Glean 拾遗
日刊 /2026-07-07 / 异端复苏:当代社会何以重拾中世纪的言论禁忌

异端复苏:当代社会何以重拾中世纪的言论禁忌

原文 www.paulgraham.com 收录 2026-07-07 15:16 阅读 13 min
AI 解读

保罗·格雷厄姆观察到,过去几十年里,“异端”这一概念以世俗形式悄然回归:某些意见的表达会被当作罪行,导致失业与社会性抹杀。他剖析了异端的两个结构特征——(1) 优先于真伪问题,(2) 盖过当事人过去的一切贡献,并指出“好斗的从众者”是天然的审查执行者。文章追溯了这股不宽容浪潮的起源:1980年代末美国大学中出现的一种强调道德纯净的意识形态,其运作方式与宗教极其相似。格雷厄姆警告,尽管当前言论窗口的绝对宽度仍大于数百年前,但自1985年起已持续收窄,趋势本身值得警惕。他主张持续抵抗以培养“社会抗体”,并对长期前景保持乐观。文章刻意避免了具体实例,以使其在不同时期都能适用。适合关心言论自由、社会动态与职场文化的读者。

原文 13 分钟
原文 www.paulgraham.com ↗
§ 1

Heresy

异端

§ 2

April 2022One of the most surprising things I've witnessed in my lifetime is the rebirth of the concept of heresy.

In his excellent biography of Newton, Richard Westfall writes about the moment when he was elected a fellow of Trinity College:

Supported comfortably, Newton was free to devote himself wholly to whatever he chose. To remain on, he had only to avoid the three unforgivable sins: crime, heresy, and marriage. [1]

The first time I read that, in the 1990s, it sounded amusingly medieval. How strange, to have to avoid committing heresy. But when I reread it 20 years later it sounded like a description of contemporary employment.

2022年4月 我一生中目睹的最令人惊讶的事情之一,就是异端概念的复兴。

在理查德·韦斯特福尔(Richard Westfall)那本出色的牛顿传记中,他写到牛顿当选为三一学院院士的那一刻:

"在舒适的支持下,牛顿完全可以自由地全身心投入到他选择的任何事物。要留任,他只需避免三种不可饶恕的罪:犯罪、异端和婚姻。" [1]

1990年代我第一次读到这段话时,觉得它充满了可笑的中世纪气息。避免异端?多么奇怪。但20年后重读,它听起来却像是对当代就业状况的描述。

§ 3

There are an ever-increasing number of opinions you can be fired for. Those doing the firing don't use the word "heresy" to describe them, but structurally they're equivalent. Structurally there are two distinctive things about heresy: (1) that it takes priority over the question of truth or falsity, and (2) that it outweighs everything else the speaker has done.

For example, when someone calls a statement "x-ist," they're also implicitly saying that this is the end of the discussion. They do not, having said this, go on to consider whether the statement is true or not. Using such labels is the conversational equivalent of signalling an exception. That's one of the reasons they're used: to end a discussion.

If you find yourself talking to someone who uses these labels a lot, it might be worthwhile to ask them explicitly if they believe any babies are being thrown out with the bathwater. Can a statement be x-ist, for whatever value of x, and also true? If the answer is yes, then they're admitting to banning the truth. That's obvious enough that I'd guess most would answer no. But if they answer no, it's easy to show that they're mistaken, and that in practice such labels are applied to statements regardless of their truth or falsity.

The clearest evidence of this is that whether a statement is considered x-ist often depends on who said it. Truth doesn't work that way. The same statement can't be true when one person says it, but x-ist, and therefore false, when another person does. [2]

你可因持有某些观点而被解雇,这类观点的数量正在不断增加。解雇你的人不会用“异端”来形容它们,但在结构上它们是一样的。结构上,异端有两个独特之处:(1) 它优先于对真伪的考量,(2) 它压倒了发言者所做的其他一切。

例如,当有人称某种言论是“x-ist”时,他们也隐含着这句话的意思是讨论到此为止。说完这句话后,他们不会再去考虑该陈述是否为真。使用这类标签等于在对话中发出“异常”信号。这也是使用它们的原因之一:结束讨论。

如果你发现自己正在与一个频繁使用这些标签的人交谈,不妨直接问他们是否认为存在“把婴儿连同洗澡水一起倒掉”的情况。一个陈述能否在(无论x取何值)被标为x-ist的同时仍然为真?如果答案是肯定的,那他们就是在承认禁止真理。这太明显了,我猜大多数人会回答“不能”。但若他们回答“不能”,就很容易证明他们错了:实际上,这类标签的运用与陈述的真假无关。

最明显的证据是,一个陈述是否被视为x-ist,往往取决于说话的人是谁。真理不是这样的。同一句话,一个人说为真,另一个人说则成为x-ist(因而为假),这是不可能的。 [2]

§ 4

The other distinctive thing about heresies, compared to ordinary opinions, is that the public expression of them outweighs everything else the speaker has done. In ordinary matters, like knowledge of history, or taste in music, you're judged by the average of your opinions. A heresy is qualitatively different. It's like dropping a chunk of uranium onto the scale.

