort and no money to try a new one, and it's easy to see if the results are better. And so Google doesn't have to advertise. In a business like theirs, being the best is enough.
The exciting thing about the Internet is that it's shifting everything in that direction. The hard part, if you want to win by making the best stuff, is the beginning. Eventually everyone will learn by word of mouth that you're the best, but how do you survive to that point? And it is in this crucial stage that the Internet has the most effect. First, the Internet lets anyone find you at almost zero cost. Second, it dramatically speeds up the rate at which reputation spreads by word of mouth. Together these mean that in many fields the rule will be: Build it, and they will come. Make something great and put it online. That is a big change from the recipe for winning in the past century.
- 选择
为什么互联网会产生巨大影响?一般的论点是,新的通信形式总是如此。它们很少出现(直到工业时代之前只有口语、文字和印刷),但一旦出现,总会引起巨大轰动。
具体的论点,或者说其中之一,是互联网给了我们更多选择。在“旧”经济中,向人们展示信息的成本很高,意味着他们只有有限的选择。通向消费者的那条狭小、昂贵的管道被恰如其分地称为“渠道”。控制了渠道,你就可以按自己的条件向他们灌输你想让他们看到的东西。而依赖这一原则的不仅仅是大型企业。工会、传统新闻媒体、艺术和文学机构也以各自的方式依赖它。赢家不是靠做出好产品,而是靠控制某个瓶颈。
有迹象表明这种情况正在改变。谷歌每月有超过8200万独立用户,年收入约30亿美元。[2] 但你见过谷歌的广告吗?这其中必有蹊跷。
诚然,谷歌是一个极端案例。人们很容易切换到新的搜索引擎。尝试新引擎几乎不费力气、不花钱,而且很容易看出结果是否更好。所以谷歌不必做广告。在他们的业务中,做到最好就足够了。
互联网令人兴奋之处在于,它正在把一切推向那个方向。如果你想通过做出最好的产品来获胜,困难在于起步阶段。最终所有人都会通过口口相传知道你是最好的,但你怎么能活到那一步?而正是在这个关键阶段,互联网的作用最大。首先,互联网让任何人以近乎零成本找到你。其次,它极大地加速了声誉通过口口相传的速度。两者加在一起意味着,在许多领域,规则将是:只要你造出来,他们就会来。做出伟大的东西并放到网上。这与上个世纪的制胜法则相比是一个巨大的变化。
- Youth
The aspect of the Internet Bubble that the press seemed most taken with was the youth of some of the startup founders. This too is a trend that will last. There is a huge standard deviation among 26 year olds. Some are fit only for entry level jobs, but others are ready to rule the world if they can find someone to handle the paperwork for them.
A 26 year old may not be very good at managing people or dealing with the SEC. Those require experience. But those are also commodities, which can be handed off to some lieutenant. The most important quality in a CEO is his vision for the company's future. What will they build next? And in that department, there are 26 year olds who can compete with anyone.
In 1970 a company president meant someone in his fifties, at least. If he had technologists working for him, they were treated like a racing stable: prized, but not powerful. But as technology has grown more important, the power of nerds has grown to reflect it. Now it's not enough for a CEO to have someone smart he can ask about technical matters. Increasingly, he has to be that person himself.
As always, business has clung to old forms. VCs still seem to want to install a legitimate-looking talking head as the CEO. But increasingly the founders of the company are the real powers, and the grey-headed man installed by the VCs more like a music group's manager than a general.
