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Why Startups Condense in America

Source www.paulgraham.com Glean’d 2026-07-07 16:15 Read 28 min
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In this classic 2006 essay, Paul Graham examines why startups concentrate in America, particularly Silicon Valley. He lists ten advantages: immigration that welcomes talent, the country's wealth, political freedom (not a police state), superior universities, flexible labor laws, a cultural separation between work and employment, tolerance of marginal business practices, a large domestic market, abundant venture capital (especially angel investors), and a dynamic career system that allows late decisions. He also suggests how other nations could outperform the US, such as lower capital gains tax and smarter immigration policies. While dated, the analysis remains insightful for understanding startup ecosystems.

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§ 1

Why Startups Condense in America

Why Startups Condense in America

§ 2

May 2006 (This essay is derived from a keynote at Xtech.)

Startups happen in clusters. There are a lot of them in Silicon Valley and Boston, and few in Chicago or Miami. A country that wants startups will probably also have to reproduce whatever makes these clusters form.

I've claimed that the recipe is a great university near a town smart people like. If you set up those conditions within the US, startups will form as inevitably as water droplets condense on a cold piece of metal. But when I consider what it would take to reproduce Silicon Valley in another country, it's clear the US is a particularly humid environment. Startups condense more easily here.

It is by no means a lost cause to try to create a silicon valley in another country. There's room not merely to equal Silicon Valley, but to surpass it. But if you want to do that, you have to understand the advantages startups get from being in America.

2006年5月 (本文源自 Xtech 的主题演讲。)

创业公司呈集群分布。硅谷和波士顿聚集了大量创业公司,而芝加哥或迈阿密却寥寥无几。一个想要发展创业公司的国家,很可能也需要复制这些集群形成的原因。

我此前曾提出,秘诀在于一所顶尖大学靠近一个聪明人喜欢居住的小镇。在美国境内营造这些条件,创业公司就会像水珠在冷金属上凝结一样必然形成。但当我思考在另一个国家复制硅谷需要什么时,我发现美国的环境尤其湿润——创业公司在这里更容易凝结。

在其他国家创建硅谷绝非不可能。不仅有与美国硅谷并驾齐驱的空间,甚至可以超越它。但要想做到这一点,就必须理解创业公司在美国所拥有的优势。

§ 3
  1. The US Allows Immigration.

For example, I doubt it would be possible to reproduce Silicon Valley in Japan, because one of Silicon Valley's most distinctive features is immigration. Half the people there speak with accents. And the Japanese don't like immigration. When they think about how to make a Japanese silicon valley, I suspect they unconsciously frame it as how to make one consisting only of Japanese people. This way of framing the question probably guarantees failure.

A silicon valley has to be a mecca for the smart and the ambitious, and you can't have a mecca if you don't let people into it.

Of course, it's not saying much that America is more open to immigration than Japan. Immigration policy is one area where a competitor could do better.

  1. 美国允许移民。

例如,我怀疑在日本复制硅谷是不可能的,因为硅谷最显著的特征之一就是移民。那里一半的人说话都带有口音。而日本人不喜欢移民。当他们在思考如何打造一个日本硅谷时,我怀疑他们潜意识里把它框定为如何打造一个只由日本人组成的硅谷。这种提问方式很可能注定失败。

硅谷必须成为聪明而有抱负之人的圣地,但如果你不允许人们进入,就无法拥有圣地。

当然,美国比日本更开放移民,这并不值得夸耀。移民政策恰恰是一个竞争对手能做得更好的领域。

§ 4
  1. The US Is a Rich Country.

I could see India one day producing a rival to Silicon Valley. Obviously they have the right people: you can tell that by the number of Indians in the current Silicon Valley. The problem with India itself is that it's still so poor.

In poor countries, things we take for granted are missing. A friend of mine visiting India sprained her ankle falling down the steps in a railway station. When she turned to see what had happened, she found the steps were all different heights. In industrialized countries we walk down steps our whole lives and never think about this, because there's an infrastructure that prevents such a staircase from being built.

The US has never been so poor as some countries are now. There have never been swarms of beggars in the streets of American cities. So we have no data about what it takes to get from the swarms-of-beggars stage to the silicon-valley stage. Could you have both at once, or does there have to be some baseline prosperity before you get a silicon valley?

I suspect there is some speed limit to the evolution of an economy. Economies are made out of people, and attitudes can only change a certain amount per generation.

[1] On the verge of the Industrial Revolution, England was already the richest country in the world. As far as such things can be compared, per capita income in England in 1750 was higher than India's in 1960. Deane, Phyllis, The First Industrial Revolution, Cambridge University Press, 1965.

  1. 美国是富裕国家。

我可以预见印度有一天能成为硅谷的对手。显然他们拥有合适的人才:从当前硅谷中印度人的数量就能看出。印度自身的问题是它仍然非常贫穷。

在贫穷国家,我们认为理所当然的东西都不存在。我的一位朋友访问印度时,在火车站台阶上摔倒扭伤了脚踝。当她回头看发生了什么时,发现台阶高度不一。在工业化国家,我们一辈子走台阶从没想过这个问题,因为有基础设施防止建造这样的楼梯。

美国从未像现在一些国家那样贫穷过。美国城市街头从未出现过成群结队的乞丐。因此,我们缺乏关于如何从乞丐成群阶段过渡到硅谷阶段的数据。你能同时拥有两者吗?还是必须先达到一定的繁荣基准才能出现硅谷?

