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创业致富的逻辑:测量、杠杆与用户验证

原文 www.paulgraham.com 收录 2026-07-07 14:47 阅读 50 min
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本文是Paul Graham的经典创业论述,核心观点:创业通过压缩工作周期、利用效率乘数实现财富快速积累;财富是满足他人需求的东西,不是金钱;创业提供测量(小团队)和杠杆(技术)两大优势;技术杠杆使得解决一个问题能惠及大量用户;用户数是检验财富创造的最终标准。文章也讨论了创业的风险和收购策略,并指出允许创业者保留财富是社会技术进步的动力。

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§ 1

May 2004

(This essay was originally published in Hackers & Painters.)

If you wanted to get rich, how would you do it? I think your best bet would be to start or join a startup. That's been a reliable way to get rich for hundreds of years. The word "startup" dates from the 1960s, but what happens in one is very similar to the venture-backed trading voyages of the Middle Ages.

Startups usually involve technology, so much so that the phrase "high-tech startup" is almost redundant. A startup is a small company that takes on a hard technical problem.

Lots of people get rich knowing nothing more than that. You don't have to know physics to be a good pitcher. But I think it could give you an edge to understand the underlying principles. Why do startups have to be small? Will a startup inevitably stop being a startup as it grows larger? And why do they so often work on developing new technology? Why are there so many startups selling new drugs or computer software, and none selling corn oil or laundry detergent?

2004年5月

(本文最初发表于《黑客与画家》)

如果你想变得富有,你会怎么做?我认为最好的选择是创办或加入一家初创公司。几百年来,这都是一条可靠的致富之路。“初创公司”这个词源于20世纪60年代,但其运作模式与中世纪的风险投资贸易航行非常相似。

初创公司通常涉及技术,以至于“高科技初创公司”这个短语几乎多余。初创公司是一家解决棘手技术问题的小公司。

很多人只知道这些就变得富有了。你不必懂物理学也能成为一个好投手。但我认为理解基本原理会给你一个优势。为什么初创公司必须小?随着规模扩大,它是否不可避免地不再是初创公司?为什么它们经常致力于开发新技术?为什么有那么多初创公司销售新药或计算机软件,却没有一家销售玉米油或洗衣粉?

§ 2

The Proposition

Economically, you can think of a startup as a way to compress your whole working life into a few years. Instead of working at a low intensity for forty years, you work as hard as you possibly can for four. This pays especially well in technology, where you earn a premium for working fast.

Here is a brief sketch of the economic proposition. If you're a good hacker in your mid twenties, you can get a job paying about $80,000 per year. So on average such a hacker must be able to do at least $80,000 worth of work per year for the company just to break even. You could probably work twice as many hours as a corporate employee, and if you focus you can probably get three times as much done in an hour. [1] You should get another multiple of two, at least, by eliminating the drag of the pointy-haired middle manager who would be your boss in a big company. Then there is one more multiple: how much smarter are you than your job description expects you to be? Suppose another multiple of three. Combine all these multipliers, and I'm claiming you could be 36 times more productive than you're expected to be in a random corporate job. [2] If a fairly good hacker is worth $80,000 a year at a big company, then a smart hacker working very hard without any corporate bullshit to slow him down should be able to do work worth about $3 million a year.

Like all back-of-the-envelope calculations, this one has a lot of wiggle room. I wouldn't try to defend the actual numbers. But I stand by the structure of the calculation. I'm not claiming the multiplier is precisely 36, but it is certainly more than 10, and probably rarely as high as 100.

If $3 million a year seems high, remember that we're talking about the limit case: the case where you not only have zero leisure time but indeed work so hard that you endanger your health.

Startups are not magic. They don't change the laws of wealth creation. They just represent a point at the far end of the curve. There is a conservation law at work here: if you want to make a million dollars, you have to endure a million dollars' worth of pain. For example, one way to make a million dollars would be to work for the Post Office your whole life, and save every penny of your salary. Imagine the stress of working for the Post Office for fifty years. In a startup you compress all this stress into three or four years. You do tend to get a certain bulk discount if you buy the economy-size pain, but you can't evade the fundamental conservation law. If starting a startup were easy, everyone would do it.

核心命题

从经济角度看,你可以把初创公司看作一种将整个职业生涯压缩到几年内完成的方式。与其以低强度工作四十年,不如尽最大努力工作四年。这在技术领域尤其有利,因为快速工作能获得溢价。

以下是对这一经济命题的简要概述。如果你是一个二十五岁左右的优秀黑客,你可以找到一份年薪约8万美元的工作。因此,平均而言,这样一个黑客每年至少要为公司创造8万美元的价值,才能实现盈亏平衡。你很可能比公司员工多工作一倍的时间,如果能集中精力,一小时内完成的工作量可能是对方的三倍。[1] 至少,通过摆脱大公司里那种尖头中层经理——他们本应是你的老板——的拖累,你还能再获得两倍的提升。还有一个倍数:你比职位描述所预期的聪明多少?假设再翻三倍。综合所有这些乘数,我声称你的生产效率可能是在随机一家公司工作所预期值的36倍。[2] 如果一个大公司里相当不错的黑客值8万美元一年,那么一个聪明的黑客,非常努力地工作,没有公司官僚主义的拖累,应该能创造出大约300万美元一年的价值。

