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雇佣已过时:为何创业比打工好

原文 www.paulgraham.com 收录 2026-07-07 14:43 阅读 27 min
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Paul Graham 在2005年发表的经典文章,论述了创业成本急剧下降如何改变年轻人与雇主、投资者之间的权力平衡。核心观点是:创业仅需约一万美元生活费,年轻人无需再通过大公司“雇佣”来估算自身价值,可以直接面向用户创造财富。大公司通过收购初创公司实现变相招聘,这比内部研发更高效。文章强调年轻时承担创业风险的数学优势——即使失败,其经历也受雇主认可,且失败成本极低。适合对创业感兴趣的工程师和学生阅读。

原文 27 分钟
原文 www.paulgraham.com ↗
§ 1

§ 2

Hiring is Obsolete

Hiring is Obsolete

§ 3

May 2005

(This essay is derived from a talk at the Berkeley CSUA.)

The three big powers on the Internet now are Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft. Average age of their founders: 24. So it is pretty well established now that grad students can start successful companies. And if grad students can do it, why not undergrads?

Like everything else in technology, the cost of starting a startup has decreased dramatically. Now it's so low that it has disappeared into the noise. The main cost of starting a Web-based startup is food and rent. Which means it doesn't cost much more to start a company than to be a total slacker. You can probably start a startup on ten thousand dollars of seed funding, if you're prepared to live on ramen.

The less it costs to start a company, the less you need the permission of investors to do it. So a lot of people will be able to start companies now who never could have before.

The most interesting subset may be those in their early twenties. I'm not so excited about founders who have everything investors want except intelligence, or everything except energy. The most promising group to be liberated by the new, lower threshold are those who have everything investors want except experience.

2005年5月

(本文源于在伯克利CSUA的一次演讲。)

如今互联网的三大巨头是雅虎、谷歌和微软,其创始人平均年龄24岁。事实已充分证明,研究生能创办成功公司。既然研究生可以,本科生为什么不行?

与科技领域其他事物一样,创业成本已大幅下降,低到几乎可以忽略不计。开办一家基于Web的创业公司主要成本不过是食物和房租,这意味着创业与当个彻头彻尾的懒汉花费相差无几。如果你愿意靠吃方便面维生,可能一万美元种子资金就能启动一个创业公司。

创业成本越低,就越不需要投资者批准。因此,现在很多过去无法创业的人都可以创业了。

最有趣的群体可能是二十出头的人。我并非对那种投资者所想要的一切都具备、唯独缺乏智慧或精力的创始人感到兴奋。新门槛降低后,最有希望解放出来的群体是那些拥有投资者想要的一切、唯独缺乏经验的人。

§ 4

Market Rate

I once claimed that nerds were unpopular in secondary school mainly because they had better things to do than work full-time at being popular. Some said I was just telling people what they wanted to hear. Well, I'm now about to do that in a spectacular way: I think undergraduates are undervalued.

Or more precisely, I think few realize the huge spread in the value of 20 year olds. Some, it's true, are not very capable. But others are more capable than all but a handful of 30 year olds.

[1]

Till now the problem has always been that it's difficult to pick them out. Every VC in the world, if they could go back in time, would try to invest in Microsoft. But which would have then? How many would have understood that this particular 19 year old was Bill Gates?

It's hard to judge the young because (a) they change rapidly, (b) there is great variation between them, and (c) they're individually inconsistent. That last one is a big problem. When you're young, you occasionally say and do stupid things even when you're smart. So if the algorithm is to filter out people who say stupid things, as many investors and employers unconsciously do, you're going to get a lot of false positives.

Most organizations who hire people right out of college are only aware of the average value of 22 year olds, which is not that high. And so the idea for most of the twentieth century was that everyone had to begin as a trainee in some entry-level job. Organizations realized there was a lot of variation in the incoming stream, but instead of pursuing this thought they tended to suppress it, in the belief that it was good for even the most promising kids to start at the bottom, so they didn't get swelled heads.

The most productive young people will always be undervalued by large organizations, because the young have no performance to measure yet, and any error in guessing their ability will tend toward the mean.

What's an especially productive 22 year old to do? One thing you can do is go over the heads of organizations, directly to the users. Any company that hires you is, economically, acting as a proxy for the customer. The rate at which they value you (though they may not consciously realize it) is an attempt to guess your value to the user. But there's a way to appeal their judgement. If you want, you can opt to be valued directly by users, by starting your own company.

The market is a lot more discerning than any employer. And it is completely non-discriminatory. On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog. And more to the point, nobody knows you're 22. All users care about is whether your site or software gives them what they want. They don't care if the person behind it is a high school kid.

If you're really productive, why not make employers pay market rate for you? Why go work as an ordinary employee for a big company, when you could start a startup and make them buy it to get you?

When most people hear the word "startup," they think of the famous ones that have gone public. But most startups that succeed do it by getting bought. And usually the acquirer doesn't just want the technology, but the people who created it as well.

Often big companies buy startups before they're profitable. Obviously in such cases they're not after revenues. What they want is the development team and the software they've built so far. When a startup gets bought for 2 or 3 million six months in, it's really more of a hiring bonus than an acquisition.