我怀疑经济的发展存在某种速度限制。经济由人构成,而每一代人的观念只能改变到一定程度。

[1] 工业革命前夕,英国已经是世界上最富裕的国家。就可比范围而言,1750 年英国的人均收入高于 1960 年的印度。Deane, Phyllis,《第一次工业革命》,剑桥大学出版社,1965 年。

§ 5
  1. The US Is Not (Yet) a Police State.

Another country I could see wanting to have a silicon valley is China. But I doubt they could do it yet either. China still seems to be a police state, and although present rulers seem enlightened compared to the last, even enlightened despotism can probably only get you part way toward being a great economic power.

It can get you factories for building things designed elsewhere. Can it get you the designers, though? Can imagination flourish where people can't criticize the government? Imagination means having odd ideas, and it's hard to have odd ideas about technology without also having odd ideas about politics. And in any case, many technical ideas do have political implications. So if you squash dissent, the back pressure will propagate into technical fields.

Singapore would face a similar problem. Singapore seems very aware of the importance of encouraging startups. But while energetic government intervention may be able to make a port run efficiently, it can't coax startups into existence. A state that bans chewing gum has a long way to go before it could create a San Francisco.

Do you need a San Francisco? Might there not be an alternate route to innovation that goes through obedience and cooperation instead of individualism? Possibly, but I'd bet not. Most imaginative people seem to share a certain prickly independence, whenever and wherever they lived. You see it in Diogenes telling Alexander to get out of his light and two thousand years later in Feynman breaking into safes at Los Alamos.

Imaginative people don't want to follow or lead. They're most productive when everyone gets to do what they want.

Ironically, of all rich countries the US has lost the most civil liberties recently. But I'm not too worried yet. I'm hoping once the present administration is out, the natural openness of American culture will reassert itself.

[2] This has already happened once in China, during the Ming Dynasty, when the country turned its back on industrialization at the command of the court. One of Europe's advantages was that it had no government powerful enough to do that.

[3] Of course, Feynman and Diogenes were from adjacent traditions, but Confucius, though more polite, was no more willing to be told what to think.

  1. 美国不是(尚未)警察国家。

另一个我预见可能想要拥有硅谷的国家是中国。但我怀疑他们也还做不到。中国看起来仍然是一个警察国家,尽管当下的统治者与过去相比似乎较开明,但即便是开明的专制也只能让你在成为经济强国的路上走一段距离。

它可以让你拥有为其他地方设计的产品建造工厂。但能让你拥有设计师吗?在人们不能批评政府的地方,想象力能蓬勃发展吗?想象力意味着有古怪的想法,而在技术问题上产生古怪的想法,很难不涉及政治上的古怪想法。而且,许多技术思想确实具有政治含义。所以如果你压制异议,反压就会蔓延到技术领域。

新加坡将面临类似的问题。新加坡似乎非常清楚鼓励创业公司的重要性。但是,尽管积极的政府干预或许能让港口高效运转,却无法催生创业公司。一个禁止咀嚼口香糖的国家,离创造一个旧金山还有很长的路要走。

你需要一个旧金山吗?难道不存在一条通过服从与合作而非个人主义实现创新的替代路径吗?可能吧,但我赌没有。大多数富有想象力的人,无论何时何地,似乎都共享一种尖刻的独立性。你在第欧根尼让亚历山大大帝别挡他的阳光中看到了这一点,两千年后又在费曼撬开洛斯阿拉莫斯的保险柜中看到了这一点。

富有想象力的人不想追随或领导。当每个人都能做自己想做的事时,他们最富创造力。

讽刺的是,在所有富裕国家中,美国最近失去了最多的公民自由。但我还不太担心。我希望一旦现政府下台,美国文化天生的开放性能重新彰显。

[2] 这在中国明朝已经发生过一次,当时朝廷命令国家背弃工业化。欧洲的优势之一是没有足够强大的政府能做到这一点。

[3] 当然,费曼和第欧根尼来自邻近的传统,但孔子虽然更有礼貌,也同样不愿被别人告诉该想什么。

§ 6
  1. American Universities Are Better.

You need a great university to seed a silicon valley, and so far there are few outside the US. I asked a handful of American computer science professors which universities in Europe were most admired, and they all basically said "Cambridge" followed by a long pause while they tried to think of others. There don't seem to be many universities elsewhere that compare with the best in America, at least in technology.

In some countries this is the result of a deliberate policy. The German and Dutch governments, perhaps from fear of elitism, try to ensure that all universities are roughly equal in quality. The downside is that none are especially good. The best professors are spread out, instead of being concentrated as they are in the US. This probably makes them less productive, because they don't have good colleagues to inspire them. It also means no one university will be good enough to act as a mecca, attracting talent from abroad and causing startups to form around it.

The case of Germany is a strange one. The Germans invented the modern university, and up till the 1930s theirs were the best in the world. Now they have none that stand out. As I was mulling this over, I found myself thinking: "I can understand why German universities declined in the 1930s, after they excluded Jews. But surely they should have bounced back by now." Then I realized: maybe not. There are few Jews left in Germany and most Jews I know would not want to move there. And if you took any great American university and removed the Jews, you'd have some pretty big gaps. So maybe it would be a lost cause trying to create a silicon valley in Germany, because you couldn't establish the level of university you'd need as a seed.