Back in the day (and still, in some places) the punishment for heresy was death. You could have led a life of exemplary goodness, but if you publicly doubted, say, the divinity of Christ, you were going to burn. Nowadays, in civilized countries, heretics only get fired in the metaphorical sense, by losing their jobs. But the structure of the situation is the same: the heresy outweighs everything else. You could have spent the last ten years saving children's lives, but if you express certain opinions, you're automatically fired.

It's much the same as if you committed a crime. No matter how virtuously you've lived, if you commit a crime, you must still suffer the penalty of the law. Having lived a previously blameless life might mitigate the punishment, but it doesn't affect whether you're guilty or not.

A heresy is an opinion whose expression is treated like a crime — one that makes some people feel not merely that you're mistaken, but that you should be punished. Indeed, their desire to see you punished is often stronger than it would be if you'd committed an actual crime. There are many on the far left who believe strongly in the reintegration of felons (as I do myself), and yet seem to feel that anyone guilty of certain heresies should never work again.

与普通观点相比,异端的另一个独特之处在于:公开表达它们会压过说话者所做的一切。在普通事情上(如历史知识或音乐品味),人们根据你观点的平均值来评判你。异端则完全不同,就像往秤上扔了一块铀。

在过去(而且有些地方至今如此),异端的惩罚是死刑。你可以过着模范般善良的生活,但只要你公开怀疑(比如)基督的神性,你就会被烧死。如今在文明国家,异端只会在比喻意义上被“烧死”——丢掉工作。但情况的结构是一样的:异端压倒一切。你可能过去十年都在拯救儿童的生命,但只要表达某些观点,你就会被自动解雇。

这与犯罪极为相似。无论你此前生活得多么有德,一旦犯罪,就必须受到法律惩罚。清白的既往生活或许能减轻刑罚,但不会影响你是否构成犯罪。

异端是一种表达后会被当成犯罪对待的意见——它不仅让一些人觉得你错了,更觉得你应该受到惩罚。事实上,他们希望你受惩的愿望往往比对你真正犯罪时还要强烈。极左派中有许多人强烈主张重罪犯重新融入社会(我也是如此),但他们似乎认为,犯有某些异端罪的人就应该永不再被雇用。

§ 5

There are always some heresies — some opinions you'd be punished for expressing. But there are a lot more now than there were a few decades ago, and even those who are happy about this would have to agree that it's so.

Why? Why has this antiquated-sounding religious concept come back in a secular form? And why now?

异端总是存在的——有些意见你表达后会受到惩罚。但现在的数量比几十年前多得多,即使对此感到高兴的人也不得不承认这一点。

为什么?为什么这个听起来很古老的宗教概念会以世俗形式卷土重来?而且为什么是现在?

§ 6

You need two ingredients for a wave of intolerance: intolerant people, and an ideology to guide them. The intolerant people are always there. They exist in every sufficiently large society. That's why waves of intolerance can arise so suddenly; all they need is something to set them off.

一场不宽容的浪潮需要两个要素:不宽容的人,以及引导他们的意识形态。不宽容的人始终存在。任何一个足够大的社会里都有他们。这就是为什么不宽容浪潮可能如此突然地出现;他们只需要一个触发点。

§ 7

I've already written an essay describing the aggressively conventional-minded. The short version is that people can be classified in two dimensions according to (1) how independent- or conventional-minded they are, and (2) how aggressive they are about it. The aggressively conventional-minded are the enforcers of orthodoxy.

Normally they're only locally visible. They're the grumpy, censorious people in a group — the ones who are always first to complain when something violates the current rules of propriety. But occasionally, like a vector field whose elements become aligned, a large number of aggressively conventional-minded people unite behind some ideology all at once. Then they become much more of a problem, because a mob dynamic takes over, where the enthusiasm of each participant is increased by the enthusiasm of the others.