- 年轻
互联网泡沫中,媒体最关注的一点是一些创业公司创始人的年轻。这也是一种将持续下去的趋势。26岁的人之间存在巨大的标准差。有些人只适合做入门级工作,但另一些人已经准备好统治世界——只要有人能帮他们处理文书工作。
一个26岁的人可能不擅长管理员工或与SEC打交道。那些需要经验。但那些也是可以交给副手的“商品”。CEO最重要的品质是对公司未来的愿景。下一步该构建什么?在这方面,有些26岁的人可以跟任何人竞争。
1970年,公司总裁至少是五十多岁的人。如果有技术人员为他工作,他们会被当作赛马厩一样对待:珍视,但没有权力。但随着技术变得越来越重要,书呆子的权力也随之增长。现在CEO光有可以咨询技术问题的聪明人已经不够了。他越来越需要自己就是那个人。
一如既往,商业界固守着旧形式。风投似乎仍然想安插一个看起来合法的“传声筒”作为CEO。但公司的创始人越来越是真正的权力者,而风投安插的白发老人更像是乐队的经理,而不是将军。
- Informality
In New York, the Bubble had dramatic consequences: suits went out of fashion. They made one seem old. So in 1998 powerful New York types were suddenly wearing open-necked shirts and khakis and oval wire-rimmed glasses, just like guys in Santa Clara.
The pendulum has swung back a bit, driven in part by a panicked reaction by the clothing industry. But I'm betting on the open-necked shirts. And this is not as frivolous a question as it might seem. Clothes are important, as all nerds can sense, though they may not realize it consciously.
If you're a nerd, you can understand how important clothes are by asking yourself how you'd feel about a company that made you wear a suit and tie to work. The idea sounds horrible, doesn't it? In fact, horrible far out of proportion to the mere discomfort of wearing such clothes. A company that made programmers wear suits would have something deeply wrong with it.
And what would be wrong would be that how one presented oneself counted more than the quality of one's ideas. That's the problem with formality. Dressing up is not so much bad in itself. The problem is the receptor it binds to: dressing up is inevitably a substitute for good ideas. It is no coincidence that technically inept business types are known as "suits."
Nerds don't just happen to dress informally. They do it too consistently. Consciously or not, they dress informally as a prophylactic measure against stupidity.
- 非正式
在纽约,泡沫带来了戏剧性的后果:西装过时了。它们让人显得老气。于是1998年,纽约的权势人物突然穿起了开领衬衫、卡其裤和椭圆形金属丝眼镜,就像圣克拉拉的那些人一样。
钟摆又往回摆了一点,部分原因是服装行业的恐慌反应。但我押注开领衬衫。这并不像看起来那么轻浮。衣服很重要,所有书呆子都能感觉到,尽管他们可能没有意识到。
如果你是个书呆子,你可以通过问自己“如果一家公司让你穿西装打领带上班,你会怎么想?”来理解衣服有多重要。这个想法听起来很可怕,不是吗?事实上,其可怕之处远远超出了穿这种衣服的不适感。一家让程序员穿西装的公司,一定有深层次的问题。
问题在于,一个人如何展示自己比其想法质量更重要。这就是形式主义的问题。打扮本身并不坏。问题在于它绑定的受体:打扮不可避免地成为了好点子的替代品。技术上无能的高管被称为“西装”并非巧合。
书呆子们并非偶然穿得随便。他们一贯如此。有意无意地,他们穿得随便,作为对抗愚蠢的预防措施。
- Nerds
Clothing is only the most visible battleground in the war against formality. Nerds tend to eschew formality of any sort. They're not impressed by one's job title, for example, or any of the other appurtenances of authority.
Indeed, that's practically the definition of a nerd. I found myself talking recently to someone from Hollywood who was planning a show about nerds. I thought it would be useful if I explained what a nerd was. What I came up with was: someone who doesn't expend any effort on marketing himself.
A nerd, in other words, is someone who concentrates on substance. So what's the connection between nerds and technology? Roughly that you can't fool mother nature. In technical matters, you have to get the right answers. If your software miscalculates the path of a space probe, you can't finesse your way out of trouble by saying that your code is patriotic, or avant-garde, or any of the other dodges people use in nontechnical fields.
And as technology becomes increasingly important in the economy, nerd culture is rising with it. Nerds are already a lot cooler than they were when I was a kid. When I was in college in the mid-1980s, "nerd" was still an insult. People who majored in computer science generally tried to conceal it. Now women ask me where they can meet nerds. (The answer that springs to mind is "Usenix," but that would be like drinking from a firehose.)