It's natural for US universities to compete with one another because so many are private. To reproduce the quality of American universities you probably also have to reproduce this. If universities are controlled by the central government, log-rolling will pull them all toward the mean: the new Institute of X will end up at the university in the district of a powerful politician, instead of where it should be.

[4] For similar reasons it might be a lost cause to try to establish a silicon valley in Israel. Instead of no Jews moving there, only Jews would move there, and I don't think you could build a silicon valley out of just Jews any more than you could out of just Japanese. (This is not a remark about the qualities of these groups, just their sizes. Japanese are only about 2% of the world population, and Jews about .2%.)

  1. 美国大学更优秀。

你需要一所伟大的大学来播下硅谷的种子,而目前美国以外这样的大学寥寥无几。我问了几位美国计算机科学教授,欧洲哪些大学最受推崇,他们基本上都说“剑桥”,然后停顿很久想还有没有其他的。其他地方似乎没有多少大学能与美国最好的大学媲美,至少在技术领域如此。

在一些国家,这是刻意政策的结果。德国和荷兰政府或许是出于对精英主义的恐惧,试图确保所有大学的质量大致相等。但缺点是没有任何一所特别出色。最好的教授被分散各处,而不是像美国那样集中。这可能降低了他们的生产力,因为他们没有优秀的同事来激励自己。这也意味着没有一所大学能好到足以成为圣地,吸引海外人才并催生周围的创业公司。

德国的情况很奇怪。德国人发明了现代大学,直到 20 世纪 30 年代,他们的大学仍是世界上最优秀的。如今却没有一所突出。当我思考这个问题时,我发现自己想:“我能理解为什么德国大学在 20 世纪 30 年代排挤犹太人后衰落了。但到现在,它们肯定已经恢复过来了吧。”然后我意识到:也许没有。德国几乎没剩下多少犹太人,而且我认识的多数犹太人也不愿搬到那里。如果你从任何一所伟大的美国大学中移除犹太人,都会留下相当大的空缺。所以,试图在德国创建硅谷或许注定失败,因为你无法建立起所需的大学水平作为种子。

美国大学之间相互竞争是很自然的,因为很多是私立大学。要复制美国大学的质量,很可能也需要复制这一点。如果大学由中央政府控制,利益交换会把它们都拉向平均水平:新的X研究所最终会落在一名权势政治人物所在地区的大学,而不是它应该在的地方。

[4] 出于类似原因,试图在以色列建立硅谷也可能徒劳。不是没有犹太人搬到那里,而是只有犹太人会搬到那里。我认为仅仅靠犹太人无法建成硅谷,就像仅仅靠日本人也不行一样。(这不是对这些族群的品质的评价,只是规模问题。日本人大约占世界人口的 2%,犹太人约占 0.2%。)

§ 7
  1. You Can Fire People in America.

I think one of the biggest obstacles to creating startups in Europe is the attitude toward employment. The famously rigid labor laws hurt every company, but startups especially, because startups have the least time to spare for bureaucratic hassles.

The difficulty of firing people is a particular problem for startups because they have no redundancy. Every person has to do their job well.

But the problem is more than just that some startup might have a problem firing someone they needed to. Across industries and countries, there's a strong inverse correlation between performance and job security. Actors and directors are fired at the end of each film, so they have to deliver every time. Junior professors are fired by default after a few years unless the university chooses to grant them tenure. Professional athletes know they'll be pulled if they play badly for just a couple games. At the other end of the scale (at least in the US) are auto workers, New York City schoolteachers, and civil servants, who are all nearly impossible to fire. The trend is so clear that you'd have to be willfully blind not to see it.

Performance isn't everything, you say? Well, are auto workers, schoolteachers, and civil servants happier than actors, professors, and professional athletes?

European public opinion will apparently tolerate people being fired in industries where they really care about performance. Unfortunately the only industry they care enough about so far is soccer. But that is at least a precedent.

  1. 在美国可以解雇员工。

我认为在欧洲创建创业公司的最大障碍之一是对就业的态度。著名的僵化劳动法伤害了所有公司,但创业公司尤其严重,因为创业公司最没有时间应付官僚麻烦。

解雇人的困难对创业公司是个特殊问题,因为它们没有冗余。每个人都必须把工作做好。

但问题不仅仅是某家创业公司可能难以解雇一个不需要的人。跨行业和国家来看,绩效与工作安全感之间存在强烈的负相关。演员和导演每部电影结束后都被解雇,所以他们每次都必须交出好成绩。初级教授几年后通常会被解雇,除非大学授予他们终身教职。职业运动员知道如果连打几场差劲比赛就会被换下。而在另一端(至少在美国)是汽车工人、纽约市教师和公务员,他们几乎不可能被解雇。趋势如此明显,只有故意视而不见才会看不到。

你会说,绩效不是一切吧?那么,汽车工人、教师和公务员比演员、教授和职业运动员更快乐吗?

欧洲的公众舆论显然能容忍在他们真正关心绩效的行业中解雇人。不幸的是,到目前为止,他们足够关心的行业只有足球。但这至少是一个先例。

§ 8
  1. In America Work Is Less Identified with Employment.