I think this sort of thing will happen more and more, and that it will be better for everyone. It's obviously better for the people who start the startup, because they get a big chunk of money up front. But I think it will be better for the acquirers too. The central problem in big companies, and the main reason they're so much less productive than small companies, is the difficulty of valuing each person's work. Buying larval startups solves that problem for them: the acquirer doesn't pay till the developers have proven themselves. Acquirers are protected on the downside, but still get most of the upside.

市场定价

我曾声称,书呆子在中学不受欢迎,主要是因为他们有更好的事情要做,而不是全职搞社交。有人说我是在迎合读者。好吧,我现在要以一种惊人的方式再做一次:我认为本科生被低估了。

更准确地说,很少有人意识到20岁年轻人的价值差距有多大。的确,有些人能力一般。但另一些人比绝大多数30岁的人都更有能力。[1]

到目前为止,问题一直是很难挑出他们。世界上每个风投,如果能回到过去,都会试图投资微软。但当时谁会呢?有多少人能理解这个19岁的年轻人是比尔·盖茨?

年轻人很难判断,因为(a)他们变化很快,(b)个体之间差异巨大,(c)他们自身不稳定。最后一点是大问题。年轻时,即使你很聪明,偶尔也会说蠢话做蠢事。所以如果算法是过滤掉说蠢话的人——许多投资者和雇主不知不觉中就是这么做的——就会产生大量误报。

大多数直接从大学招聘的组织只了解22岁年轻人的平均价值,而这个平均值并不高。因此,20世纪大部分时间的主流理念是每个人都必须从入门级培训生开始。组织意识到新进人员中差异很大,但它们往往压制这种想法,认为即使最有前途的孩子也最好从底层做起,免得他们翘尾巴。

最有创造力的年轻人总是被大组织低估,因为他们还没有业绩可衡量,而任何能力猜测的误差都会趋向平均值。

一个特别有生产力的22岁年轻人该怎么办?你可以绕过组织,直接面向用户。雇佣你的公司,在经济上只是客户的代理人。他们给你定的薪酬(尽管可能没有意识到)是猜测你对用户的价值。但你可以上诉他们的判决:如果你想,你可以选择自己创办公司,直接由用户来估值。

市场比任何雇主都更具洞察力,而且完全无歧视。在互联网上,没人知道你是一条狗。更关键的是,没人知道你22岁。用户只关心你的网站或软件是否能给他们想要的东西,他们不在乎背后是不是一个高中生。

如果你真的高效,为什么不让雇主按市场价付你钱?为什么要作为普通员工去大公司工作,而不去创办一家创业公司,然后让他们通过收购来得到你?

当大多数人听到“创业公司”这个词,他们会想到那些上市的著名公司。但大多数成功的创业公司是通过被收购实现的。收购方通常不仅想要技术,还希望得到创造它的人。

大公司经常在创业公司还未盈利时收购它们。显然,这种情况下它们不是为了收入,而是想要开发团队和他们已经构建的软件。当一个创业公司在六个月时以两三百万美元被收购,那实际上更像是一笔招聘奖金,而不是收购。

我认为这种事情会越来越多,对所有人都更好。对创业公司创始人显然更好,因为他们提前获得了一大笔钱。但我认为对收购方也更有利。大公司的核心问题,以及它们为什么比小公司生产力低得多的主要原因,是难以评估每个人的工作。收购早期初创公司解决了这个问题:收购方在开发者证明自己之前不必付钱。收购方在下跌时受到保护,但仍然获得大部分上涨收益。

§ 5

Product Development

Buying startups also solves another problem afflicting big companies: they can't do product development. Big companies are good at extracting the value from existing products, but bad at creating new ones.

Why? It's worth studying this phenomenon in detail, because this is the raison d'etre of startups.

To start with, most big companies have some kind of turf to protect, and this tends to warp their development decisions. For example, Web-based applications are hot now, but within Microsoft there must be a lot of ambivalence about them, because the very idea of Web-based software threatens the desktop. So any Web-based application that Microsoft ends up with, will probably, like Hotmail, be something developed outside the company.

Another reason big companies are bad at developing new products is that the kind of people who do that tend not to have much power in big companies (unless they happen to be the CEO). Disruptive technologies are developed by disruptive people. And they either don't work for the big company, or have been outmaneuvered by yes-men and have comparatively little influence.

Big companies also lose because they usually only build one of each thing. When you only have one Web browser, you can't do anything really risky with it. If ten different startups design ten different Web browsers and you take the best, you'll probably get something better.

The more general version of this problem is that there are too many new ideas for companies to explore them all. There might be 500 startups right now who think they're making something Microsoft might buy. Even Microsoft probably couldn't manage 500 development projects in-house.

Big companies also don't pay people the right way. People developing a new product at a big company get paid roughly the same whether it succeeds or fails. People at a startup expect to get rich if the product succeeds, and get nothing if it fails.

[2] So naturally the people at the startup work a lot harder.