我已在另一篇文章中描述了“激进传统主义者”。简而言之,可以根据两个维度对人进行分类:(1) 他们思想独立或传统的程度,(2) 他们的激进程度。激进传统主义者是正统的执法者。

通常他们只在局部可见。他们是一群中脾气暴躁、爱挑剔的人——当某些事情违反当前礼仪规则时,他们总是最先抱怨。但偶尔,就像矢量场中的元素对齐一样,大量激进传统主义者会突然团结在某种意识形态背后。这时它们就成了更大的问题,因为会形成群体效应,每个参与者的热情相互助长。

§ 8

The most notorious 20th century case may have been the Cultural Revolution. Though initiated by Mao to undermine his rivals, the Cultural Revolution was otherwise mostly a grass-roots phenomenon. Mao said in essence: There are heretics among us. Seek them out and punish them. And that's all the aggressively conventional-minded ever need to hear. They went at it with the delight of dogs chasing squirrels.

20世纪最臭名昭著的案例大概要数文化大革命。虽然它由毛泽东发动以打击对手,但除此之外基本是一种草根现象。毛泽东实质上是在说:我们中间有异端。找出他们并予以惩罚。这正是激进传统主义者一直想听到的话。他们像狗追松鼠一样兴高采烈地行动起来。

§ 9

To unite the conventional-minded, an ideology must have many of the features of a religion. In particular it must have strict and arbitrary rules that adherents can demonstrate their purity by obeying, and its adherents must believe that anyone who obeys these rules is ipso facto morally superior to anyone who doesn't. [3] The rules must be strict, but they need not be demanding. So the most effective type of rules are those about superficial matters, like doctrinal minutiae, or the precise words adherents must use. Such rules can be made extremely complicated, and yet don't repel potential converts by requiring significant sacrifice. The superficial demands of orthodoxy make it an inexpensive substitute for virtue. And that in turn is one of the reasons orthodoxy is so attractive to bad people. You could be a horrible person, and yet as long as you're orthodox, you're better than everyone who isn't.

要团结传统主义者,意识形态必须具有许多宗教的特征。特别是它必须有严格而专断的规则,遵守规则可以证明自己的纯洁性,并且遵守者必须相信,凡是遵守这些规则的人在道德上自然优于不遵守的人。 [3] 规则必须严格,但无需苛刻。因此最有效的规则是那些关于表面事情的规则,比如教义细节,或者信徒必须使用的精确措辞。这类规则可以极其复杂,却不会因要求巨大牺牲而吓跑潜在皈依者。 正统的表面要求使其成为一种廉价的替代美德。这反过来也是正统对坏人如此有吸引力的原因之一。你可以是一个可怕的人,但只要你是正统的,你就比所有非正统的人更好。

§ 10

In the late 1980s a new ideology of this type appeared in US universities. It had a very strong component of moral purity, and the aggressively conventional-minded seized upon it with their usual eagerness — all the more because the relaxation of social norms in the preceding decades meant there had been less and less to forbid. The resulting wave of intolerance has been eerily similar in form to the Cultural Revolution, though fortunately much smaller in magnitude. [4]

1980年代末,一种这类新意识形态出现在美国大学中。它带有非常强的道德纯洁成分,激进传统主义者以他们一贯的热切抓住了它——更是因为之前几十年社会规范的放松意味着可供禁止的东西越来越少。由此产生的不宽容浪潮在形式上与文化大革命极其相似,尽管幸运的是规模小得多。 [4]

§ 11

I've deliberately avoided mentioning any specific heresies here. Partly because one of the universal tactics of heretic hunters, now as in the past, is to accuse those who disapprove of the way in which they suppress ideas of being heretics themselves. Indeed, this tactic is so consistent that you could use it as a way of detecting witch hunts in any era.

And that's the second reason I've avoided mentioning any specific heresies. I want this essay to work in the future, not just now. And unfortunately it probably will. The aggressively conventional-minded will always be among us, looking for things to forbid. All they need is an ideology to tell them what. And it's unlikely the current one will be the last.

我在这里刻意避免提及任何具体的异端。部分原因在于,异端猎人(无论古今)的通用策略之一,就是指责那些不赞同他们压制思想方式的人为异端本身。事实上,这一策略如此一致,以至于你可以用它来识别任何时代的猎巫行动。

这也是我避免提及具体异端的第二个原因。我希望这篇文章在未来也能适用,而不仅仅是当下。而很不幸,它很可能适用。激进传统主义者将永远在我们中间,寻找可以禁止的东西。他们只需要一个意识形态告诉他们禁止什么。而且目前的这个不太可能成为最后一个。

§ 12

There are aggressively conventional-minded people on both the right and the left. The reason the current wave of intolerance comes from the left is simply because the new unifying ideology happened to come from the left. The next one might come from the right. Imagine what that would be like.

