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Why to Not Not Start a Startup

Source www.paulgraham.com Glean’d 2026-07-07 16:11 Read 35 min
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Paul Graham draws on Y Combinator data to dissect sixteen common reasons people hesitate to start startups, arguing most are misconceptions or solvable through action. Highlights: out of YC's first eight startups, at least four succeeded; zero percent regretted the experience. Real barriers include family obligations and lack of cofounder. A data-driven, honest pitch for entrepreneurial risk-taking, aimed at technical talent.

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§ 1

March 2007

(This essay is derived from talks at the 2007 Startup School and the Berkeley CSUA.)

We've now been doing Y Combinator long enough to have some data about success rates. Our first batch, in the summer of 2005, had eight startups in it. Of those eight, it now looks as if at least four succeeded. Three have been acquired: Reddit was a merger of two, Reddit and Infogami, and a third was acquired that we can't talk about yet. Another from that batch was Loopt, which is doing so well they could probably be acquired in about ten minutes if they wanted to.

So about half the founders from that first summer, less than two years ago, are now rich, at least by their standards. (One thing you learn when you get rich is that there are many degrees of it.)

I'm not ready to predict our success rate will stay as high as 50%. That first batch could have been an anomaly. But we should be able to do better than the oft-quoted (and probably made up) standard figure of 10%. I'd feel safe aiming at 25%.

Even the founders who fail don't seem to have such a bad time. Of those first eight startups, three are now probably dead. In two cases the founders just went on to do other things at the end of the summer. I don't think they were traumatized by the experience. The closest to a traumatic failure was Kiko, whose founders kept working on their startup for a whole year before being squashed by Google Calendar. But they ended up happy. They sold their software on eBay for a quarter of a million dollars. After they paid back their angel investors, they had about a year's salary each.

Then they immediately went on to start a new and much more exciting startup, Justin.TV.

So here is an even more striking statistic: 0% of that first batch had a terrible experience. They had ups and downs, like every startup, but I don't think any would have traded it for a job in a cubicle. And that statistic is probably not an anomaly. Whatever our long-term success rate ends up being, I think the rate of people who wish they'd gotten a regular job will stay close to 0%.

The big mystery to me is: why don't more people start startups? If nearly everyone who does it prefers it to a regular job, and a significant percentage get rich, why doesn't everyone want to do this? A lot of people think we get thousands of applications for each funding cycle. In fact we usually only get several hundred. Why don't more people apply? And while it must seem to anyone watching this world that startups are popping up like crazy, the number is small compared to the number of people with the necessary skills. The great majority of programmers still go straight from college to cubicle, and stay there.

It seems like people are not acting in their own interest. What's going on? Well, I can answer that. Because of Y Combinator's position at the very start of the venture funding process, we're probably the world's leading experts on the psychology of people who aren't sure if they want to start a company.

There's nothing wrong with being unsure. If you're a hacker thinking about starting a startup and hesitating before taking the leap, you're part of a grand tradition. Larry and Sergey seem to have felt the same before they started Google, and so did Jerry and Filo before they started Yahoo. In fact, I'd guess the most successful startups are the ones started by uncertain hackers rather than gung-ho business guys.

We have some evidence to support this. Several of the most successful startups we've funded told us later that they only decided to apply at the last moment. Some decided only hours before the deadline.

The way to deal with uncertainty is to analyze it into components. Most people who are reluctant to do something have about eight different reasons mixed together in their heads, and don't know themselves which are biggest. Some will be justified and some bogus, but unless you know the relative proportion of each, you don't know whether your overall uncertainty is mostly justified or mostly bogus.

So I'm going to list all the components of people's reluctance to start startups, and explain which are real. Then would-be founders can use this as a checklist to examine their own feelings.

I admit my goal is to increase your self-confidence. But there are two things different here from the usual confidence-building exercise. One is that I'm motivated to be honest. Most people in the confidence-building business have already achieved their goal when you buy the book or pay to attend the seminar where they tell you how great you are. Whereas if I encourage people to start startups who shouldn't, I make my own life worse. If I encourage too many people to apply to Y Combinator, it just means more work for me, because I have to read all the applications.

The other thing that's going to be different is my approach. Instead of being positive, I'm going to be negative. Instead of telling you "come on, you can do it" I'm going to consider all the reasons you aren't doing it, and show why most (but not all) should be ignored. We'll start with the one everyone's born with.

2007年3月

(本文源自2007年创业学校和加州大学伯克利分校CSUA的演讲。)

我们运营Y Combinator的时间已经足够长,积累了一些关于成功率的统计数据。我们的第一批项目始于2005年夏天,当时有八家创业公司。现在看来,其中至少四家成功了。三家已被收购:Reddit是两家公司(Reddit和Infogami)的合并,还有一家目前不便透露。另一家是Loopt,它发展得非常好,如果他们愿意,大概十分钟内就能被收购。

所以,不到两年前的那个夏天里,大约一半的创始人现在都致富了——至少按他们的标准来看是这样。(当你变富时,你会明白财富也有许多等级。)

我并不准备预测我们的成功率会一直保持在50%那么高。第一批可能是个特例。但我们应该能做到比常被引用的(很可能是编造的)10%标准更好。我觉得瞄准25%是安全的。

即使是失败的创始人,看起来过得也不算太糟。那八家初创公司中,现在有三家可能已经死了。其中两家公司的创始人在夏天结束后就去做了别的事。我认为这次经历并没有给他们留下创伤。最接近创伤性失败的是Kiko,它的创始人坚持了整整一年,最终被Google Calendar击败。但他们结局不错——他们把软件在eBay上以25万美元卖出。还清天使投资人后,每人大概拿到了一年的薪水。

然后他们立刻又创办了一家更令人兴奋的新公司:Justin.TV

所以,还有一个更惊人的数据:第一批创始人中,0%的人有过糟糕的体验。他们经历过起伏,就像每家创业公司一样,但我认为没人愿意用这种经历去换一个格子间的工作。而且这个数据很可能不是特例。无论我们长期的成功率最终是多少,我认为希望自己当初找了份普通工作的人的比例会一直接近0%。

对我来说,最大的谜团是:为什么更多人不创业?如果几乎每个创业的人都觉得比普通工作好,而且相当比例的人发了财,为什么不是所有人都想创业?很多人以为我们每个融资周期会收到成千上万份申请,实际上通常只有几百份。为什么申请的人不多?而且,对于观察这个领域的人来说,创业公司似乎如雨后春笋般涌现,但与拥有必要技能的人数相比,这个数字仍然很小。绝大多数程序员依然是大学毕业后直接走进格子间,并一直待在那里。