The mere bigness of big companies is an obstacle. In startups, developers are often forced to talk directly to users, whether they want to or not, because there is no one else to do sales and support. It's painful doing sales, but you learn much more from trying to sell people something than reading what they said in focus groups.

And then of course, big companies are bad at product development because they're bad at everything. Everything happens slower in big companies than small ones, and product development is something that has to happen fast, because you have to go through a lot of iterations to get something good.

产品开发

收购创业公司还解决了困扰大公司的另一个问题:它们无法做好产品开发。大公司擅长从现有产品中提取价值,但不擅长创造新产品。

为什么?这值得详细研究,因为这是创业公司存在的理由。

首先,大多数大公司都有要保护的地盘,这往往会扭曲它们的开发决策。例如,基于Web的应用现在很热门,但在微软内部一定存在很多矛盾心理,因为Web软件的概念本身就威胁到桌面。因此,微软最终拿到的任何Web应用,很可能像Hotmail一样,是公司外部开发的。

另一个原因是,擅长开发新产品的人在大公司中通常没有太多权力(除非恰好是CEO)。颠覆性技术是由颠覆性的人开发的。他们要么不为大公司工作,要么已被唯唯诺诺的人排挤,影响力相对较小。

大公司还会输,因为它们通常只构建每种东西的一个版本。当你只有一个Web浏览器时,不能对它做任何真正冒险的事情。如果十个不同的创业公司设计了十种不同的Web浏览器,你从中选出最好的,你可能会得到更好的东西。

这个问题的更一般版本是,新想法太多,公司无法全部探索。现在可能有500家创业公司认为自己在做什么微软可能收购的东西。即使是微软,内部可能也管理不了500个开发项目。

大公司付薪方式也不对。在大公司开发新产品的人,无论产品成功还是失败,报酬大致相同。而在创业公司,人们期望产品成功就发财,失败则一无所有。[2] 所以自然创业公司的人工作更努力。

仅仅是规模大本身也是障碍。在创业公司,开发者经常被迫直接与用户交谈,无论他们愿不愿意,因为没有其他人做销售和支持。做销售很痛苦,但通过尝试向人们推销东西学到的东西,比阅读焦点小组的报告要多得多。

当然,大公司产品开发差,还因为它们什么都差。大公司的一切都比小公司慢,而产品开发必须快,因为要经过大量迭代才能得到好的东西。

§ 6

Trend

I think the trend of big companies buying startups will only accelerate. One of the biggest remaining obstacles is pride. Most companies, at least unconsciously, feel they ought to be able to develop stuff in house, and that buying startups is to some degree an admission of failure. And so, as people generally do with admissions of failure, they put it off for as long as possible. That makes the acquisition very expensive when it finally happens.

What companies should do is go out and discover startups when they're young, before VCs have puffed them up into something that costs hundreds of millions to acquire. Much of what VCs add, the acquirer doesn't need anyway.

Why don't acquirers try to predict the companies they're going to have to buy for hundreds of millions, and grab them early for a tenth or a twentieth of that? Because they can't predict the winners in advance? If they're only paying a twentieth as much, they only have to predict a twentieth as well. Surely they can manage that.

I think companies that acquire technology will gradually learn to go after earlier stage startups. They won't necessarily buy them outright. The solution may be some hybrid of investment and acquisition: for example, to buy a chunk of the company and get an option to buy the rest later.

When companies buy startups, they're effectively fusing recruiting and product development. And I think that's more efficient than doing the two separately, because you always get people who are really committed to what they're working on.

Plus this method yields teams of developers who already work well together. Any conflicts between them have been ironed out under the very hot iron of running a startup. By the time the acquirer gets them, they're finishing one another's sentences. That's valuable in software, because so many bugs occur at the boundaries between different people's code.

趋势

我认为大公司收购创业公司的趋势只会加速。一个最大的障碍是骄傲。大多数公司,至少潜意识里,认为自己应该能在内部开发,而收购创业公司在某种程度上是承认失败。因此,就像人们通常对待承认失败一样,它们尽可能拖延,导致最终收购成本非常高昂。

公司应该做的是在创业公司还年轻时就去发现它们,在VC把它们吹嘘成需要数亿美元收购之前。VC增加的大部分东西,收购方其实并不需要。

为什么收购方不尝试预测它们将来必须花数亿美元收购的公司,早点以十分之一或二十分之一的价格拿下呢?是因为无法提前预测赢家?如果只付二十分之一的价格,那么预测准确率只需二十分之一即可。它们肯定能做到。

我认为收购技术的公司会逐渐学会去追求更早期的创业公司。它们不必完全收购。解决办法可能是投资与收购的混合:例如,购买公司的一部分股份,并获得以后购买剩余部分的期权。

当公司收购创业公司时,它们实际上将招聘和产品开发融为一体。我认为这比分开做更高效,因为你总能得到真正致力于自己工作的人。

此外,这种方法会产生已经良好合作的开发团队。他们在创业过程中经历的高温已经磨合了彼此冲突。当收购方得到他们时,他们已经能接上对方的话茬。这在软件领域非常有价值,因为许多bug出现在不同人代码的边界之间。

§ 7

Investors

The increasing cheapness of starting a company doesn't just give hackers more power relative to employers. It also gives them more power relative to investors.