I have no illusions about why nerd culture is becoming more accepted. It's not because people are realizing that substance is more important than marketing. It's because the nerds are getting rich. But that is not going to change.
- 书呆子
服装只是反形式主义战争中最显眼的战场。书呆子们倾向于避开任何形式主义。他们不会对一个人的头衔或其他权威附属物留下深刻印象。
事实上,这几乎就是书呆子的定义。我最近跟一个来自好莱坞的人聊天,他正在策划一个关于书呆子的节目。我觉得如果能解释一下什么是一个书呆子,会很有用。我给出的答案是:一个不花任何精力推销自己的人。
换句话说,书呆子是一个专注于实质的人。那么书呆子和技术之间有什么联系?大致来说,你不能愚弄大自然。在技术问题上,你必须得到正确的答案。如果你的软件计算错了太空探测器的轨道,你不能通过说你的代码是爱国的、前卫的,或者其他在非技术领域人们使用的搪塞手段来摆脱麻烦。
随着技术在经济中变得越来越重要,书呆子文化也随之兴起。书呆子已经比我小时候酷多了。20世纪80年代中期我上大学时,“书呆子”仍然是一个侮辱性的词。学计算机科学的人一般都试图隐瞒。现在女性问我哪里可以遇到书呆子。(我脑子里蹦出的答案是“Usenix大会”,但那就像对着消防水管喝水。)
我对书呆子文化为何越来越被接受不抱幻想。不是因为人们认识到实质比营销更重要。而是因为书呆子们正在变得富有。但这不会改变。
- Options
What makes the nerds rich, usually, is stock options. Now there are moves afoot to make it harder for companies to grant options. To the extent there's some genuine accounting abuse going on, by all means correct it. But don't kill the golden goose. Equity is the fuel that drives technical innovation.
Options are a good idea because (a) they're fair, and (b) they work. Someone who goes to work for a company is (one hopes) adding to its value, and it's only fair to give them a share of it. And as a purely practical measure, people work a lot harder when they have options. I've seen that first hand.
The fact that a few crooks during the Bubble robbed their companies by granting themselves options doesn't mean options are a bad idea. During the railroad boom, some executives enriched themselves by selling watered stock—by issuing more shares than they said were outstanding. But that doesn't make common stock a bad idea. Crooks just use whatever means are available.
If there is a problem with options, it's that they reward slightly the wrong thing. Not surprisingly, people do what you pay them to. If you pay them by the hour, they'll work a lot of hours. If you pay them by the volume of work done, they'll get a lot of work done (but only as you defined work). And if you pay them to raise the stock price, which is what options amount to, they'll raise the stock price.
But that's not quite what you want. What you want is to increase the actual value of the company, not its market cap. Over time the two inevitably meet, but not always as quickly as options vest. Which means options tempt employees, if only unconsciously, to "pump and dump"—to do things that will make the company seem valuable. I found that when I was at Yahoo, I couldn't help thinking, "how will this sound to investors?" when I should have been thinking "is this a good idea?"
So maybe the standard option deal needs to be tweaked slightly. Maybe options should be replaced with something tied more directly to earnings. It's still early days.
- 期权
通常让书呆子们变得富有的是股票期权。现在有一些举措让公司更难授予期权。如果确实存在某些会计滥用,当然应该纠正。但不要杀死下金蛋的鹅。股权是驱动技术创新的燃料。
期权是个好主意,因为(a)它公平,(b)它有效。去一家公司工作的人(希望如此)正在为其增加价值,给他们一份价值份额是公平的。而且作为纯粹务实的措施,当人们拥有期权时,工作会更努力。我亲眼目睹了这一点。
泡沫期间几个骗子通过给自己授予期权来掠夺公司,这并不意味着期权是个坏主意。铁路繁荣期间,一些高管通过出售掺水股票(发行比他们声称的流通股更多的股票)来中饱私囊。但这不意味着普通股是个坏主意。骗子只是使用任何可用的手段。
如果说期权有问题,那就是它们奖励了稍微错误的东西。毫不奇怪,人们会做你付钱让他们做的事。如果你按小时付钱,他们会工作很多小时。如果你按完成的工作量付钱,他们会完成很多工作(但仅限于你定义的工作)。如果你付钱让他们提高股价——期权本质上就是如此——他们就会提高股价。
但这并不是你真正想要的。你想要的是增加公司的实际价值,而不是市值。长期来看,两者必然趋同,但并非总是像期权行权前那样快。这意味着期权会引诱员工(即使是无意识地)“拉高出货”——做一些让公司看起来有价值的事情。我发现当我在雅虎时,我忍不住想“这向投资者听起来怎么样?”,而我应该想的是“这是个好主意吗?”