看起来人们并没有按自己的利益行事。这到底是怎么回事?好吧,我能回答。由于Y Combinator处于风险投资流程的最前端,我们可能是世界上最了解那些不确定是否要创业的人的心理的专家。

不确定并没有什么不对。如果你是一个黑客,正在考虑创业却在犹豫不决,那么你属于一个伟大的传统。拉里和塞尔吉在创办Google之前似乎也有同样的感受,杰里和菲洛在创办雅虎之前也是如此。事实上,我猜测最成功的创业公司往往是由那些犹豫不决的黑客创办的,而不是那些满腔热血的商业人士。

我们有一些证据支持这一点。我们资助过的几家最成功的创业公司后来告诉我们,他们是在最后一刻才决定申请的。有些人是在截止日期前几小时才做出决定。

处理不确定性的方法是将其分解成各个组成部分。大多数不愿意做某事的人,脑子里混杂着大约八种不同的原因,连他们自己都不知道哪些是最主要的。有些是合理的,有些是虚假的,但除非你知道每种原因的相对比例,否则你无法判断自己的整体不确定性主要是合理还是虚假。

所以,我将列出人们不愿创业的所有原因,并解释哪些是真实的。然后,潜在的创始人可以用这个清单来审视自己的感受。

我承认我的目标是增强你的自信心。但这与通常的自信建立练习有两个不同之处。第一,我有动力保持诚实。大多数做自信生意的人,在你买了书或付钱参加他们告诉你你有多棒的高级研讨班时,就已经达到了他们的目标。而如果我鼓励不该创业的人去创业,那只会让我的生活更糟。如果我鼓励太多人申请Y Combinator,那只是给我增加工作,因为我得阅读所有申请。

第二个不同之处是我的方法。我不会积极正面,而是消极负面。我不会告诉你“加油,你能行”,而是会考虑所有你还没行动的原因,并说明为什么大多数(但不是全部)应该被忽略。我们从第一个与生俱来的原因开始。

§ 2
  1. Too young

A lot of people think they're too young to start a startup. Many are right. The median age worldwide is about 27, so probably a third of the population can truthfully say they're too young.

What's too young? One of our goals with Y Combinator was to discover the lower bound on the age of startup founders. It always seemed to us that investors were too conservative here—that they wanted to fund professors, when really they should be funding grad students or even undergrads.

The main thing we've discovered from pushing the edge of this envelope is not where the edge is, but how fuzzy it is. The outer limit may be as low as 16. We don't look beyond 18 because people younger than that can't legally enter into contracts. But the most successful founder we've funded so far, Sam Altman, was 19 at the time.

Sam Altman, however, is an outlying data point. When he was 19, he seemed like he had a 40 year old inside him. There are other 19 year olds who are 12 inside.

There's a reason we have a distinct word "adult" for people over a certain age. There is a threshold you cross. It's conventionally fixed at 21, but different people cross it at greatly varying ages. You're old enough to start a startup if you've crossed this threshold, whatever your age.

How do you tell? There are a couple tests adults use. I realized these tests existed after meeting Sam Altman, actually. I noticed that I felt like I was talking to someone much older. Afterward I wondered, what am I even measuring? What made him seem older?

One test adults use is whether you still have the kid flake reflex. When you're a little kid and you're asked to do something hard, you can cry and say "I can't do it" and the adults will probably let you off. As a kid there's a magic button you can press by saying "I'm just a kid" that will get you out of most difficult situations. Whereas adults, by definition, are not allowed to flake. They still do, of course, but when they do they're ruthlessly pruned.

The other way to tell an adult is by how they react to a challenge. Someone who's not yet an adult will tend to respond to a challenge from an adult in a way that acknowledges their dominance. If an adult says "that's a stupid idea," a kid will either crawl away with his tail between his legs, or rebel. But rebelling presumes inferiority as much as submission. The adult response to "that's a stupid idea," is simply to look the other person in the eye and say "Really? Why do you think so?"

There are a lot of adults who still react childishly to challenges, of course. What you don't often find are kids who react to challenges like adults. When you do, you've found an adult, whatever their age.

  1. 太年轻

很多人认为自己太年轻不能创业。他们中的许多人是对的。全球中位年龄约为27岁,所以大约三分之一的人口确实可以说自己太年轻。

什么算太年轻?Y Combinator的目标之一就是发现创业创始人年龄的下限。我们一直觉得投资者在这方面过于保守——他们想资助教授,但实际上应该资助研究生甚至本科生。

通过探索这个边界,我们发现的主要不是边界在哪里,而是它有多模糊。最低年龄可能低至16岁。我们不关注18岁以下的人,因为他们无法合法签订合同。但迄今为止我们资助过的最成功的创始人Sam Altman当时只有19岁。

不过,Sam Altman是一个离群数据点。他19岁时,看起来就像体内住着一个40岁的人。而有些19岁的人内心只有12岁。

我们之所以用一个独立的词“成人”来指代超过一定年龄的人,是有原因的。存在一个你越过的门槛。传统上固定在21岁,但不同的人跨过这个门槛的年龄差异很大。如果你跨过了这个门槛,无论实际年龄多大,你都已经足够大去创业。

如何判断?成年人会用几个测试。实际上,遇到Sam Altman后我才意识到这些测试的存在。我注意到我感觉自己像是在和一个年龄大得多的人说话。后来我思考:我在衡量什么?是什么让他显得更年长?

一个测试是看你是否还有孩子的“退缩反射”。当你是小孩子时,被要求做一件难事,你可以哭着说“我做不到”,大人很可能会放过你。作为孩子,你有一个神奇的按钮:说“我只是个孩子”,就能摆脱大多数困境。而成年人,顾名思义,不允许退缩。当然,他们还是会退缩,但一旦退缩就会被无情地淘汰。

另一种判断成人的方式是看他们如何应对挑战。尚未成年的人在面对成年人的挑战时,往往会承认对方的支配地位。如果成年人说“那是个愚蠢的想法”,孩子要么夹着尾巴溜走,要么反抗。但反抗和顺从一样,都预设了自身处于劣势。成年人对“那是个愚蠢的想法”的回应,只是直视对方的眼睛,说:“真的吗?为什么你这么认为?”

当然,有很多成年人仍然像孩子一样应对挑战。但你很少看到孩子像成年人那样应对挑战。当你发现这样的人,无论年龄多大,你找到的就是一个成年人。

§ 3
  1. Too inexperienced

I once wrote that startup founders should be at least 23, and that people should work for another company for a few years before starting their own. I no longer believe that, and what changed my mind is the example of the startups we've funded.