The conventional wisdom among VCs is that hackers shouldn't be allowed to run their own companies. The founders are supposed to accept MBAs as their bosses, and themselves take on some title like Chief Technical Officer. There may be cases where this is a good idea. But I think founders will increasingly be able to push back in the matter of control, because they just don't need the investors' money as much as they used to.

Startups are a comparatively new phenomenon. Fairchild Semiconductor is considered the first VC-backed startup, and they were founded in 1959, less than fifty years ago. Measured on the time scale of social change, what we have now is pre-beta. So we shouldn't assume the way startups work now is the way they have to work.

Fairchild needed a lot of money to get started. They had to build actual factories. What does the first round of venture funding for a Web-based startup get spent on today? More money can't get software written faster; it isn't needed for facilities, because those can now be quite cheap; all money can really buy you is sales and marketing. A sales force is worth something, I'll admit. But marketing is increasingly irrelevant. On the Internet, anything genuinely good will spread by word of mouth.

Investors' power comes from money. When startups need less money, investors have less power over them. So future founders may not have to accept new CEOs if they don't want them. The VCs will have to be dragged kicking and screaming down this road, but like many things people have to be dragged kicking and screaming toward, it may actually be good for them.

Google is a sign of the way things are going. As a condition of funding, their investors insisted they hire someone old and experienced as CEO. But from what I've heard the founders didn't just give in and take whoever the VCs wanted. They delayed for an entire year, and when they did finally take a CEO, they chose a guy with a PhD in computer science.

It sounds to me as if the founders are still the most powerful people in the company, and judging by Google's performance, their youth and inexperience doesn't seem to have hurt them. Indeed, I suspect Google has done better than they would have if the founders had given the VCs what they wanted, when they wanted it, and let some MBA take over as soon as they got their first round of funding.

I'm not claiming the business guys installed by VCs have no value. Certainly they have. But they don't need to become the founders' bosses, which is what that title CEO means. I predict that in the future the executives installed by VCs will increasingly be COOs rather than CEOs. The founders will run engineering directly, and the rest of the company through the COO.

投资者

创业成本的不断降低不仅让黑客(年轻程序员)相对于雇主更有力量,也让他们相对于投资者更有力量。

风险投资界的传统观点是,黑客不应该被允许运营自己的公司。创始人应该接受MBA作为老板,自己担任首席技术官之类的头衔。在某些情况下,这或许是个好主意。但我认为创始人将越来越有能力在控制权上反击,因为他们不像过去那样需要投资者的钱了。

创业公司是一个相对较新的现象。仙童半导体被认为是第一家VC支持的创业公司,成立于1959年,不到五十年前。以社会变革的时间尺度衡量,我们现在还处于pre-beta阶段。所以我们不应该假设现在创业公司的运作方式就是它们必须的运作方式。

仙童需要大量资金才能起步,他们必须建造实体工厂。今天,基于Web的创业公司第一轮融资花在什么地方?更多的钱不能更快地写完软件;设施不需要,因为它们现在可以非常便宜;钱真正能买到的是销售和营销。我承认销售团队有价值,但营销越来越无关紧要。在互联网上,任何真正好的东西都会通过口碑传播。

投资者的力量来自金钱。当创业公司需要更少资金时,投资者对它们的控制力就减弱。因此,未来的创始人可能不必接受不想要的新CEO。VC们将被连拖带拽地走上这条路,但就像许多人们必须被连拖带拽才肯走的路一样,这实际上可能对他们有好处。

谷歌是未来趋势的征兆。作为融资条件,投资者坚持要求他们雇佣一位年长有经验的CEO。但据我所知,创始人并没有简单地屈服并接受VC想要的人。他们拖延了整整一年,最终选择了一位拥有计算机科学博士学位的CEO。

在我看来,创始人仍然是公司最有权力的人,从谷歌的表现来看,他们的年轻和缺乏经验似乎并没有伤害他们。事实上,我怀疑如果创始人在获得第一轮融资后就顺从VC,让某个MBA接管,谷歌可能不会做得这么好。

我并不是说VC安置的业务人员没有价值。他们当然有。但他们不需要成为创始人的老板,而CEO这个头衔就意味着老板。我预测未来VC安置的高管将越来越多是COO而不是CEO。创始人将直接管理工程,并通过COO管理公司的其他部分。

§ 8

The Open Cage

With both employers and investors, the balance of power is slowly shifting towards the young. And yet they seem the last to realize it. Only the most ambitious undergrads even consider starting their own company when they graduate. Most just want to get a job.

Maybe this is as it should be. Maybe if the idea of starting a startup is intimidating, you filter out the uncommitted. But I suspect the filter is set a little too high. I think there are people who could, if they tried, start successful startups, and who instead let themselves be swept into the intake ducts of big companies.