The problem in more traditional places like Europe and Japan goes deeper than the employment laws. More dangerous is the attitude they reflect: that an employee is a kind of servant, whom the employer has a duty to protect. It used to be that way in America too. In 1970 you were still supposed to get a job with a big company, for whom ideally you'd work your whole career. In return the company would take care of you: they'd try not to fire you, cover your medical expenses, and support you in old age.

Gradually employment has been shedding such paternalistic overtones and becoming simply an economic exchange. But the importance of the new model is not just that it makes it easier for startups to grow. More important, I think, is that it makes it easier for people to start startups.

Even in the US most kids graduating from college still think they're supposed to get jobs, as if you couldn't be productive without being someone's employee. But the less you identify work with employment, the easier it becomes to start a startup. When you see your career as a series of different types of work, instead of a lifetime's service to a single employer, there's less risk in starting your own company, because you're only replacing one segment instead of discarding the whole thing.

The old ideas are so powerful that even the most successful startup founders have had to struggle against them. A year after the founding of Apple, Steve Wozniak still hadn't quit HP. He still planned to work there for life. And when Jobs found someone to give Apple serious venture funding, on the condition that Woz quit, he initially refused, arguing that he'd designed both the Apple I and the Apple II while working at HP, and there was no reason he couldn't continue.

  1. 在美国,工作与雇佣关系更松散。

在欧洲和日本等更传统的地方,问题比劳动法更深层。更危险的是它们所反映的态度:员工是一种仆人,雇主有责任保护他们。美国曾经也是这样。1970 年,你仍然应该去一家大公司工作,最好在那里度过整个职业生涯。作为回报,公司会照顾你:他们尽量不解雇你,承担你的医疗费用,并在你年老时提供支持。

逐渐地,雇佣关系已经褪去这种家长式色彩,变成了简单的经济交换。但新模式的重要性不仅在于它让创业公司更容易成长。我认为更重要的是,它让人们更容易创办创业公司。

即使在美国,大多数大学毕业生仍然认为自己应该找工作,好像不成为别人的员工就无法产出。但你对工作与雇佣关系的认同越弱,创办创业公司就越容易。当你的职业生涯被看作一系列不同类型的工作,而不是对单一雇主的终身服务时,创办自己的公司风险更小,因为你只是替换了一个片段,而不是抛弃整个东西。

旧观念如此强大,以至于最成功的创业公司创始人也曾与之抗争。苹果成立一年后,史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克仍未从惠普离职。他仍计划在那里工作一辈子。当乔布斯找到人为苹果提供可观的风险投资,条件是沃兹离开时,他起初拒绝了,辩称自己在惠普工作时设计了 Apple I 和 Apple II,没有理由不能继续。

§ 9
  1. America Is Not Too Fussy.

If there are any laws regulating businesses, you can assume larval startups will break most of them, because they don't know what the laws are and don't have time to find out.

For example, many startups in America begin in places where it's not really legal to run a business. Hewlett-Packard, Apple, and Google were all run out of garages. Many more startups, including ours, were initially run out of apartments. If the laws against such things were actually enforced, most startups wouldn't happen.

That could be a problem in fussier countries. If Hewlett and Packard tried running an electronics company out of their garage in Switzerland, the old lady next door would report them to the municipal authorities.

But the worst problem in other countries is probably the effort required just to start a company. A friend of mine started a company in Germany in the early 90s, and was shocked to discover, among many other regulations, that you needed $20,000 in capital to incorporate. That's one reason I'm not typing this on an Apfel laptop. Jobs and Wozniak couldn't have come up with that kind of money in a company financed by selling a VW bus and an HP calculator. We couldn't have started Viaweb either.

[5] According to the World Bank, the initial capital requirement for German companies is 47.6% of the per capita income. Doh. World Bank, Doing Business in 2006, http://doingbusiness.org

  1. 美国不会过分挑剔。

如果有任何法律监管企业,你可以假设初创公司将违反其中大多数,因为他们不知道有哪些法律,也没有时间去了解。

例如,美国的许多创业公司都在并不真正合法经营的地方起步。惠普、苹果和谷歌都是从车库起家的。还有更多创业公司,包括我们的,最初是在公寓里运营的。如果针对此类行为的法律真的被严格执行,大多数创业公司就不会发生。

在更挑剔的国家,这可能是个问题。如果休利特和帕卡德试图在瑞士的车库里经营一家电子公司,隔壁的老太太会向市政当局举报。

但其他国家最严重的问题可能只是创办公司所需付出的努力。我的一位朋友在 90 年代初在德国创办了一家公司,并震惊地发现,在众多其他法规中,你需要 2 万美元的资本才能注册公司。这就是为什么我不是在用 Apfel 笔记本电脑打字的原因。乔布斯和沃兹尼亚克在一家靠卖大众巴士和惠普计算器融资的公司里根本拿不出这么多钱。我们也无法创办 Viaweb。

[5] 据世界银行称,德国公司的初始资本要求为人均收入的 47.6%。得。世界银行,《2006 年营商环境报告》,http://doingbusiness.org

§ 10
  1. America Has a Large Domestic Market.

What sustains a startup in the beginning is the prospect of getting their initial product out. The successful ones therefore make the first version as simple as possible. In the US they usually begin by making something just for the local market.

This works in America, because the local market is 300 million people. It wouldn't work so well in Sweden. In a small country, a startup has a harder task: they have to sell internationally from the start.