I still think 23 is a better age than 21. But the best way to get experience if you're 21 is to start a startup. So, paradoxically, if you're too inexperienced to start a startup, what you should do is start one. That's a way more efficient cure for inexperience than a normal job. In fact, getting a normal job may actually make you less able to start a startup, by turning you into a tame animal who thinks he needs an office to work in and a product manager to tell him what software to write.

What really convinced me of this was the Kikos. They started a startup right out of college. Their inexperience caused them to make a lot of mistakes. But by the time we funded their second startup, a year later, they had become extremely formidable. They were certainly not tame animals. And there is no way they'd have grown so much if they'd spent that year working at Microsoft, or even Google. They'd still have been diffident junior programmers.

So now I'd advise people to go ahead and start startups right out of college. There's no better time to take risks than when you're young. Sure, you'll probably fail. But even failure will get you to the ultimate goal faster than getting a job.

It worries me a bit to be saying this, because in effect we're advising people to educate themselves by failing at our expense, but it's the truth.

  1. 经验不足

我曾写过,创业创始人至少应该23岁,并且应该在其他公司工作几年后再创业。我不再相信这一点了,改变我想法的是我们资助过的创业公司的例子。

我仍然认为23岁比21岁更合适。但如果你21岁,获得经验的最好方式就是去创业。所以,矛盾的是,如果你因为经验不足而无法创业,你应该做的就是去创业。这比一份普通工作更能高效地治愈经验不足。事实上,找一份普通工作可能会让你变得更不适合创业——它把你变成一只温顺的动物,认为自己需要一个办公室工作,需要一个产品经理来告诉你写什么软件。

真正让我信服的是Kiko团队。他们大学一毕业就创业。他们的经验不足导致犯了很多错误。但当我们一年后资助他们的第二家创业公司时,他们已经变得极其强大。他们当然不是温顺的动物。如果他们那年是在微软甚至谷歌工作,绝不可能成长这么多。他们还会是那个缺乏自信的初级程序员。

所以现在我会建议人们大学一毕业就去创业。没有比年轻时更好的冒险时机了。当然,你可能会失败。但即使是失败,也会比找工作更快地让你达到最终目标。

这样说让我有点担心,因为实际上我们在建议人们以我们的代价来教育自己,但事实就是如此。

§ 4
  1. Not determined enough

You need a lot of determination to succeed as a startup founder. It's probably the single best predictor of success.

Some people may not be determined enough to make it. It's hard for me to say for sure, because I'm so determined that I can't imagine what's going on in the heads of people who aren't. But I know they exist.

Most hackers probably underestimate their determination. I've seen a lot become visibly more determined as they get used to running a startup. I can think of several we've funded who would have been delighted at first to be bought for $2 million, but are now set on world domination.

How can you tell if you're determined enough, when Larry and Sergey themselves were unsure at first about starting a company? I'm guessing here, but I'd say the test is whether you're sufficiently driven to work on your own projects. Though they may have been unsure whether they wanted to start a company, it doesn't seem as if Larry and Sergey were meek little research assistants, obediently doing their advisors' bidding. They started projects of their own.

  1. 决心不够

作为创业创始人,你需要很大的决心才能成功。这很可能是成功的最佳单一预测指标。

有些人可能决心不够,无法成功。我很难确定,因为我非常有决心,无法想象那些没有决心的人脑子里在想什么。但我知道他们存在。

大多数黑客可能低估了自己的决心。我看到很多人在习惯经营创业公司后,决心明显增强。我可以想到我们资助过的几家公司,他们一开始如果被200万美元收购会很高兴,但现在却立志要统治世界。

既然拉里和塞尔吉本人一开始也不确定是否要创办公司,你如何判断自己的决心是否足够?我猜,测试的标准是你是否足够有动力去从事自己的项目。虽然他们可能不确定是否要创办公司,但拉里和塞尔吉显然不是温顺的研究助理,服从导师的指令。他们有自己的项目。

§ 5
  1. Not smart enough

You may need to be moderately smart to succeed as a startup founder. But if you're worried about this, you're probably mistaken. If you're smart enough to worry that you might not be smart enough to start a startup, you probably are.

And in any case, starting a startup just doesn't require that much intelligence. Some startups do. You have to be good at math to write Mathematica. But most companies do more mundane stuff where the decisive factor is effort, not brains. Silicon Valley can warp your perspective on this, because there's a cult of smartness here. People who aren't smart at least try to act that way. But if you think it takes a lot of intelligence to get rich, try spending a couple days in some of the fancier bits of New York or LA.

If you don't think you're smart enough to start a startup doing something technically difficult, just write enterprise software. Enterprise software companies aren't technology companies, they're sales companies, and sales depends mostly on effort.

  1. 不够聪明

你可能需要中等智商才能作为创业创始人成功。但如果你担心这个,你很可能错了。如果你聪明到会担心自己不够聪明去创业,那你很可能就是聪明的。

而且无论如何,创业并不需要那么多智慧。有些创业公司需要——你必须数学好才能写Mathematica。但大多数公司做的是更平凡的事情,决定性因素是努力而不是大脑。硅谷可能会扭曲你对这个问题的看法,因为这里崇拜聪明。不聪明的人至少也会装聪明。但如果你认为创业需要很多智慧才能致富,试着在纽约或洛杉矶的某些高档地方待几天。

如果你觉得自己不够聪明去创业做技术难事,那就写企业软件吧。企业软件公司不是技术公司,而是销售公司,销售主要靠努力。

§ 6
  1. Know nothing about business

This is another variable whose coefficient should be zero. You don't need to know anything about business to start a startup. The initial focus should be the product. All you need to know in this phase is how to build things people want. If you succeed, you'll have to think about how to make money from it. But this is so easy you can pick it up on the fly.

I get a fair amount of flak for telling founders just to make something great and not worry too much about making money. And yet all the empirical evidence points that way: pretty much 100% of startups that make something popular manage to make money from it. And acquirers tell me privately that revenue is not what they buy startups for, but their strategic value. Which means, because they made something people want. Acquirers know the rule holds for them too: if users love you, you can always make money from that somehow, and if they don't, the cleverest business model in the world won't save you.

So why do so many people argue with me? I think one reason is that they hate the idea that a bunch of twenty year olds could get rich from building something cool that doesn't make any money. They just don't want that to be possible. But how possible it is doesn't depend on how much they want it to be.