Have you ever noticed that when animals are let out of cages, they don't always realize at first that the door's open? Often they have to be poked with a stick to get them out. Something similar happened with blogs. People could have been publishing online in 1995, and yet blogging has only really taken off in the last couple years. In 1995 we thought only professional writers were entitled to publish their ideas, and that anyone else who did was a crank. Now publishing online is becoming so popular that everyone wants to do it, even print journalists. But blogging has not taken off recently because of any technical innovation; it just took eight years for everyone to realize the cage was open.

I think most undergrads don't realize yet that the economic cage is open. A lot have been told by their parents that the route to success is to get a good job. This was true when their parents were in college, but it's less true now. The route to success is to build something valuable, and you don't have to be working for an existing company to do that. Indeed, you can often do it better if you're not.

When I talk to undergrads, what surprises me most about them is how conservative they are. Not politically, of course. I mean they don't seem to want to take risks. This is a mistake, because the younger you are, the more risk you can take.

打开的笼子

在雇主和投资者两方面,权力平衡正在缓慢地转向年轻人。然而,他们似乎是最后意识到这一点的群体。只有最有雄心的本科生才会考虑毕业后创业。大多数人只想找份工作。

也许这本应如此。也许创业的想法令人畏惧,能过滤掉那些不坚定的人。但我怀疑过滤门槛设置得有点太高了。我认为有些人,如果他们尝试,可以创办成功的创业公司,却让自己被卷入大公司的进气管道。

你有没有注意到,当动物被放出笼子时,它们起初并不总是意识到门开了?通常需要用棍子戳才能让它们出去。类似的事情也发生在博客上。人们本可以在1995年就在线发表文章,但博客真正流行起来只是最近几年。1995年我们认为只有专业作家才有资格发表观点,其他人这样做就是怪人。现在在线出版变得如此流行,每个人都想尝试,甚至印刷媒体记者也是如此。但博客的兴起并非因为任何技术创新;只是花了八年时间,大家才意识到笼子门是开着的。

我认为大多数本科生还没有意识到经济笼门是开着的。很多人的父母告诉他们,成功的途径是找到一份好工作。在他们父母上大学时,这是对的,但现在已不那么正确了。成功的途径是创造有价值的东西,而你不必为现有公司工作就能做到。事实上,你经常可以做得更好。

当我和本科生交谈时,最让我惊讶的是他们有多么保守。当然不是政治上的保守。我的意思是他们似乎不愿意冒险。这是个错误,因为你越年轻,就越可以冒险。

§ 9

Risk

Risk and reward are always proportionate. For example, stocks are riskier than bonds, and over time always have greater returns. So why does anyone invest in bonds? The catch is that phrase "over time." Stocks will generate greater returns over thirty years, but they might lose value from year to year. So what you should invest in depends on how soon you need the money. If you're young, you should take the riskiest investments you can find.

All this talk about investing may seem very theoretical. Most undergrads probably have more debts than assets. They may feel they have nothing to invest. But that's not true: they have their time to invest, and the same rule about risk applies there. Your early twenties are exactly the time to take insane career risks.

The reason risk is always proportionate to reward is that market forces make it so. People will pay extra for stability. So if you choose stability-- by buying bonds, or by going to work for a big company-- it's going to cost you.

Riskier career moves pay better on average, because there is less demand for them. Extreme choices like starting a startup are so frightening that most people won't even try. So you don't end up having as much competition as you might expect, considering the prizes at stake.

The math is brutal. While perhaps 9 out of 10 startups fail, the one that succeeds will pay the founders more than 10 times what they would have made in an ordinary job.

[3] That's the sense in which startups pay better "on average."

Remember that. If you start a startup, you'll probably fail. Most startups fail. It's the nature of the business. But it's not necessarily a mistake to try something that has a 90% chance of failing, if you can afford the risk. Failing at 40, when you have a family to support, could be serious. But if you fail at 22, so what? If you try to start a startup right out of college and it tanks, you'll end up at 23 broke and a lot smarter. Which, if you think about it, is roughly what you hope to get from a graduate program.

Even if your startup does tank, you won't harm your prospects with employers. To make sure I asked some friends who work for big companies. I asked managers at Yahoo, Google, Amazon, Cisco and Microsoft how they'd feel about two candidates, both 24, with equal ability, one who'd tried to start a startup that tanked, and another who'd spent the two years since college working as a developer at a big company. Every one responded that they'd prefer the guy who'd tried to start his own company. Zod Nazem, who's in charge of engineering at Yahoo, said:

I actually put more value on the guy with the failed startup. And you can quote me!

So there you have it. Want to get hired by Yahoo? Start your own company.