所以也许标准的期权交易需要稍作调整。也许期权应该被某种与收益更直接相关的东西取代。现在还为时过早。
- Startups
What made the options valuable, for the most part, is that they were options on the stock of startups. Startups were not of course a creation of the Bubble, but they were more visible during the Bubble than ever before.
One thing most people did learn about for the first time during the Bubble was the startup created with the intention of selling it. Originally a startup meant a small company that hoped to grow into a big one. But increasingly startups are evolving into a vehicle for developing technology on spec.
As I wrote in Hackers & Painters, employees seem to be most productive when they're paid in proportion to the wealth they generate. And the advantage of a startup—indeed, almost its raison d'etre—is that it offers something otherwise impossible to obtain: a way of measuring that.
In many businesses, it just makes more sense for companies to get technology by buying startups rather than developing it in house. You pay more, but there is less risk, and risk is what big companies don't want. It makes the guys developing the technology more accountable, because they only get paid if they build the winner. And you end up with better technology, created faster, because things are made in the innovative atmosphere of startups instead of the bureaucratic atmosphere of big companies.
Our startup, Viaweb, was built to be sold. We were open with investors about that from the start. And we were careful to create something that could slot easily into a larger company. That is the pattern for the future.
- 创业公司
让期权有价值的主要原因,是它们大多是创业公司的股票期权。创业公司当然不是泡沫的产物,但在泡沫期间它们比以往任何时候都更引人注目。
大多数人在泡沫期间第一次了解到的是,有些创业公司从创建之初就打算被出售。最初,创业公司是指希望成长为大公司的小公司。但创业公司越来越演变为一种按约定开发技术的工具。
正如我在《黑客与画家》中写到的,当员工的报酬与他们创造的财富成正比时,他们似乎最具生产力。而创业公司的优势——几乎是其存在的理由——在于它提供了其他方式无法获得的东西:衡量这一点的方法。
在许多业务中,公司通过收购创业公司而不是内部开发来获取技术更为合理。你付出更多,但风险更小,而风险是大公司不想要的。这让开发技术的人更负责任,因为他们只有造出赢家才能获得报酬。而且最终你会得到更好的技术,创建速度也更快,因为事情是在创业公司的创新氛围中完成的,而不是大公司的官僚氛围。
我们的创业公司Viaweb就是为了被出售而建的。我们从一开始就对投资者坦诚相告。而且我们非常注意创造一些能轻松融入大公司的东西。这就是未来的模式。
- California
The Bubble was a California phenomenon. When I showed up in Silicon Valley in 1998, I felt like an immigrant from Eastern Europe arriving in America in 1900. Everyone was so cheerful and healthy and rich. It seemed a new and improved world.
The press, ever eager to exaggerate small trends, now gives one the impression that Silicon Valley is a ghost town. Not at all. When I drive down 101 from the airport, I still feel a buzz of energy, as if there were a giant transformer nearby. Real estate is still more expensive than just about anywhere else in the country. The people still look healthy, and the weather is still fabulous. The future is there. (I say "there" because I moved back to the East Coast after Yahoo. I still wonder if this was a smart idea.)
What makes the Bay Area superior is the attitude of the people. I notice that when I come home to Boston. The first thing I see when I walk out of the airline terminal is the fat, grumpy guy in charge of the taxi line. I brace myself for rudeness: remember, you're back on the East Coast now.