和所有粗略估算一样,这个数字有很大的浮动空间。我不会试图为具体数字辩护。但我坚持这个计算结构。我并非声称乘数精确为36,但它肯定大于10,而且可能很少能达到100。

如果300万美元一年看起来很高,请记住我们讨论的是极限情况:你不仅完全没有休闲时间,而且工作之努力甚至会危及健康。

初创公司并非魔法。它们不会改变财富创造的法则。它们只是代表了曲线远端的一个点。这里存在一条守恒定律:如果你想赚一百万美元,就必须承受一百万美元的痛苦。例如,赚一百万美元的一种方法是终身在邮局工作,并把每一分薪水都存起来。想象一下在邮局工作五十年的压力。在初创公司里,你把这些压力压缩到三四年。如果你购买经济装痛苦,确实会获得一定的批量折扣,但你无法逃避基本的守恒定律。如果创办初创公司很容易,那每个人都会去做。

§ 3

Millions, not Billions

If $3 million a year seems high to some people, it will seem low to others. Three million? How do I get to be a billionaire, like Bill Gates?

So let's get Bill Gates out of the way right now. It's not a good idea to use famous rich people as examples, because the press only write about the very richest, and these tend to be outliers. Bill Gates is a smart, determined, and hardworking man, but you need more than that to make as much money as he has. You also need to be very lucky.

There is a large random factor in the success of any company. So the guys you end up reading about in the papers are the ones who are very smart, totally dedicated, and win the lottery. Certainly Bill is smart and dedicated, but Microsoft also happens to have been the beneficiary of one of the most spectacular blunders in the history of business: the licensing deal for DOS. No doubt Bill did everything he could to steer IBM into making that blunder, and he has done an excellent job of exploiting it, but if there had been one person with a brain on IBM's side, Microsoft's future would have been very different. Microsoft at that stage had little leverage over IBM. They were effectively a component supplier. If IBM had required an exclusive license, as they should have, Microsoft would still have signed the deal. It would still have meant a lot of money for them, and IBM could easily have gotten an operating system elsewhere.

Instead IBM ended up using all its power in the market to give Microsoft control of the PC standard. From that point, all Microsoft had to do was execute. They never had to bet the company on a bold decision. All they had to do was play hardball with licensees and copy more innovative products reasonably promptly.

If IBM hadn't made this mistake, Microsoft would still have been a successful company, but it could not have grown so big so fast. Bill Gates would be rich, but he'd be somewhere near the bottom of the Forbes 400 with the other guys his age.

There are a lot of ways to get rich, and this essay is about only one of them. This essay is about how to make money by creating wealth and getting paid for it. There are plenty of other ways to get money, including chance, speculation, marriage, inheritance, theft, extortion, fraud, monopoly, graft, lobbying, counterfeiting, and prospecting. Most of the greatest fortunes have probably involved several of these.

百万而非十亿

如果300万美元一年对某些人来说显得很高,对另一些人来说则会显得很低。才300万?我怎样才能像比尔·盖茨那样成为亿万富翁?

那么我们现在就把比尔·盖茨放一边。拿著名富豪作为例子并不是好主意,因为媒体只报道最富有的人,而这些往往是例外。比尔·盖茨是一个聪明、坚定、勤奋的人,但要赚到他那么多钱,你需要的远不止这些。你还需要非常幸运。

任何公司的成功都有很大的随机因素。因此,你在报纸上读到的人都是那些非常聪明、全身心投入并且中了大奖的人。比尔当然既聪明又投入,但微软碰巧也是商业史上最惊人的失误之一的受益者:DOS的授权协议。毫无疑问,比尔尽其所能引导IBM犯下那个失误,并且他出色地利用了它,但如果IBM方面有一个有头脑的人,微软的未来将大不相同。当时微软对IBM几乎没有影响力。他们实际上是一个组件供应商。如果IBM要求独占许可(他们本该如此),微软仍然会签署协议。这对他们来说仍然意味着很多钱,而IBM可以轻易地从别处获得操作系统。

相反,IBM最终利用其在市场上的所有力量将PC标准的控制权交给了微软。从那一刻起,微软要做的只是执行。他们从未需要豪赌公司的未来。他们所要做的就是对被授权者采取强硬手段,并及时复制更具创新性的产品。

如果IBM没有犯这个错误,微软仍然会是一家成功的公司,但它不可能增长得如此之快、如此之大。比尔·盖茨会富有,但可能只是像其他同龄人一样排在福布斯400强末尾。

致富有很多种方式,本文只讨论其中之一。本文是关于通过创造财富并因此获得报酬来赚钱。还有大量其他获取金钱的方式,包括运气、投机、婚姻、继承、偷窃、勒索、欺诈、垄断、贪污、游说、伪造和探矿。大多数巨额财富可能涉及其中几种。

§ 4

Money Is Not Wealth

If you want to create wealth, it will help to understand what it is. Wealth is not the same thing as money. [3] Wealth is as old as human history. Far older, in fact; ants have wealth. Money is a comparatively recent invention.