左翼和右翼都有激进传统主义者。当前的不宽容浪潮来自左翼,只不过是因为新的统一意识形态碰巧来自左翼。下一次可能来自右翼。想象一下那会是什么样子。

§ 13

Fortunately in western countries the suppression of heresies is nothing like as bad as it used to be. Though the window of opinions you can express publicly has narrowed in the last decade, it's still much wider than it was a few hundred years ago. The problem is the derivative. Up till about 1985 the window had been growing ever wider. Anyone looking into the future in 1985 would have expected freedom of expression to continue to increase. Instead it has decreased. [5]

幸运的是,在西方国家,对异端的压制远不如过去严重。尽管过去十年里你可以公开表达的意见窗口有所收窄,但它仍然比几百年前宽得多。问题在于导数。直到大约1985年,窗口一直在不断变宽。任何在1985年展望未来的人都会预期言论自由将继续增加。然而实际上它减少了。 [5]

§ 14

The situation is similar to what's happened with infectious diseases like measles. Anyone looking into the future in 2010 would have expected the number of measles cases in the US to continue to decrease. Instead, thanks to anti-vaxxers, it has increased. The absolute number is still not that high. The problem is the derivative. [6]

这种情况类似于麻疹等传染病。任何在2010年展望未来的人都会预期美国麻疹病例数将继续下降。然而,由于反疫苗者,它反而上升了。绝对数字仍然不算高。问题在于导数。 [6]

§ 15

In both cases it's hard to know how much to worry. Is it really dangerous to society as a whole if a handful of extremists refuse to get their kids vaccinated, or shout down speakers at universities? The point to start worrying is presumably when their efforts start to spill over into everyone else's lives. And in both cases that does seem to be happening.

在这两种情况下,很难知道该担心到什么程度。如果少数极端分子拒绝给孩子接种疫苗,或在大学里喊倒演讲者,对整个社会来说真的很危险吗?大概开始担心的时候,是当他们的努力开始溢出到每个人的生活中时。这两种情况似乎都在发生。

§ 16

So it's probably worth spending some amount of effort on pushing back to keep open the window of free expression. My hope is that this essay will help form social antibodies not just against current efforts to suppress ideas, but against the concept of heresy in general. That's the real prize. How do you disable the concept of heresy? Since the Enlightenment, western societies have discovered many techniques for doing that, but there are surely more to be discovered.

Overall I'm optimistic. Though the trend in freedom of expression has been bad over the last decade, it's been good over the longer term. And there are signs that the current wave of intolerance is peaking. Independent-minded people I talk to seem more confident than they did a few years ago. On the other side, even some of the leaders are starting to wonder if things have gone too far. And popular culture among the young has already moved on. All we have to do is keep pushing back, and the wave collapses. And then we'll be net ahead, because as well as having defeated this wave, we'll also have developed new tactics for resisting the next one.

因此,花费一些精力去反击,以保持言论自由的窗口开放,很可能是值得的。我希望这篇文章不仅有助于形成针对当前压制思想行为的社会抗体,更有助于形成针对异端概念本身的社会抗体。这才是真正的目标。如何废除异端概念?自启蒙运动以来,西方社会已经发现了许多方法,但肯定还有更多等待发现。

总体而言,我持乐观态度。尽管过去十年言论自由的趋势不佳,但从更长周期看是好的。而且有迹象表明当前的不宽容浪潮正在见顶。我接触到的思想独立的人们似乎比几年前更有信心。另一方面,即使是某些领军人物也开始怀疑事情是否走得太远。年轻人的流行文化已经往前走了。我们所要做的就是不断反击,浪潮就会崩溃。那时我们将整体向前,因为不仅击败了这次浪潮,我们还为抵抗下一次浪潮发展了新的战术。

§ 17

[1] Or more accurately, biographies of Newton, since Westfall wrote two: a long version called Never at Rest, and a shorter one called The Life of Isaac Newton. Both are great. The short version moves faster, but the long one is full of interesting and often very funny details. This passage is the same in both.

[2] Another more subtle but equally damning bit of evidence is that claims of x-ism are never qualified. You never hear anyone say that a statement is "probably x-ist" or "almost certainly y-ist." If claims of x-ism were actually claims about truth, you'd expect to see "probably" in front of "x-ist" as often as you see it in front of "fallacious."