The atmosphere varies from city to city, and fragile organisms like startups are exceedingly sensitive to such variation. If it hadn't already been hijacked as a new euphemism for liberal, the word to describe the atmosphere in the Bay Area would be "progressive." People there are trying to build the future. Boston has MIT and Harvard, but it also has a lot of truculent, unionized employees like the police who recently held the Democratic National Convention for ransom, and a lot of people trying to be Thurston Howell. Two sides of an obsolete coin.
Silicon Valley may not be the next Paris or London, but it is at least the next Chicago. For the next fifty years, that's where new wealth will come from.
- 加州
泡沫是加州的现象。当我1998年出现在硅谷时,我感觉就像1900年东欧移民到达美国一样。每个人都那么快乐、健康、富有。这似乎是一个全新的、更好的世界。
媒体总是急于夸大微小的趋势,现在给人们一种印象,认为硅谷是一座鬼城。完全不是。当我从机场沿着101公路开车时,我仍然感受到一股能量的嗡嗡声,仿佛附近有一个巨大的变压器。房地产仍然比全国其他任何地方都贵。人们看起来仍然健康,天气仍然极好。未来在那里。(我说“那里”,是因为我在雅虎之后搬回了东海岸。我仍然怀疑这是否是个明智的主意。)
湾区优越的地方在于人们的态度。当我回到波士顿时,我注意到这一点。我走出航站楼看到的第一件事,就是那个负责出租车线的胖乎乎、脾气暴躁的家伙。我做好了面对粗鲁的准备:记住,你现在回到东海岸了。
每个城市的气氛都不同,而创业公司这样脆弱的生物对这种变化极其敏感。如果“进步”这个词还没有被劫持为“自由派”的新委婉语,那么用来描述湾区气氛的词就是“进步”。那里的人们在努力建设未来。波士顿有麻省理工和哈佛,但也有很多好斗的、工会化的员工,比如最近挟持民主党全国代表大会的警察,以及很多试图成为瑟斯顿·豪厄尔的人。同一枚过时硬币的两面。
硅谷可能不会是下一个巴黎或伦敦,但至少是下一个芝加哥。未来五十年,新的财富将从那里产生。
- Productivity
During the Bubble, optimistic analysts used to justify high price to earnings ratios by saying that technology was going to increase productivity dramatically. They were wrong about the specific companies, but not so wrong about the underlying principle. I think one of the big trends we'll see in the coming century is a huge increase in productivity.
Or more precisely, a huge increase in variation in productivity. Technology is a lever. It doesn't add; it multiplies. If the present range of productivity is 0 to 100, introducing a multiple of 10 increases the range from 0 to 1000.
One upshot of which is that the companies of the future may be surprisingly small. I sometimes daydream about how big you could grow a company (in revenues) without ever having more than ten people. What would happen if you outsourced everything except product development? If you tried this experiment, I think you'd be surprised at how far you could get. As Fred Brooks pointed out, small groups are intrinsically more productive, because the internal friction in a group grows as the square of its size.
Till quite recently, running a major company meant managing an army of workers. Our standards about how many employees a company should have are still influenced by old patterns. Startups are perforce small, because they can't afford to hire a lot of people. But I think it's a big mistake for companies to loosen their belts as revenues increase. The question is not whether you can afford the extra salaries. Can you afford the loss in productivity that comes from making the company bigger?
The prospect of technological leverage will of course raise the specter of unemployment. I'm surprised people still worry about this. After centuries of supposedly job-killing innovations, the number of jobs is within ten percent of the number of people who want them. This can't be a coincidence. There must be some kind of balancing mechanism.