For a while it annoyed me to hear myself described as some kind of irresponsible pied piper, leading impressionable young hackers down the road to ruin. But now I realize this kind of controversy is a sign of a good idea.

The most valuable truths are the ones most people don't believe. They're like undervalued stocks. If you start with them, you'll have the whole field to yourself. So when you find an idea you know is good but most people disagree with, you should not merely ignore their objections, but push aggressively in that direction. In this case, that means you should seek out ideas that would be popular but seem hard to make money from.

We'll bet a seed round you can't make something popular that we can't figure out how to make money from.

  1. 对商业一无所知

这是另一个系数应为零的变量。创业不需要任何商业知识。最初的重点应该是产品。这个阶段你只需要知道如何构建人们想要的东西。如果你成功了,你就需要考虑如何赚钱。但这太容易了,你可以在过程中学会。

我经常因为告诉创始人只需做出伟大的产品而不用太担心赚钱而受到抨击。然而,所有经验证据都指向这一点:几乎100%的做出受欢迎产品的创业公司都能从中赚钱。收购者私下告诉我,他们收购创业公司不是为了收入,而是为了战略价值。这意味着,因为他们做出了人们想要的东西。收购者知道这个规则也适用于他们:如果用户喜欢你,你总能以某种方式赚钱;如果用户不喜欢,世界上最聪明的商业模式也救不了你。

那么为什么那么多人与我争论?我认为一个原因是他们讨厌一群二十多岁的年轻人通过建造一个不赚钱但很酷的东西就能发财的想法。他们就是不想让这成为可能。但它的可能性并不取决于他们多么希望它是。

有一段时间,我被描述成某种不负责任的吹笛人,带领容易受影响的年轻黑客走向毁灭,这让我很恼火。但现在我意识到,这种争议是一个好想法的标志。

最有价值的真理是大多数人不相信的。它们就像被低估的股票。如果你从它们开始,你将拥有整个领域。所以,当你发现一个你认为是好的但大多数人不同意的想法时,你不应该仅仅忽略他们的反对意见,而是应该积极地向那个方向推进。在这种情况下,这意味着你应该寻找那些会受欢迎但似乎很难赚钱的想法。

我们打赌,你无法在种子轮做出一个受欢迎而我们不知道怎么赚钱的东西。

§ 7
  1. No cofounder

Not having a cofounder is a real problem. A startup is too much for one person to bear. And though we differ from other investors on a lot of questions, we all agree on this. All investors, without exception, are more likely to fund you with a cofounder than without.

We've funded two single founders, but in both cases we suggested their first priority should be to find a cofounder. Both did. But we'd have preferred them to have cofounders before they applied. It's not super hard to get a cofounder for a project that's just been funded, and we'd rather have cofounders committed enough to sign up for something super hard.

If you don't have a cofounder, what should you do? Get one. It's more important than anything else. If there's no one where you live who wants to start a startup with you, move where there are people who do. If no one wants to work with you on your current idea, switch to an idea people want to work on.

If you're still in school, you're surrounded by potential cofounders. A few years out it gets harder to find them. Not only do you have a smaller pool to draw from, but most already have jobs, and perhaps even families to support. So if you had friends in college you used to scheme about startups with, stay in touch with them as well as you can. That may help keep the dream alive.

It's possible you could meet a cofounder through something like a user's group or a conference. But I wouldn't be too optimistic. You need to work with someone to know whether you want them as a cofounder.

The real lesson to draw from this is not how to find a cofounder, but that you should start startups when you're young and there are lots of them around.

  1. 没有联合创始人

没有联合创始人是一个真正的问题。创业公司对一个人来说太难承受了。尽管我们在很多问题上与其他投资者意见不同,但在这一点上我们是一致的。所有投资者无一例外,更可能资助有联合创始人的你。

我们资助过两位单一创始人,但在这两种情况下,我们都建议他们的首要任务是找到联合创始人。两人都做到了。但我们更希望他们在申请前就有联合创始人。为一个刚刚获得资助的项目找联合创始人并不太难,我们更希望联合创始人有足够的承诺去参与一件超级困难的事情。

如果你没有联合创始人,该怎么办?找一个。这比什么都重要。如果你住的地方没有人想和你一起创业,搬到有这样的人的地方去。如果没有人愿意和你一起做你现在的想法,换成一个人们愿意做的想法。

如果你还在上学,你周围都是潜在的联合创始人。几年后,找到他们就会变得更难。不仅你选择的池子更小,而且大多数人已经有了工作,甚至可能还有家庭要养活。所以如果你在大学里有曾经一起策划过创业的朋友,尽可能和他们保持联系。这可能有助于保持梦想。

你有可能通过用户组或会议认识联合创始人。但我不太乐观。你需要和某人一起工作才能知道他们是否适合做联合创始人。

从这里得到的真正教训不是如何找到联合创始人,而是你应该在年轻时创业,那时身边有很多这样的人。

§ 8
  1. No idea

In a sense, it's not a problem if you don't have a good idea, because most startups change their idea anyway. In the average Y Combinator startup, I'd guess 70% of the idea is new at the end of the first three months. Sometimes it's 100%.

In fact, we're so sure the founders are more important than the initial idea that we're going to try something new this funding cycle. We're going to let people apply with no idea at all. If you want, you can answer the question on the application form that asks what you're going to do with "We have no idea." If you seem really good we'll accept you anyway. We're confident we can sit down with you and cook up some promising project.

Really this just codifies what we do already. We put little weight on the idea. We ask mainly out of politeness. The kind of question on the application form that we really care about is the one where we ask what cool things you've made. If what you've made is version one of a promising startup, so much the better, but the main thing we care about is whether you're good at making things. Being lead developer of a popular open source project counts almost as much.

That solves the problem if you get funded by Y Combinator. What about in the general case? Because in another sense, it is a problem if you don't have an idea. If you start a startup with no idea, what do you do next?

So here's the brief recipe for getting startup ideas. Find something that's missing in your own life, and supply that need—no matter how specific to you it seems. Steve Wozniak built himself a computer; who knew so many other people would want them? A need that's narrow but genuine is a better starting point than one that's broad but hypothetical. So even if the problem is simply that you don't have a date on Saturday night, if you can think of a way to fix that by writing software, you're onto something, because a lot of other people have the same problem.