[3] The rules must be strict, but they need not be demanding. So the most effective type of rules are those about superficial matters, like doctrinal minutiae, or the precise words adherents must use. Such rules can be made extremely complicated, and yet don't repel potential converts by requiring significant sacrifice.

The superficial demands of orthodoxy make it an inexpensive substitute for virtue. And that in turn is one of the reasons orthodoxy is so attractive to bad people. You could be a horrible person, and yet as long as you're orthodox, you're better than everyone who isn't.

[4] Arguably there were two. The first had died down somewhat by 2000, but was followed by a second in the 2010s, probably caused by social media.

[5] Fortunately most of those trying to suppress ideas today still respect Enlightenment principles enough to pay lip service to them. They know they're not supposed to ban ideas per se, so they have to recast the ideas as causing "harm," which sounds like something that can be banned. The more extreme try to claim speech itself is violence, or even that silence is. But strange as it may sound, such gymnastics are a good sign. We'll know we're really in trouble when they stop bothering to invent pretenses for banning ideas — when, like the medieval church, they say "Damn right we're banning ideas, and in fact here's a list of them."

[6] People only have the luxury of ignoring the medical consensus about vaccines because vaccines have worked so well. If we didn't have any vaccines at all, the mortality rate would be so high that most current anti-vaxxers would be begging for them. And the situation with freedom of expression is similar. It's only because they live in a world created by the Enlightenment that kids from the suburbs can play at banning ideas.

[1] 更准确地说,是牛顿的传记,因为韦斯特福尔写了两种版本:一部长篇叫《永不停息》,一部短篇叫《艾萨克·牛顿传》。两者都很好。短篇节奏更快,但长篇充满了有趣且常常非常搞笑的细节。这段话在两个版本中是一样的。

[2] 另一个更微妙但同样致命的证据是,关于x-ism的指控从来不会被修饰。你永远不会听到有人说某个陈述“可能是x-ist”或“几乎肯定是y-ist”。如果x-ism的指控实际上是关于真实性的,那么你应该会看到“可能”出现在“x-ist”前面,就像出现在“谬误”前面那样频繁。

[3] 规则必须严格,但未必需要严苛。因此最有效的规则是关于表面事物的规则,比如教义细节,或者信徒必须使用的精确措辞。这类规则可以极其复杂,却不会因为要求巨大牺牲而吓跑潜在皈依者。

正统的表面要求使其成为一种廉价的替代美德。这反过来也是正统对坏人如此有吸引力的原因之一。你可以是一个可怕的人,但只要你是正统的,你就比所有非正统的人更好。

[4] 可以说有两次。第一次到2000年时有所平息,但之后在2010年代又出现了第二次,很可能是由社交媒体引起的。

[5] 幸运的是,如今大多数试图压制思想的人仍然尊重启蒙原则,至少在口头上如此。他们知道不应该直接禁止思想,所以他们不得不把思想重新描述为造成“伤害”,这听起来像是一种可以禁止的东西。更极端的人试图声称言语本身就是暴力,甚至沉默也是。但尽管听起来奇怪,这种故作姿态却是个好兆头。当他们不再费心为禁止思想编造借口时——当他们像中世纪教会那样说“没错,我们就是在禁止思想,实际上这是清单”——那时我们才知道真的麻烦了。

[6] 人们之所以有奢侈去忽视关于疫苗的医学共识,是因为疫苗效果太好了。如果我们根本没有疫苗,死亡率会高到使大多数反疫苗者都去乞求疫苗。而言论自由的状况与此类似。正是因为生活在一个由启蒙运动创造的世界里,郊区的孩子们才能玩禁止思想的游戏。

§ 18

Thanks to Marc Andreessen, Chris Best, Trevor Blackwell, Nicholas Christakis, Daniel Gackle, Jonathan Haidt, Claire Lehmann, Jessica Livingston, Greg Lukianoff, Robert Morris, and Garry Tan for reading drafts of this.

感谢马克·安德森(Marc Andreessen)、克里斯·贝斯特(Chris Best)、特雷弗·布莱克韦尔(Trevor Blackwell)、尼古拉斯·克里斯塔基斯(Nicholas Christakis)、丹尼尔·加克尔(Daniel Gackle)、乔纳森·海特(Jonathan Haidt)、克莱尔·莱曼(Claire Lehmann)、杰西卡·利文斯顿(Jessica Livingston)、格雷格·卢基安诺夫(Greg Lukianoff)、罗伯特·莫里斯(Robert Morris)和加里·谭(Garry Tan)阅读本文的草稿。

打开原文 ↗