风险

风险与回报总是成比例的。例如,股票比债券风险高,长期回报也更高。那为什么还有人投资债券?关键在于“长期”二字。股票在三十年内回报更高,但可能逐年贬值。所以你的投资取决于你何时需要这笔钱。如果你年轻,你应该投资你能找到的最冒险的项目。

所有这些关于投资的讨论可能看起来很理论化。大多数本科生可能负债多于资产。他们可能觉得自己没什么可投资的。但事实并非如此:他们拥有可以投资的时间,同样的风险规则也适用。二十出头正是承担疯狂职业风险的时机。

风险与回报总是成比例的原因是市场力量使然。人们愿意为稳定性付出额外代价。所以如果你选择稳定——购买债券,或者去大公司工作——你会付出代价。

风险更高的职业选择平均回报更高,因为需求更少。像创业这样极端的选择非常吓人,大多数人甚至不会尝试。所以最终你的竞争并没有你想象的那么激烈,尽管奖品诱人。

数学是残酷的。虽然十有八九的创业公司会失败,但成功的那一个会给创始人带来超过普通工作十倍以上的回报。[3] 这就是创业公司“平均”回报更高的含义。

记住这一点。如果你创业,你很可能会失败。大多数创业公司都会失败。这是这行的本质。但如果你能承担风险,尝试一个90%会失败的事情并不一定是错误。如果你40岁时失败,有家庭要养,可能很严重。但如果你22岁失败,那又怎样?如果你一毕业就尝试创业,然后搞砸了,你会在23岁时身无分文但更聪明。想一想,这大概就是你希望从研究生项目得到的东西。

即使你的创业公司真的失败了,也不会损害你在雇主眼中的前景。为了确认这一点,我询问了一些在大公司工作的朋友。我问雅虎、谷歌、亚马逊、思科和微软的经理们,如果两个候选人,都是24岁,能力相当,一个尝试创业但失败了,另一个在大学毕业后两年里在大公司做开发,他们会怎么选择。每个人都回答,他们更倾向那个尝试过创业的人。雅虎负责工程的Zod Nazem说:

“我实际上更看重有失败创业经历的人。你可以引用我!”

所以,你看。想被雅虎雇佣?那就去创办你自己的公司。

§ 10

The Man is the Customer

If even big employers think highly of young hackers who start companies, why don't more do it? Why are undergrads so conservative? I think it's because they've spent so much time in institutions.

The first twenty years of everyone's life consists of being piped from one institution to another. You probably didn't have much choice about the secondary schools you went to. And after high school it was probably understood that you were supposed to go to college. You may have had a few different colleges to choose between, but they were probably pretty similar. So by this point you've been riding on a subway line for twenty years, and the next stop seems to be a job.

Actually college is where the line ends. Superficially, going to work for a company may feel like just the next in a series of institutions, but underneath, everything is different. The end of school is the fulcrum of your life, the point where you go from net consumer to net producer.

The other big change is that now, you're steering. You can go anywhere you want. So it may be worth standing back and understanding what's going on, instead of just doing the default thing.

All through college, and probably long before that, most undergrads have been thinking about what employers want. But what really matters is what customers want, because they're the ones who give employers the money to pay you.

So instead of thinking about what employers want, you're probably better off thinking directly about what users want. To the extent there's any difference between the two, you can even use that to your advantage if you start a company of your own. For example, big companies like docile conformists. But this is merely an artifact of their bigness, not something customers need.

老板就是顾客

如果连大雇主都看好创办公司的年轻黑客,为什么不多一些人这么做?为什么本科生如此保守?我认为是因为他们在机构里待得太久了。

每个人生命的前二十年都是在从一所机构被输送到另一所机构。你可能对上的中学没什么选择。高中毕业后,人们默认你应该上大学。你可能在几所大学之间选择,但它们可能很相似。到这时候,你已经坐地铁坐了二十年,下一站似乎就是工作。

实际上,大学就是线路的终点。表面上看,去一家公司工作感觉像是又进入一个机构,但本质上一切都不同了。学校生活的结束是你人生的支点,从净消费者转变为净生产者。

另一个重大变化是,现在你在掌舵。你可以去任何想去的地方。所以也许值得后退一步,理解正在发生的事情,而不是只做默认的事。

整个大学期间,甚至更早,大多数本科生都在思考雇主想要什么。但实际上真正重要的是顾客想要什么,因为是他们给雇主钱来支付你的工资。

因此,与其思考雇主想要什么,不如直接思考用户想要什么。如果两者存在差异,你甚至可以创办自己的公司来利用这种差异。例如,大公司喜欢温顺的随大流者。但这只是它们规模大的副产品,而不是顾客的需求。

§ 11

Grad School

I didn't consciously realize all this when I was graduating from college-- partly because I went straight to grad school. Grad school can be a pretty good deal, even if you think of one day starting a startup. You can start one when you're done, or even pull the ripcord part way through, like the founders of Yahoo and Google.

Grad school makes a good launch pad for startups, because you're collected together with a lot of smart people, and you have bigger chunks of time to work on your own projects than an undergrad or corporate employee would. As long as you have a fairly tolerant advisor, you can take your time developing an idea before turning it into a company. David Filo and Jerry Yang started the Yahoo directory in February 1994 and were getting a million hits a day by the fall, but they didn't actually drop out of grad school and start a company till March 1995.

You could also try the startup first, and if it doesn't work, then go to grad school. When startups tank they usually do it fairly quickly. Within a year you'll know if you're wasting your time.

If it fails, that is. If it succeeds, you may have to delay grad school a little longer. But you'll have a much more enjoyable life once there than you would on a regular grad student stipend.