  1. 没有想法

从某种意义上说,没有一个好主意并不是问题,因为大多数创业公司都会改变主意。在Y Combinator的平均创业公司中,我估计在前三个月结束时,70%的想法是新的。有时甚至是100%。

事实上,我们非常确信创始人比最初的想法更重要,以至于我们打算在这个融资周期尝试一些新东西。我们将允许人们在没有想法的情况下申请。如果你愿意,你可以在申请表上回答“你打算做什么”的问题时写“我们不知道”。如果你看起来真的很棒,我们还是会接受你。我们相信我们可以和你坐下来,一起构思一个很有前景的项目。

实际上,这只是我们已经在做的事情的正式化。我们不太看重想法。我们问主要是出于礼貌。在申请表上,我们真正关心的问题是你们做过哪些酷的东西。如果你做的是有前景的创业公司的第一个版本,那就更好了,但我们主要关心的是你是否擅长做东西。成为热门开源项目的首席开发者几乎同样重要。

如果你能得到Y Combinator的资助,这解决了问题。但一般情况呢?因为从另一种意义上说,没有想法确实是个问题。如果你在没有想法的情况下开始创业,下一步做什么?

所以,获取创业想法的简单方法是:找到你生活中缺少的东西,并满足这个需求——无论看起来多么特定于你。史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克为自己造了一台电脑;谁知道会有那么多其他人也想要呢?一个狭窄但真实的需求,比一个广泛但假设的需求更适合作为起点。所以,即使问题只是你周六晚上没有约会,如果你能想到通过编写软件来解决这个问题,你就找到了一些东西,因为很多其他人都有同样的问题。

§ 9
  1. No room for more startups

A lot of people look at the ever-increasing number of startups and think "this can't continue." Implicit in their thinking is a fallacy: that there is some limit on the number of startups there could be. But this is false. No one claims there's any limit on the number of people who can work for salary at 1000-person companies. Why should there be any limit on the number who can work for equity at 5-person companies?

Nearly everyone who works is satisfying some kind of need. Breaking up companies into smaller units doesn't make those needs go away. Existing needs would probably get satisfied more efficiently by a network of startups than by a few giant, hierarchical organizations, but I don't think that would mean less opportunity, because satisfying current needs would lead to more. Certainly this tends to be the case in individuals. Nor is there anything wrong with that. We take for granted things that medieval kings would have considered effeminate luxuries, like whole buildings heated to spring temperatures year round. And if things go well, our descendants will take for granted things we would consider shockingly luxurious. There is no absolute standard for material wealth. Health care is a component of it, and that alone is a black hole. For the foreseeable future, people will want ever more material wealth, so there is no limit to the amount of work available for companies, and for startups in particular.

Usually the limited-room fallacy is not expressed directly. Usually it's implicit in statements like "there are only so many startups Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo can buy." Maybe, though the list of acquirers is a lot longer than that. And whatever you think of other acquirers, Google is not stupid. The reason big companies buy startups is that they've created something valuable. And why should there be any limit to the number of valuable startups companies can acquire, any more than there is a limit to the amount of wealth individual people want? Maybe there would be practical limits on the number of startups any one acquirer could assimilate, but if there is value to be had, in the form of upside that founders are willing to forgo in return for an immediate payment, acquirers will evolve to consume it. Markets are pretty smart that way.

  1. 没有更多创业空间

很多人看着创业公司数量的不断增加,心想“这不可能持续”。他们的想法中隐含着一个谬误:创业公司的数量存在某种限制。但这是错误的。没有人声称在1000人的公司里拿工资的人数有任何限制。为什么在5人的公司里拿股权的人数就应该有限制?

几乎每个工作的人都在满足某种需求。将公司分解成更小的单元并不会使这些需求消失。现有的需求很可能通过创业公司网络比通过少数大型等级制组织得到更有效的满足,但我认为这并不意味着机会减少,因为满足当前需求会导致更多需求。在个人层面确实如此。这也没什么不对。我们视为理所当然的东西,中世纪的国王会觉得是娘娘腔的奢侈品,比如整栋建筑全年保持春天的温度。如果一切顺利,我们的后代将把我们视为极度奢华的东西视为理所当然。物质财富没有绝对标准。医疗保健是其中的一部分,仅此一项就是一个黑洞。在可预见的未来,人们会想要越来越多的物质财富,所以公司、尤其是创业公司可做的工作是无限的。

通常,有限空间的谬误不会直接表达。它通常隐含在“Google、Microsoft和Yahoo能收购的创业公司只有那么多”这样的陈述中。也许吧,尽管收购者的名单要长得多。而且无论你怎么看待其他收购者,Google并不愚蠢。大公司收购创业公司的原因是它们创造了有价值的东西。为什么公司能收购的有价值创业公司的数量应该有限制,就像个人想要的财富数量没有限制一样?也许任何收购者能吸收的创业公司数量存在实际限制,但如果有价值可获——以创始人愿意放弃以换取即时付款的上升空间的形式——收购者会进化来消耗它。市场在这方面很聪明。

§ 10
  1. Family to support

This one is real. I wouldn't advise anyone with a family to start a startup. I'm not saying it's a bad idea, just that I don't want to take responsibility for advising it. I'm willing to take responsibility for telling 22 year olds to start startups. So what if they fail? They'll learn a lot, and that job at Microsoft will still be waiting for them if they need it. But I'm not prepared to cross moms.

What you can do, if you have a family and want to start a startup, is start a consulting business you can then gradually turn into a product business. Empirically the chances of pulling that off seem very small. You're never going to produce Google this way. But at least you'll never be without an income.

Another way to decrease the risk is to join an existing startup instead of starting your own. Being one of the first employees of a startup is a lot like being a founder, in both the good ways and the bad. You'll be roughly 1/n^2 founder, where n is your employee number.

As with the question of cofounders, the real lesson here is to start startups when you're young.

  1. 需要养家

这是真的。我不会建议有家庭的人创业。我不是说这是个坏主意,只是我不愿承担建议的责任。我愿意承担告诉22岁年轻人创业的责任。即使他们失败了呢?他们会学到很多,如果需要,微软的工作还会等着他们。但我不准备越过妈妈们。

如果你有家庭并且想创业,你可以做的是先创办一家咨询公司,然后逐步转变为产品公司。经验表明,成功的概率似乎很小。你不可能用这种方式打造出Google。但至少你永远不会没有收入。

另一种降低风险的方法是加入一家现有的创业公司,而不是自己创办。成为一家创业公司的首批员工,在好和坏两方面都很像创始人。你大致是1/n^2的创始人,其中n是你的员工编号。

和联合创始人的问题一样,这里真正的教训是应该在年轻时创业。

§ 11
  1. Independently wealthy

This is my excuse for not starting a startup. Startups are stressful. Why do it if you don't need the money? For every "serial entrepreneur," there are probably twenty sane ones who think "Start another company? Are you crazy?"