The EU was designed partly to simulate a single, large domestic market. The problem is that the inhabitants still speak many different languages. So a software startup in Sweden is still at a disadvantage relative to one in the US, because they have to deal with internationalization from the beginning. It's significant that the most famous recent startup in Europe, Skype, worked on a problem that was intrinsically international.

However, for better or worse it looks as if Europe will in a few decades speak a single language. When I was a student in Italy in 1990, few Italians spoke English. Now all educated people seem to be expected to-- and Europeans do not like to seem uneducated. This is presumably a taboo subject, but if present trends continue, French and German will eventually go the way of Irish and Luxembourgish: they'll be spoken in homes and by eccentric nationalists.

  1. 美国拥有巨大的国内市场。

创业公司在初期赖以生存的是推出最初产品的前景。因此,成功的创业公司尽可能简化第一个版本。在美国,他们通常先从只面向本地市场的产品做起。

这在美国行得通,因为本地市场有 3 亿人。在瑞典就行不通了。在一个小国家,创业公司的任务更艰巨:他们必须从一开始就进行国际销售。

欧盟的部分设计意图就是模拟一个单一的、庞大的国内市场。问题是居民仍然讲多种不同的语言。因此,瑞典的软件创业公司相对于美国仍然处于劣势,因为他们从一开始就必须处理国际化问题。值得注意的是,欧洲最近最著名的创业公司 Skype,解决的正是本质上国际化的问题。

然而,无论好坏,看起来几十年后欧洲将讲同一种语言。1990 年我在意大利留学时,很少意大利人会说英语。现在,似乎所有受过教育的人都应该会——而欧洲人不喜欢显得没受过教育。这大概是一个禁忌话题,但如果当前趋势继续下去,法语和德语最终将像爱尔兰语和卢森堡语一样:在家里和古怪的民族主义者口中使用。

§ 11
  1. America Has Venture Funding.

Startups are easier to start in America because funding is easier to get. There are now a few VC firms outside the US, but startup funding doesn't only come from VC firms. A more important source, because it's more personal and comes earlier in the process, is money from individual angel investors. Google might never have got to the point where they could raise millions from VC funds if they hadn't first raised a hundred thousand from Andy Bechtolsheim. And he could help them because he was one of the founders of Sun. This pattern is repeated constantly in startup hubs. It's this pattern that makes them startup hubs.

The good news is, all you have to do to get the process rolling is get those first few startups successfully launched. If they stick around after they get rich, startup founders will almost automatically fund and encourage new startups.

The bad news is that the cycle is slow. It probably takes five years, on average, before a startup founder can make angel investments. And while governments might be able to set up local VC funds by supplying the money themselves and recruiting people from existing firms to run them, only organic growth can produce angel investors.

Incidentally, America's private universities are one reason there's so much venture capital. A lot of the money in VC funds comes from their endowments. So another advantage of private universities is that a good chunk of the country's wealth is managed by enlightened investors.

  1. 美国拥有风险投资。

在美国创办创业公司更容易,因为融资更容易。现在美国之外也有少数风投公司,但创业公司的资金并不只来自风投公司。一个更重要的来源,因为更个人化且出现得更早,是来自个人天使投资人的资金。谷歌可能永远不会达到能从风投基金筹集数百万美元的地步,如果他们最初没有从安迪·贝托尔斯海姆那里筹集到十万美元的话。而他能够帮助他们,因为他是 Sun 公司的创始人之一。这种模式在创业中心不断重复。正是这种模式让它们成为创业中心。

好消息是,要让这个过程运转起来,你只需要让最初的几家创业公司成功启动。如果他们致富后留下来,创业公司的创始人几乎会自动资助和鼓励新的创业公司。

坏消息是,这个周期很慢。平均可能需要五年时间,创业公司的创始人才能进行天使投资。虽然政府或许可以通过自己提供资金并从现有公司招募人员来管理,设立本地风投基金,但只有有机增长才能产生天使投资人。

顺便提一句,美国的私立大学是风险投资如此之多的原因之一。风投基金中有大量资金来自它们的捐赠基金。因此,私立大学的另一个优势是国家财富的相当一部分由开明的投资者管理。

§ 12
  1. America Has Dynamic Typing for Careers.

Compared to other industrialized countries the US is disorganized about routing people into careers. For example, in America people often don't decide to go to medical school till they've finished college. In Europe they generally decide in high school.

The European approach reflects the old idea that each person has a single, definite occupation-- which is not far from the idea that each person has a natural "station" in life. If this were true, the most efficient plan would be to discover each person's station as early as possible, so they could receive the training appropriate to it.

In the US things are more haphazard. But that turns out to be an advantage as an economy gets more liquid, just as dynamic typing turns out to work better than static for ill-defined problems. This is particularly true with startups. "Startup founder" is not the sort of career a high school student would choose. If you ask at that age, people will choose conservatively. They'll choose well-understood occupations like engineer, or doctor, or lawyer.

Startups are the kind of thing people don't plan, so you're more likely to get them in a society where it's ok to make career decisions on the fly.

For example, in theory the purpose of a PhD program is to train you to do research. But fortunately in the US this is another rule that isn't very strictly enforced. In the US most people in CS PhD programs are there simply because they wanted to learn more. They haven't decided what they'll do afterward. So American grad schools spawn a lot of startups, because students don't feel they're failing if they don't go into research.