- 生产力
在泡沫期间,乐观的分析师常常以技术将大幅提高生产力为由,为高市盈率辩护。他们对具体公司判断错了,但对基本原则的判断并不离谱。我认为下个世纪我们将看到的重大趋势之一是生产力的巨大提升。
或者更准确地说,是生产力差异的巨大变化。技术是一个杠杆。它不是加法,而是乘法。如果当前生产力范围是0到100,引入10倍杠杆后,范围就变成了0到1000。
其结果之一是,未来的公司可能会小得惊人。我有时会白日梦:一家公司(在收入上)能做多大,同时始终不超过十个人?如果你把产品开发之外的所有事情都外包出去,会怎么样?如果你尝试这个实验,我想你会惊讶于你能走多远。正如弗雷德·布鲁克斯所指出的,小团队本质上更具生产力,因为团队内部摩擦随规模平方增长。
直到最近,经营一家大公司意味着管理一支工人大军。我们对公司应该有多少员工的标准仍然受旧模式影响。创业公司被迫保持小规模,因为它们雇不起很多人。但我认为,随着收入增加而放松腰带的公司犯了大错。问题不在于你是否负担得起额外的工资。你负担得起公司变大带来的生产力损失吗?
技术杠杆的前景当然会引发失业的幽灵。我很惊讶人们仍然担心这个。经过几个世纪所谓扼杀就业的创新之后,就业岗位数量仍然在求职人数上下百分之十的范围内徘徊。这不可能是巧合。一定有某种平衡机制。
What's New
When one looks over these trends, is there any overall theme? There does seem to be: that in the coming century, good ideas will count for more. That 26 year olds with good ideas will increasingly have an edge over 50 year olds with powerful connections. That doing good work will matter more than dressing up—or advertising, which is the same thing for companies. That people will be rewarded a bit more in proportion to the value of what they create.
If so, this is good news indeed. Good ideas always tend to win eventually. The problem is, it can take a very long time. It took decades for relativity to be accepted, and the greater part of a century to establish that central planning didn't work. So even a small increase in the rate at which good ideas win would be a momentous change—big enough, probably, to justify a name like the "new economy."
新在何处
回顾这些趋势,是否有任何总体主题?确实似乎有:在下个世纪,好主意将更受重视。有好的想法的26岁年轻人将越来越比有关系有背景的50岁老人有优势。做出好产品将比打扮——或者对公司而言是广告——更重要。人们的报酬将与他们创造的价值更成比例。
如果是这样,这确实是个好消息。好主意最终总是倾向于获胜。问题是,这可能需要很长时间。相对论花了几十年才被接受,而证明中央计划行不通用去了大半个世纪。所以,哪怕好主意获胜的速度稍微提升一点,都将是一个巨大的变化——可能大到足以证明“新经济”这样的名称是合理的。
Notes
[1] Actually it's hard to say now. As Jeremy Siegel points out, if the value of a stock is its future earnings, you can't tell if it was overvalued till you see what the earnings turn out to be. While certain famous Internet stocks were almost certainly overvalued in 1999, it is still hard to say for sure whether, e.g., the Nasdaq index was.
Siegel, Jeremy J. "What Is an Asset Price Bubble? An Operational Definition." European Financial Management, 9:1, 2003.
[2] The number of users comes from a 6/03 Nielsen study quoted on Google's site. (You'd think they'd have something more recent.) The revenue estimate is based on revenues of $1.35 billion for the first half of 2004, as reported in their IPO filing.
Thanks to Chris Anderson, Trevor Blackwell, Sarah Harlin, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.
注释
[1] 实际上现在也很难说。正如杰里米·西格尔指出的,如果股票的价值是其未来收益,那么只有看到收益结果后才能判断它是否被高估。虽然某些著名的互联网股票在1999年几乎肯定被高估,但很难确切判断例如纳斯达克指数是否被高估。
西格尔, 杰里米·J. “什么是资产价格泡沫?一个操作性定义。” 《欧洲金融管理》,9:1, 2003.
[2] 用户数量来自2003年6月尼尔森的一项研究,引用在谷歌网站上。(你会认为他们会有更新的数据。)收入估算基于他们IPO文件中报告的2004年上半年13.5亿美元的收入。
感谢克里斯·安德森、特雷弗·布莱克威尔、莎拉·哈林、杰西卡·利文斯顿和罗伯特·莫里斯阅读本文的草稿。