I've come close to starting new startups a couple times, but I always pull back because I don't want four years of my life to be consumed by random schleps. I know this business well enough to know you can't do it half-heartedly. What makes a good startup founder so dangerous is his willingness to endure infinite schleps.

There is a bit of a problem with retirement, though. Like a lot of people, I like to work. And one of the many weird little problems you discover when you get rich is that a lot of the interesting people you'd like to work with are not rich. They need to work at something that pays the bills. Which means if you want to have them as colleagues, you have to work at something that pays the bills too, even though you don't need to. I think this is what drives a lot of serial entrepreneurs, actually.

That's why I love working on Y Combinator so much. It's an excuse to work on something interesting with people I like.

  1. 财务独立

这是我不创业的借口。创业充满压力。如果你不需要钱,为什么还要做?每有一个“连续创业者”,大概就有二十个理智的人想:“再开一家公司?你疯了吗?”

我有好几次差点开始新创业,但最终都退缩了,因为我不想让四年的生命被随意的琐事消耗。我足够了解这个行业,知道你不能半心半意地去做。好的创始人之所以危险,就在于他们愿意忍受无尽的琐事。

不过,退休也有点问题。和很多人一样,我喜欢工作。当你变富时,你会发现许多奇怪的小问题之一就是:你想合作的许多有趣的人并不富有。他们需要做一些能付账单的工作。这意味着如果你想让他们成为同事,你也必须做一些能付账单的工作,尽管你并不需要。我认为这实际上是很多连续创业者的动力。

这就是为什么我非常喜欢在Y Combinator工作。这是一个与我喜欢的人一起做有趣事情的借口。

§ 12
  1. Not ready for commitment

This was my reason for not starting a startup for most of my twenties. Like a lot of people that age, I valued freedom most of all. I was reluctant to do anything that required a commitment of more than a few months. Nor would I have wanted to do anything that completely took over my life the way a startup does. And that's fine. If you want to spend your time travelling around, or playing in a band, or whatever, that's a perfectly legitimate reason not to start a company.

If you start a startup that succeeds, it's going to consume at least three or four years. (If it fails, you'll be done a lot quicker.) So you shouldn't do it if you're not ready for commitments on that scale. Be aware, though, that if you get a regular job, you'll probably end up working there for as long as a startup would take, and you'll find you have much less spare time than you might expect. So if you're ready to clip on that ID badge and go to that orientation session, you may also be ready to start that startup.

  1. 未准备好承诺

这是我在二十多岁的大部分时间里不创业的原因。和那个年龄的很多人一样,我最看重自由。我不愿意做任何需要承诺超过几个月的事情。我也不想做任何像创业那样完全占据我生活的事情。这没什么问题。如果你想花时间旅行、玩乐队或做其他事情,这是完全合理的理由不去创办公司。

如果你创业成功,它将耗费至少三到四年。(如果失败,你会快很多。)所以如果你还没有准备好承担这种规模的承诺,就不应该去做。不过要注意,如果你找一份普通工作,你可能最终会在那里工作同样长的时间,而且你会发现你的空闲时间比你预期的要少得多。所以,如果你已经准备好别上工牌去参加入职培训,那么你可能也准备好了去创业。

§ 13
  1. Need for structure

I'm told there are people who need structure in their lives. This seems to be a nice way of saying they need someone to tell them what to do. I believe such people exist. There's plenty of empirical evidence: armies, religious cults, and so on. They may even be the majority.

If you're one of these people, you probably shouldn't start a startup. In fact, you probably shouldn't even go to work for one. In a good startup, you don't get told what to do very much. There may be one person whose job title is CEO, but till the company has about twelve people no one should be telling anyone what to do. That's too inefficient. Each person should just do what they need to without anyone telling them.

If that sounds like a recipe for chaos, think about a soccer team. Eleven people manage to work together in quite complicated ways, and yet only in occasional emergencies does anyone tell anyone else what to do. A reporter once asked David Beckham if there were any language problems at Real Madrid, since the players were from about eight different countries. He said it was never an issue, because everyone was so good they never had to talk. They all just did the right thing.

How do you tell if you're independent-minded enough to start a startup? If you'd bristle at the suggestion that you aren't, then you probably are.

  1. 需要结构

我听说有些人需要在生活中有结构。这似乎是说他们需要有人告诉他们该做什么的一种委婉说法。我相信这样的人存在。有很多经验证据:军队、宗教崇拜等等。他们甚至可能是大多数。

如果你是这样的人,你可能不应该创业。事实上,你甚至不应该去创业公司工作。在一家好的创业公司,你不会被告知该做什么太多。可能有一个人的头衔是CEO,但直到公司有大约十二人之前,没有人应该告诉任何人该做什么。那太低效了。每个人都应该做他们需要做的事情,无需别人指挥。

如果这听起来像是混乱的根源,想想足球队。十一个人能够以相当复杂的方式协作,但只有在偶尔的紧急情况下才会有人告诉别人该做什么。一位记者曾问贝克汉姆,皇马是否存在语言问题,因为球员来自大约八个不同的国家。他说这从来不是问题,因为每个人都太出色了,他们根本不需要说话。他们都知道该做什么。

如何判断你是否足够有主见去创业?如果你听到别人说你不够有主见时感到恼怒,那么你很可能就是。

§ 14
  1. Fear of uncertainty

Perhaps some people are deterred from starting startups because they don't like the uncertainty. If you go to work for Microsoft, you can predict fairly accurately what the next few years will be like—all too accurately, in fact. If you start a startup, anything might happen.

Well, if you're troubled by uncertainty, I can solve that problem for you: if you start a startup, it will probably fail. Seriously, though, this is not a bad way to think about the whole experience. Hope for the best, but expect the worst. In the worst case, it will at least be interesting. In the best case you might get rich.

No one will blame you if the startup tanks, so long as you made a serious effort. There may once have been a time when employers would regard that as a mark against you, but they wouldn't now. I asked managers at big companies, and they all said they'd prefer to hire someone who'd tried to start a startup and failed over someone who'd spent the same time working at a big company.

Nor will investors hold it against you, as long as you didn't fail out of laziness or incurable stupidity. I'm told there's a lot of stigma attached to failing in other places—in Europe, for example. Not here. In America, companies, like practically everything else, are disposable.