Those worried about America's "competitiveness" often suggest spending more on public schools. But perhaps America's lousy public schools have a hidden advantage. Because they're so bad, the kids adopt an attitude of waiting for college. I did; I knew I was learning so little that I wasn't even learning what the choices were, let alone which to choose. This is demoralizing, but it does at least make you keep an open mind.

Certainly if I had to choose between bad high schools and good universities, like the US, and good high schools and bad universities, like most other industrialized countries, I'd take the US system. Better to make everyone feel like a late bloomer than a failed child prodigy.

  1. 美国拥有动态的职业规划。

与其他工业化国家相比,美国在引导人们进入职业方面缺乏条理。例如,在美国,人们通常直到大学毕业才决定是否上医学院。而在欧洲,他们通常在高中就决定了。

欧洲的做法反映了旧观念,即每个人都有一个单一的、确定的职业——这离每个人在生活中有自然的“位置”的想法不远了。如果这是真的,最有效的计划就是尽早发现每个人的位置,这样他们就能接受适合的培训。

在美国,事情更加随意。但事实证明,随着经济变得更加流动,这反而是一个优势,就像动态类型对于定义不明确的问题比静态类型效果更好一样。这对创业公司尤其如此。"创业公司创始人"不是高中生会选择的职业。在那个年龄问他们,人们会选择保守的职业。他们会选择工程师、医生或律师这样众所周知的职业。

创业公司是人们不会计划的事情,所以在允许临时做职业决定的社会中,你更有可能得到它们。

例如,理论上博士项目的目的是训练你做研究。但幸运的是,在美国,这是另一条没有被严格执行的规则。在美国,大多数计算机博士项目的人只是因为想学更多东西。他们还没决定之后做什么。所以美国的研究生院催生了很多创业公司,因为学生不觉得如果不做研究就是失败。

那些担心美国“竞争力”的人常常建议在公立学校上投入更多。但也许美国糟糕的公立学校有隐藏的优势。因为它们太差了,孩子们养成了等待上大学的心态。我就是这样;我知道自己学得那么少,以至于我甚至没有了解到有什么选择,更不用说选择哪个了。这令人沮丧,但至少让你保持开放的心态。

当然,如果我必须在糟糕的高中和好的大学(如美国)与好的高中和糟糕的大学(如其他大多数工业化国家)之间选择,我会选择美国的体系。让每个人都觉得自己是大器晚成,总好过让所有人都觉得自己是失败的少年天才。

§ 13

Attitudes

There's one item conspicuously missing from this list: American attitudes. Americans are said to be more entrepreneurial, and less afraid of risk. But America has no monopoly on this. Indians and Chinese seem plenty entrepreneurial, perhaps more than Americans.

Some say Europeans are less energetic, but I don't believe it. I think the problem with Europe is not that they lack balls, but that they lack examples.

Even in the US, the most successful startup founders are often technical people who are quite timid, initially, about the idea of starting their own company. Few are the sort of backslapping extroverts one thinks of as typically American. They can usually only summon up the activation energy to start a startup when they meet people who've done it and realize they could too.

I think what holds back European hackers is simply that they don't meet so many people who've done it. You see that variation even within the US. Stanford students are more entrepreneurial than Yale students, but not because of some difference in their characters; the Yale students just have fewer examples.

I admit there seem to be different attitudes toward ambition in Europe and the US. In the US it's ok to be overtly ambitious, and in most of Europe it's not. But this can't be an intrinsically European quality; previous generations of Europeans were as ambitious as Americans. What happened? My hypothesis is that ambition was discredited by the terrible things ambitious people did in the first half of the twentieth century. Now swagger is out. (Even now the image of a very ambitious German presses a button or two, doesn't it?)

It would be surprising if European attitudes weren't affected by the disasters of the twentieth century. It takes a while to be optimistic after events like that. But ambition is human nature. Gradually it will re-emerge.

[6] For most of the twentieth century, Europeans looked back on the summer of 1914 as if they'd been living in a dream world. It seems more accurate (or at least, as accurate) to call the years after 1914 a nightmare than to call those before a dream. A lot of the optimism Europeans consider distinctly American is simply what they too were feeling in 1914.

态度

这个列表中明显缺少一项:美国人的态度。据说美国人更具创业精神,更不怕冒险。但美国并非独有。印度人和中国人似乎也很有创业精神,甚至可能超过美国人。

有人说欧洲人精力不那么旺盛,但我不信。我认为欧洲的问题不是缺乏胆量,而是缺乏榜样。

即使在美国,最成功的创业公司创始人往往也是技术人员,最初对创办自己的公司相当胆怯。很少有人是那种典型的美国式拍背寒暄的外向者。他们通常只有在遇到已经创办过公司的人,并意识到自己也能做到时,才能聚集起启动创业公司的能量。

我认为阻碍欧洲黑客的只是他们没有遇到那么多已经这样做过的人。即使在美国国内,你也能看到这种差异。斯坦福的学生比耶鲁的学生更具创业精神,但这并非因为他们性格不同;耶鲁的学生只是榜样更少。

我承认欧洲和美国对抱负的态度似乎不同。在美国,公开表达抱负是可以的,而在欧洲大部分地区则不然。但这不可能是欧洲人的内在品质;前几代欧洲人和美国人一样有抱负。发生了什么?我的假设是,二十世纪上半叶有抱负的人做了可怕的事情,使得抱负名声扫地。现在趾高气扬已经过时了。(即使现在,一个非常有抱负的德国人的形象也会触动一两根神经,不是吗?)