研究生院

当我大学毕业时,我没有完全意识到这一切——部分原因是我直接去了研究生院。研究生院是一个相当不错的选择,即使你想着有一天要创业。你可以在毕业后创业,或者像雅虎和谷歌的创始人那样,中途拉出降落伞。

研究生院是创业的良好发射台,因为你会和很多聪明人聚集在一起,而且你有比本科生或公司员工更大块的时间做自己的项目。只要你有一个相当宽容的导师,你可以从容地发展想法,再把它变成公司。David Filo和Jerry Yang在1994年2月启动了雅虎目录,到秋天每天获得一百万次点击,但他们直到1995年3月才从研究生院退学创办公司。

你也可以先尝试创业,如果不行,再去读研。创业公司失败通常很快。一年之内你就会知道是否在浪费时间。

当然,这是指失败的情况。如果成功了,你可能需要推迟一点读研。但一旦你去了,生活会比通常的博士生津贴所允许的愉快得多。

§ 12

Experience

Another reason people in their early twenties don't start startups is that they feel they don't have enough experience. Most investors feel the same.

I remember hearing a lot of that word "experience" when I was in college. What do people really mean by it? Obviously it's not the experience itself that's valuable, but something it changes in your brain. What's different about your brain after you have "experience," and can you make that change happen faster?

I now have some data on this, and I can tell you what tends to be missing when people lack experience. I've said that every startup needs three things: to start with good people, to make something users want, and not to spend too much money. It's the middle one you get wrong when you're inexperienced. There are plenty of undergrads with enough technical skill to write good software, and undergrads are not especially prone to waste money. If they get something wrong, it's usually not realizing they have to make something people want.

This is not exclusively a failing of the young. It's common for startup founders of all ages to build things no one wants.

Fortunately, this flaw should be easy to fix. If undergrads were all bad programmers, the problem would be a lot harder. It can take years to learn how to program. But I don't think it takes years to learn how to make things people want. My hypothesis is that all you have to do is smack hackers on the side of the head and tell them: Wake up. Don't sit here making up a priori theories about what users need. Go find some users and see what they need.

Most successful startups not only do something very specific, but solve a problem people already know they have.

The big change that "experience" causes in your brain is learning that you need to solve people's problems. Once you grasp that, you advance quickly to the next step, which is figuring out what those problems are. And that takes some effort, because the way software actually gets used, especially by the people who pay the most for it, is not at all what you might expect. For example, the stated purpose of Powerpoint is to present ideas. Its real role is to overcome people's fear of public speaking. It allows you to give an impressive-looking talk about nothing, and it causes the audience to sit in a dark room looking at slides, instead of a bright one looking at you.

This kind of thing is out there for anyone to see. The key is to know to look for it-- to realize that having an idea for a startup is not like having an idea for a class project. The goal in a startup is not to write a cool piece of software. It's to make something people want. And to do that you have to look at users-- forget about hacking, and just look at users. This can be quite a mental adjustment, because little if any of the software you write in school even has users.

A few steps before a Rubik's Cube is solved, it still looks like a mess. I think there are a lot of undergrads whose brains are in a similar position: they're only a few steps away from being able to start successful startups, if they wanted to, but they don't realize it. They have more than enough technical skill. They just haven't realized yet that the way to create wealth is to make what users want, and that employers are just proxies for users in which risk is pooled.

If you're young and smart, you don't need either of those. You don't need someone else to tell you what users want, because you can figure it out yourself. And you don't want to pool risk, because the younger you are, the more risk you should take.

经验

另一个二十出头的人不创业的原因是,他们觉得自己经验不足。大多数投资者也有同感。

我记得在大学里经常听到“经验”这个词。人们到底是什么意思?显然,有价值的不是经验本身,而是它在你大脑中产生的变化。拥有“经验”后大脑有什么不同?能否加速这种变化?

我现在有一些数据,可以告诉你缺乏经验时通常会缺少什么。我曾说过,每个创业公司都需要三样东西:有好的人手、做出用户想要的东西、不乱花钱。缺乏经验时,你会在中间那项出错。很多本科生拥有足够的技术能力写出好软件,本科生也不太倾向于浪费钱。如果他们搞砸了,通常是因为没有意识到必须做出人们想要的东西。

这并非只有年轻人会犯的错误。各个年龄段的创业公司创始人都会做出没人想要的东西。

幸运的是,这个缺陷应该容易修复。如果本科生都是糟糕的程序员,问题会难得多。学习编程可能需要多年。但我认为学会如何做出人们想要的东西并不需要多年。我的假设是,你只需要敲打一下黑客的脑袋,告诉他们:醒醒。不要坐在这里编造关于用户需求的理论。去找一些用户,看看他们需要什么。

大多数成功的创业公司不仅做非常具体的事情,而且解决人们已经意识到的问题。

“经验”在大脑中引起的重大变化是学会了需要解决人们的问题。一旦你掌握了这一点,你就能迅速进入下一步:弄清楚那些问题是什么。这需要一些努力,因为软件实际使用的方式,尤其是最愿意付费的用户使用的方式,可能完全出乎你的意料。例如,Powerpoint的官方目的是展示想法。它的实际作用是克服人们对公共演讲的恐惧。它让你能做一场空洞但看起来很棒的演讲,并让观众坐在黑暗的房间里看幻灯片,而不是在明亮的房间里看你。