  1. 对不确定性的恐惧

也许有些人不愿创业是因为不喜欢不确定性。如果你去微软工作,你可以相当准确地预测未来几年会是什么样子——事实上太准确了。如果你创业,任何事情都可能发生。

好吧,如果你被不确定性困扰,我可以为你解决这个问题:如果你创业,它很可能会失败。不过,认真地说,这不是思考整个经历的一个坏方式。抱最好的希望,做最坏的打算。最坏的情况下,至少会很有趣。最好的情况下,你可能会发财。

只要你认真努力了,创业失败没人会责备你。可能曾经有那么一段时间,雇主会把这视为你的缺点,但现在不会了。我问过大公司的经理,他们都说他们更愿意雇用那些尝试过创业但失败的人,而不是那些在同一段时间里在大公司工作的人。

投资者也不会因此对你有意见,只要你不是因为懒惰或无可救药的愚蠢而失败。我听说在其他地方——比如欧洲——失败有很多污名。但在这里不是。在美国,公司和其他几乎所有东西一样,都是一次性的。

§ 15
  1. Don't realize what you're avoiding

One reason people who've been out in the world for a year or two make better founders than people straight from college is that they know what they're avoiding. If their startup fails, they'll have to get a job, and they know how much jobs suck.

If you've had summer jobs in college, you may think you know what jobs are like, but you probably don't. Summer jobs at technology companies are not real jobs. If you get a summer job as a waiter, that's a real job. Then you have to carry your weight. But software companies don't hire students for the summer as a source of cheap labor. They do it in the hope of recruiting them when they graduate. So while they're happy if you produce, they don't expect you to.

That will change if you get a real job after you graduate. Then you'll have to earn your keep. And since most of what big companies do is boring, you're going to have to work on boring stuff. Easy, compared to college, but boring. At first it may seem cool to get paid for doing easy stuff, after paying to do hard stuff in college. But that wears off after a few months. Eventually it gets demoralizing to work on dumb stuff, even if it's easy and you get paid a lot.

And that's not the worst of it. The thing that really sucks about having a regular job is the expectation that you're supposed to be there at certain times. Even Google is afflicted with this, apparently. And what this means, as everyone who's had a regular job can tell you, is that there are going to be times when you have absolutely no desire to work on anything, and you're going to have to go to work anyway and sit in front of your screen and pretend to. To someone who likes work, as most good hackers do, this is torture.

In a startup, you skip all that. There's no concept of office hours in most startups. Work and life just get mixed together. But the good thing about that is that no one minds if you have a life at work. In a startup you can do whatever you want most of the time. If you're a founder, what you want to do most of the time is work. But you never have to pretend to.

If you took a nap in your office in a big company, it would seem unprofessional. But if you're starting a startup and you fall asleep in the middle of the day, your cofounders will just assume you were tired.

  1. 没意识到你在逃避什么

那些在社会上混过一两年的人比刚毕业的大学生更适合做创始人,原因之一是他们知道自己逃避的是什么。如果他们的创业公司失败了,他们不得不去找工作,而他们知道工作有多糟糕。

如果你在大学里做过暑期工,你可能以为自己了解工作是什么样子,但很可能你不了解。科技公司的暑期工不是真正的工作。如果你做暑期工当服务员,那才是真正的工作——你必须自食其力。但软件公司雇佣学生暑期工作并不是为了廉价劳动力。他们这样做是希望在他们毕业时能招聘他们。所以,如果你能产出,他们会很高兴,但他们并不指望你。

如果你毕业后找到一份真正的工作,情况就会改变。那时你必须自己养活自己。由于大公司做的大部分事情都很无聊,你将不得不做无聊的事情。和大学相比容易,但无聊。一开始,在大学付钱做难事之后,现在做容易事还能拿钱,可能觉得很酷。但几个月后这种感觉就会消失。最终,做愚蠢的工作会让人士气低落,即使它很容易而且薪水很高。

这还不是最糟糕的。有一份普通工作最糟糕的地方在于,你必须在一定时间出现在那里。甚至谷歌显然也深受其害。这意味着,正如每个有普通工作的人都可以告诉你的那样,会有一些时候你完全不想做任何工作,但你仍然得去上班,坐在屏幕前假装工作。对于喜欢工作的人来说——就像大多数优秀的黑客一样——这是一种折磨。

在创业公司,你完全避免了这些。大多数创业公司没有办公时间的概念。工作和生活融合在一起。但好处是,没有人介意你在工作时有生活。在创业公司,大多数时间你可以做任何你想做的事。如果你是一个创始人,大多数时间你想做的就是工作。但你永远不必假装。

如果你在大公司的办公室打个盹,会显得不专业。但如果你在创业,中午睡着了,你的联合创始人只会以为你是累了。

§ 16
  1. Parents want you to be a doctor

A significant number of would-be startup founders are probably dissuaded from doing it by their parents. I'm not going to say you shouldn't listen to them. Families are entitled to their own traditions, and who am I to argue with them? But I will give you a couple reasons why a safe career might not be what your parents really want for you.

One is that parents tend to be more conservative for their kids than they would be for themselves. This is actually a rational response to their situation. Parents end up sharing more of their kids' ill fortune than good fortune. Most parents don't mind this; it's part of the job; but it does tend to make them excessively conservative. And erring on the side of conservatism is still erring. In almost everything, reward is proportionate to risk. So by protecting their kids from risk, parents are, without realizing it, also protecting them from rewards. If they saw that, they'd want you to take more risks.

The other reason parents may be mistaken is that, like generals, they're always fighting the last war. If they want you to be a doctor, odds are it's not just because they want you to help the sick, but also because it's a prestigious and lucrative career. But not so lucrative or prestigious as it was when their opinions were formed. When I was a kid in the seventies, a doctor was the thing to be. There was a sort of golden triangle involving doctors, Mercedes 450SLs, and tennis. All three vertices now seem pretty dated.

The parents who want you to be a doctor may simply not realize how much things have changed. Would they be that unhappy if you were Steve Jobs instead? So I think the way to deal with your parents' opinions about what you should do is to treat them like feature requests. Even if your only goal is to please them, the way to do that is not simply to give them what they ask for. Instead think about why they're asking for something, and see if there's a better way to give them what they need.