如果欧洲人的态度没有受到二十世纪灾难的影响,那才奇怪。经历了那样的事件之后,要恢复乐观需要一段时间。但抱负是人的天性。它会逐渐重新浮现。

[6] 在二十世纪的大部分时间里,欧洲人回顾 1914 年的夏天时,仿佛那时他们生活在一个梦幻世界。将 1914 年之后的岁月称为噩梦,似乎比将之前称为梦想更准确(至少同样准确)。欧洲人认为典型的美国乐观主义,很大一部分正是他们自己在 1914 年也能感受到的。

§ 14

How To Do Better

I don't mean to suggest by this list that America is the perfect place for startups. It's the best place so far, but the sample size is small, and "so far" is not very long. On historical time scales, what we have now is just a prototype.

So let's look at Silicon Valley the way you'd look at a product made by a competitor. What weaknesses could you exploit? How could you make something users would like better? The users in this case are those critical few thousand people you'd like to move to your silicon valley.

To start with, Silicon Valley is too far from San Francisco. Palo Alto, the original ground zero, is about thirty miles away, and the present center more like forty. So people who come to work in Silicon Valley face an unpleasant choice: either live in the boring sprawl of the valley proper, or live in San Francisco and endure an hour commute each way.

The best thing would be if the silicon valley were not merely closer to the interesting city, but interesting itself. And there is a lot of room for improvement here. Palo Alto is not so bad, but everything built since is the worst sort of strip development. You can measure how demoralizing it is by the number of people who will sacrifice two hours a day commuting rather than live there.

Another area in which you could easily surpass Silicon Valley is public transportation. There is a train running the length of it, and by American standards it's not bad. Which is to say that to Japanese or Europeans it would seem like something out of the third world.

The kind of people you want to attract to your silicon valley like to get around by train, bicycle, and on foot. So if you want to beat America, design a town that puts cars last. It will be a while before any American city can bring itself to do that.

如何做得更好

我并不是说这个列表表明美国是创业公司的完美之地。它是目前最好的地方,但样本量很小,而且“目前”并不很长。从历史尺度来看,我们现在所拥有的只是一个原型。

因此,让我们像看待竞争对手的产品一样看待硅谷。你能利用哪些弱点?如何做出用户更喜欢的东西?这里的用户是你希望吸引到你的硅谷的那关键的几千人。

首先,硅谷离旧金山太远。最初的中心帕洛阿尔托大约三十英里远,现在的中心更接近四十英里。因此,来硅谷工作的人面临一个不愉快的选择:要么住在山谷本身枯燥的蔓延地带,要么住在旧金山,忍受单程一小时的通勤。

最好的情况是,硅谷不仅离有趣的城市更近,而且本身也很有趣。这里有相当大的改进空间。帕洛阿尔托还不错,但之后建造的一切都是最糟糕的带状开发。你可以通过多少人宁愿牺牲每天两小时通勤也不愿住在那里,来衡量它有多令人沮丧。

另一个你能轻易超越硅谷的领域是公共交通。有一条火车贯穿硅谷,按美国标准算不错。但这对日本人或欧洲人来说,就像第三世界的东西。

你想吸引到你的硅谷的那类人喜欢乘火车、自行车和步行出行。所以如果你想打败美国,就设计一个把汽车放在最后的小镇。任何美国城市要下定决心做到这一点,都还需要一段时间。

§ 15

Capital Gains

There are also a couple things you could do to beat America at the national level. One would be to have lower capital gains taxes. It doesn't seem critical to have the lowest income taxes, because to take advantage of those, people have to move.

But if capital gains rates vary, you move assets, not yourself, so changes are reflected at market speeds. The lower the rate, the cheaper it is to buy stock in growing companies as opposed to real estate, or bonds, or stocks bought for the dividends they pay.

So if you want to encourage startups you should have a low rate on capital gains. Politicians are caught between a rock and a hard place here, however: make the capital gains rate low and be accused of creating "tax breaks for the rich," or make it high and starve growing companies of investment capital. As Galbraith said, politics is a matter of choosing between the unpalatable and the disastrous. A lot of governments experimented with the disastrous in the twentieth century; now the trend seems to be toward the merely unpalatable.

Oddly enough, the leaders now are European countries like Belgium, which has a capital gains tax rate of zero.

[7] The point where things start to go wrong seems to be about 50%. Above that people get serious about tax avoidance. The reason is that the payoff for avoiding tax grows hyperexponentially (x/1-x for 0 < x < 1). If your income tax rate is 10%, moving to Monaco would only give you 11% more income, which wouldn't even cover the extra cost. If it's 90%, you'd get ten times as much income. And at 98%, as it was briefly in Britain in the 70s, moving to Monaco would give you fifty times as much income. It seems quite likely that European governments of the 70s never drew this curve.