这种东西任何人都能看到。关键是知道去寻找它——意识到创业的想法不像课堂项目的想法。创业的目标不是写一段很酷的软件。而是做出人们想要的东西。要做到这一点,你必须观察用户——忘记黑客技术,只是观察用户。这在心理上需要调整,因为你在学校里写的软件几乎从来没有用户。

在魔方被解出的前几步,它看起来仍然是一团乱。我认为很多本科生的大脑处于类似状态:他们离能够成功创业只差几步,如果他们愿意的话,但他们没有意识到。他们拥有足够的技术技能。他们只是还没有意识到创造财富的方式是做出用户想要的东西,而雇主只是汇集风险的用户的代理。

如果你年轻且聪明,你两者都不需要。你不需要别人告诉你用户想要什么,因为你可以自己弄清楚。你也不想汇集风险,因为你越年轻,就越应该承担风险。

§ 13

A Public Service Message

I'd like to conclude with a joint message from me and your parents. Don't drop out of college to start a startup. There's no rush. There will be plenty of time to start companies after you graduate. In fact, it may be just as well to go work for an existing company for a couple years after you graduate, to learn how companies work.

And yet, when I think about it, I can't imagine telling Bill Gates at 19 that he should wait till he graduated to start a company. He'd have told me to get lost. And could I have honestly claimed that he was harming his future-- that he was learning less by working at ground zero of the microcomputer revolution than he would have if he'd been taking classes back at Harvard? No, probably not.

And yes, while it is probably true that you'll learn some valuable things by going to work for an existing company for a couple years before starting your own, you'd learn a thing or two running your own company during that time too.

The advice about going to work for someone else would get an even colder reception from the 19 year old Bill Gates. So I'm supposed to finish college, then go work for another company for two years, and then I can start my own? I have to wait till I'm 23? That's four years. That's more than twenty percent of my life so far. Plus in four years it will be way too late to make money writing a Basic interpreter for the Altair.

And he'd be right. The Apple II was launched just two years later. In fact, if Bill had finished college and gone to work for another company as we're suggesting, he might well have gone to work for Apple. And while that would probably have been better for all of us, it wouldn't have been better for him.

So while I stand by our responsible advice to finish college and then go work for a while before starting a startup, I have to admit it's one of those things the old tell the young, but don't expect them to listen to. We say this sort of thing mainly so we can claim we warned you. So don't say I didn't warn you.

一则公益信息

我想以一个来自我和你父母的联合信息结束:不要辍学去创业。不用着急。毕业后有大量时间创办公司。事实上,毕业后先去一家现有公司工作几年,学习公司如何运作,可能也不错。

然而,当我仔细思考时,我无法想象告诉19岁的比尔·盖茨他应该等到毕业再创业。他会让我滚开。我能否诚实地声称他在微型计算机革命的最前沿工作学到的东西,比在哈佛上课少?不,可能不是。

是的,虽然去现有公司工作几年再创业可能会学到有价值的东西,但在那段时间里经营自己的公司也会学到很多。

19岁的比尔·盖茨会对“去为别人工作”的建议嗤之以鼻。所以我应该完成大学,然后去另一家公司工作两年,然后才能创业?我必须等到23岁?那是四年,是我生命至今的20%以上。而且四年后,写Altair的Basic解释器赚钱早就太晚了。

他是对的。Apple II仅仅两年后就发布了。事实上,如果比尔按我们的建议完成大学并去另一家公司工作,他很可能会去苹果工作。虽然这对我们所有人可能更好,但对他个人并非如此。

所以,虽然我坚持我们负责任的建议——完成大学,然后工作一段时间再创业——但我必须承认,这是老人告诉年轻人的事情,却不指望他们听从。我们说这类事情主要是为了声称我们警告过你。所以别说我没警告过你。

§ 14

Notes

[ 1] The average B-17 pilot in World War II was in his early twenties. (Thanks to Tad Marko for pointing this out.)[ 2] If a company tried to pay employees this way, they'd be called unfair. And yet when they buy some startups and not others, no one thinks of calling that unfair. [ 3] The 1/10 success rate for startups is a bit of an urban legend. It's suspiciously neat. My guess is the odds are slightly worse. Thanks to Jessica Livingston for reading drafts of this, to the friends I promised anonymity to for their opinions about hiring, and to Karen Nguyen and the Berkeley CSUA for organizing this talk.

附注

[1] 二战中B-17轰炸机飞行员的平均年龄是二十出头。(感谢Tad Marko指出这一点。) [2] 如果公司试图以这种方式支付员工报酬,会被认为不公平。然而,当它们收购一些创业公司而不收购其他时,没人认为这不公平。 [3] 创业公司十分之一的成功率有点像是都市传说。这个数字过于整齐了。我猜几率要稍差一些。 感谢Jessica Livingston阅读本文草稿,感谢我承诺匿名的朋友们对招聘的意见,以及Karen Nguyen和伯克利CSUA组织本次演讲。

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