  1. 父母希望你当医生

相当大比例的潜在创业创始人可能被父母劝阻了。我不会说你不应该听他们的。家庭有权保持自己的传统,我又有什么资格和他们争论呢?但我会给你几个理由,说明为什么一份安稳的职业可能并不是父母真正希望你拥有的。

一个是,父母对孩子往往比对自己更保守。这实际上是他们处境的一种理性反应。父母最终分享孩子的不幸比分享好运更多。大多数父母并不介意;这是工作的一部分;但这确实让他们变得过分保守。而保守的犯错仍然是犯错。在几乎所有事情上,回报与风险成正比。所以,通过保护孩子远离风险,父母在无意中也保护他们远离了回报。如果他们看到这一点,他们会希望你冒更多的风险。

父母可能出错的另一个原因是,他们像将军一样,总是在打上一场战争。如果他们希望你成为医生,很可能不仅仅是因为他们希望你帮助病人,还因为这是一个有声望且收入丰厚的职业。但这份职业已经不像他们形成观点时那样丰厚或有声望了。我小时候在七十年代,医生是最理想的职业。有一个金三角,涉及医生、梅赛德斯450SL和网球。这三个顶点现在看起来都相当过时了。

那些希望你成为医生的父母可能只是没有意识到情况发生了多大的变化。如果你是史蒂夫·乔布斯,他们会那么不高兴吗?所以我认为处理父母对你应该做什么的看法,要像对待功能需求一样。即使你唯一的目标是取悦他们,方法也不是简单地满足他们的要求。相反,思考他们为什么要求这些东西,看看是否有更好的方式给他们真正需要的东西。

§ 17
  1. A job is the default

This leads us to the last and probably most powerful reason people get regular jobs: it's the default thing to do. Defaults are enormously powerful, precisely because they operate without any conscious choice.

To almost everyone except criminals, it seems an axiom that if you need money, you should get a job. Actually this tradition is not much more than a hundred years old. Before that, the default way to make a living was by farming. It's a bad plan to treat something only a hundred years old as an axiom. By historical standards, that's something that's changing pretty rapidly.

We may be seeing another such change right now. I've read a lot of economic history, and I understand the startup world pretty well, and it now seems to me fairly likely that we're seeing the beginning of a change like the one from farming to manufacturing.

And you know what? If you'd been around when that change began (around 1000 in Europe) it would have seemed to nearly everyone that running off to the city to make your fortune was a crazy thing to do. Though serfs were in principle forbidden to leave their manors, it can't have been that hard to run away to a city. There were no guards patrolling the perimeter of the village. What prevented most serfs from leaving was that it seemed insanely risky. Leave one's plot of land? Leave the people you'd spent your whole life with, to live in a giant city of three or four thousand complete strangers? How would you live? How would you get food, if you didn't grow it?

Frightening as it seemed to them, it's now the default with us to live by our wits. So if it seems risky to you to start a startup, think how risky it once seemed to your ancestors to live as we do now. Oddly enough, the people who know this best are the very ones trying to get you to stick to the old model. How can Larry and Sergey say you should come work as their employee, when they didn't get jobs themselves?

Now we look back on medieval peasants and wonder how they stood it. How grim it must have been to till the same fields your whole life with no hope of anything better, under the thumb of lords and priests you had to give all your surplus to and acknowledge as your masters. I wouldn't be surprised if one day people look back on what we consider a normal job in the same way. How grim it would be to commute every day to a cubicle in some soulless office complex, and be told what to do by someone you had to acknowledge as a boss—someone who could call you into their office and say "take a seat," and you'd sit! Imagine having to ask permission to release software to users. Imagine being sad on Sunday afternoons because the weekend was almost over, and tomorrow you'd have to get up and go to work. How did they stand it?

It's exciting to think we may be on the cusp of another shift like the one from farming to manufacturing. That's why I care about startups. Startups aren't interesting just because they're a way to make a lot of money. I couldn't care less about other ways to do that, like speculating in securities. At most those are interesting the way puzzles are. There's more going on with startups. They may represent one of those rare, historic shifts in the way wealth is created.

That's ultimately what drives us to work on Y Combinator. We want to make money, if only so we don't have to stop doing it, but that's not the main goal. There have only been a handful of these great economic shifts in human history. It would be an amazing hack to make one happen faster.

  1. 工作是默认选项

这引出了最后一个,也可能是最强大的理由:工作是默认要做的事情。默认值非常强大,恰恰是因为它们在没有任何有意识选择的情况下运作。

对于几乎所有人(除了罪犯)来说,如果你需要钱,就应该找一份工作,这似乎是一个公理。实际上,这个传统不过一百多年的历史。在那之前,默认的谋生方式是种地。把一个只有一百年历史的东西当作公理是错误的。按历史标准,这变化相当快。

我们现在可能正在目睹另一个这样的变化。我读过很多经济史,也相当了解创业世界,现在在我看来,我们很可能正在见证一个类似于从农业到制造业的变革的开端。

你知道吗?如果你在那个变革开始时(大约公元1000年的欧洲)在场,几乎所有人都会觉得跑到城里去发财是一件疯狂的事情。尽管农奴原则上不许离开庄园,但逃到城里并不难。村子周围没有警卫巡逻。阻止大多数农奴离开的原因是,这看起来极其冒险。离开自己的土地?离开你一生相伴的人,去住在一个有三四千陌生人的大城市?你怎么生活?如果你不种地,你怎么获得食物?

尽管当时看起来可怕,但现在我们默认靠自己的智慧生活。所以,如果创业对你来说有风险,想想你的祖先觉得我们现在的生活方式有多冒险。奇怪的是,最清楚这一点的人正是那些试图让你坚持旧模式的人。拉里和塞尔吉怎么能说你应该来当他们的员工,而他们自己却没有找工作呢?

现在我们回顾中世纪的农民,好奇他们是如何忍受的。一辈子耕种同样的田地,没有改善的希望,在领主和牧师的控制下,你必须把所有剩余产品都交给他们,并承认他们是你的主人,这该多么悲惨。如果有一天人们以同样的方式回顾我们认为的正常工作,我一点也不会惊讶。每天通勤到某个毫无灵魂的办公园区里的格子间,被一个你不得不称为老板的人指使——那个人可以把你叫进办公室说“坐下”,而你真的会坐下!想象一下,发布软件还需要请求许可。想象一下,周日下午因为周末即将结束而感到悲伤,因为明天又得起床去上班。他们是怎么忍受的?

想到我们可能正站在另一个类似从农业到制造业的转变的风口上,真是令人兴奋。这就是我关心创业的原因。创业之所以有趣,不仅仅是因为它是一种赚大钱的方式。我对其他赚钱方式——比如证券投机——毫不在乎。最多它们像谜题一样有趣。创业背后有更多东西。它们可能代表财富创造方式中那些罕见的历史性转变之一。

这正是我们致力于Y Combinator的动力。我们想赚钱,只是为了能够继续做这件事,但这不是主要目标。人类历史上只有少数几次这样的经济大变革。如果能加速一次变革,那将是一个了不起的黑客行为。

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