资本利得

还有几件事可以在国家层面击败美国。其中之一是降低资本利得税。收入税最低似乎并不关键,因为要利用这些,人们必须迁移。

但如果资本利得税率不同,你转移的是资产而不是自己,因此变化会以市场速度反映出来。税率越低,购买成长型公司股票相对于房地产、债券或分红股票的成本就越低。

因此,如果你想鼓励创业公司,就应该设定较低的资本利得税率。然而,政治家们进退两难:降低资本利得税率会被指责为“为富人减税”,提高税率则会饿死成长型公司的投资资本。正如加尔布雷思所说,政治就是在难以下咽和灾难性之间做选择。许多政府在二十世纪尝试了灾难性的选择;现在趋势似乎转向了仅仅是难以下咽。

奇怪的是,现在的领先者是欧洲国家,比如比利时,其资本利得税率为零。

[7] 开始出问题的地方似乎是 50% 左右。超过这个比例,人们就会认真考虑避税。原因是避税的回报呈超指数增长(x/(1-x),0<x<1)。如果你的所得税税率是 10%,搬到摩纳哥只能增加 11% 的收入,甚至无法覆盖额外成本。如果是 90%,你会得到十倍于原来的收入。而在 70 年代的英国一度高达 98% 时,搬到摩纳哥会带来五十倍的收入。很可能 70 年代的欧洲政府从未画过这条曲线。

§ 16

Immigration

The other place you could beat the US would be with smarter immigration policy. There are huge gains to be made here. Silicon valleys are made of people, remember.

Like a company whose software runs on Windows, those in the current Silicon Valley are all too aware of the shortcomings of the INS, but there's little they can do about it. They're hostages of the platform.

America's immigration system has never been well run, and since 2001 there has been an additional admixture of paranoia. What fraction of the smart people who want to come to America can even get in? I doubt even half. Which means if you made a competing technology hub that let in all smart people, you'd immediately get more than half the world's top talent, for free.

US immigration policy is particularly ill-suited to startups, because it reflects a model of work from the 1970s. It assumes good technical people have college degrees, and that work means working for a big company.

If you don't have a college degree you can't get an H1B visa, the type usually issued to programmers. But a test that excludes Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, and Michael Dell can't be a good one. Plus you can't get a visa for working on your own company, only for working as an employee of someone else's. And if you want to apply for citizenship you daren't work for a startup at all, because if your sponsor goes out of business, you have to start over.

American immigration policy keeps out most smart people, and channels the rest into unproductive jobs. It would be easy to do better. Imagine if, instead, you treated immigration like recruiting-- if you made a conscious effort to seek out the smartest people and get them to come to your country.

A country that got immigration right would have a huge advantage. At this point you could become a mecca for smart people simply by having an immigration system that let them in.

移民

另一个击败美国的方面是更聪明的移民政策。这里有巨大的收益可图。记住,硅谷是由人构成的。

就像一家软件运行在 Windows 上的公司一样,当前硅谷的人们太了解移民局的缺点了,但他们无能为力。他们是平台的俘虏。

美国的移民系统从来就没管理好过,而且自 2001 年以来,又额外掺入了偏执。想来到美国的聪明人中有多少能真正进入?我怀疑连一半都不到。这意味着如果你建立一个竞争性的技术中心,让所有聪明人都能进来,你就能立刻免费获得超过一半的世界顶级人才。

美国的移民政策尤其不适合创业公司,因为它反映了 20 世纪 70 年代的工作模式。它假设优秀的技术人员拥有大学学位,并且工作意味着为一家大公司工作。

如果没有大学学位,你就无法获得 H1B 签证(通常发给程序员的签证)。但一个排除史蒂夫·乔布斯、比尔·盖茨和迈克尔·戴尔的测试不可能是好测试。另外,你无法为自己公司工作而获得签证,只能作为别人的雇员工作。如果你想申请公民身份,你根本不敢为创业公司工作,因为如果你的担保人倒闭了,你必须从头再来。

美国的移民政策挡住了大多数聪明人,并将剩下的人引向低生产率的工作。很容易做得更好。想象一下,如果你把移民视为招聘——有意识地寻找最聪明的人并让他们来到你的国家。

一个移民政策正确的国家将拥有巨大优势。此时,你只需拥有一个让聪明人进入的移民系统,就能成为聪明人的圣地。

§ 17

A Good Vector

If you look at the kinds of things you have to do to create an environment where startups condense, none are great sacrifices. Great universities? Livable towns? Civil liberties? Flexible employment laws? Immigration policies that let in smart people? Tax laws that encourage growth? It's not as if you have to risk destroying your country to get a silicon valley; these are all good things in their own right.

And then of course there's the question, can you afford not to? I can imagine a future in which the default choice of ambitious young people is to start their own company rather than work for someone else's. I'm not sure that will happen, but it's where the trend points now. And if that is the future, places that don't have startups will be a whole step behind, like those that missed the Industrial Revolution.

一个良好的矢量

如果你看看创造创业公司凝结环境所需的各种条件,没有一个是巨大的牺牲。顶尖大学?宜居城镇?公民自由?灵活的雇佣法律?让聪明人进来的移民政策?鼓励增长的税法?似乎并不需要冒毁灭国家的风险才能得到硅谷;这些本身就是好事。

那么当然还有这个问题:你能承受没有它的代价吗?我可以想象一个未来,有抱负的年轻人的默认选择是创办自己的公司,而不是为别人工作。我不确定这一定会发生,但这是当前的趋势指向。如果那就是未来,没有创业公司的地方将落后整整一步,就像那些错过工业革命的地方一样。

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