Wealth is the fundamental thing. Wealth is stuff we want: food, clothes, houses, cars, gadgets, travel to interesting places, and so on. You can have wealth without having money. If you had a magic machine that could on command make you a car or cook you dinner or do your laundry, or do anything else you wanted, you wouldn't need money. Whereas if you were in the middle of Antarctica, where there is nothing to buy, it wouldn't matter how much money you had.

Wealth is what you want, not money. But if wealth is the important thing, why does everyone talk about making money? It is a kind of shorthand: money is a way of moving wealth, and in practice they are usually interchangeable. But they are not the same thing, and unless you plan to get rich by counterfeiting, talking about making money can make it harder to understand how to make money.

Money is a side effect of specialization. In a specialized society, most of the things you need, you can't make for yourself. If you want a potato or a pencil or a place to live, you have to get it from someone else.

How do you get the person who grows the potatoes to give you some? By giving him something he wants in return. But you can't get very far by trading things directly with the people who need them. If you make violins, and none of the local farmers wants one, how will you eat?

The solution societies find, as they get more specialized, is to make the trade into a two-step process. Instead of trading violins directly for potatoes, you trade violins for, say, silver, which you can then trade again for anything else you need. The intermediate stuff-- the medium of exchange-- can be anything that's rare and portable. Historically metals have been the most common, but recently we've been using a medium of exchange, called the dollar, that doesn't physically exist. It works as a medium of exchange, however, because its rarity is guaranteed by the U.S. Government.

The advantage of a medium of exchange is that it makes trade work. The disadvantage is that it tends to obscure what trade really means. People think that what a business does is make money. But money is just the intermediate stage-- just a shorthand-- for whatever people want. What most businesses really do is make wealth. They do something people want. [4]

金钱并非财富

如果你想创造财富,理解它是什么会有所帮助。财富和金钱不是一回事。[3] 财富和人类历史一样古老。事实上要古老得多;蚂蚁也有财富。金钱是相对较新的发明。

财富是根本。财富是我们想要的东西:食物、衣服、房子、汽车、小玩意、去有趣的地方旅行,等等。你可以没有金钱而拥有财富。如果你有一台魔法机器,可以按指令为你造一辆车、做晚餐、洗衣服,或做任何你想做的事,你就不需要金钱。而如果你在南极洲中部,那里什么也买不到,你有多少钱都无关紧要。

财富是你想要的,而不是金钱。但如果财富是重要的东西,为什么每个人都在谈论赚钱?这是一种简略说法:金钱是转移财富的方式,在实践中它们通常可以互换。但它们不是一回事,除非你打算通过伪造来致富,否则谈论赚钱可能会让你更难理解如何赚钱。

金钱是专业化的副产品。在一个专业化的社会中,你需要的大部分东西都不能自己制造。如果你想要一个土豆、一支铅笔或一个住处,你必须从别人那里获得。

如何让种土豆的人给你一些?通过给他一些他想要的东西作为回报。但直接与需要它们的人交易走不远。如果你制作小提琴,而当地农民没有一个想要,你怎么吃饭?

随着社会越来越专业化,社会找到的解决方案是将交易变成两步过程。不是直接用小提琴交换土豆,而是用小提琴交换比如说白银,然后再用白银交换你需要的任何其他东西。中间的东西——交换媒介——可以是任何稀有且便携的东西。历史上金属最常见,但最近我们使用一种叫做美元的交换媒介,它并不实际存在。然而,它作为一种交换媒介有效,是因为它的稀有性由美国政府担保。

交换媒介的好处是它使贸易生效。缺点是它往往掩盖了贸易的真正含义。人们认为企业的目的是赚钱。但金钱只是中间阶段——只是人们想要东西的简略说法。大多数企业真正做的是创造财富。它们做人们需要的事。[4]

§ 5

The Pie Fallacy

A surprising number of people retain from childhood the idea that there is a fixed amount of wealth in the world. There is, in any normal family, a fixed amount of money at any moment. But that's not the same thing.

When wealth is talked about in this context, it is often described as a pie. "You can't make the pie larger," say politicians. When you're talking about the amount of money in one family's bank account, or the amount available to a government from one year's tax revenue, this is true. If one person gets more, someone else has to get less.

I can remember believing, as a child, that if a few rich people had all the money, it left less for everyone else. Many people seem to continue to believe something like this well into adulthood. This fallacy is usually there in the background when you hear someone talking about how x percent of the population have y percent of the wealth. If you plan to start a startup, then whether you realize it or not, you're planning to disprove the Pie Fallacy.

What leads people astray here is the abstraction of money. Money is not wealth. It's just something we use to move wealth around. So although there may be, in certain specific moments (like your family, this month) a fixed amount of money available to trade with other people for things you want, there is not a fixed amount of wealth in the world. You can make more wealth. Wealth has been getting created and destroyed (but on balance, created) for all of human history.

Suppose you own a beat-up old car. Instead of sitting on your butt next summer, you could spend the time restoring your car to pristine condition. In doing so you create wealth. The world is-- and you specifically are-- one pristine old car the richer. And not just in some metaphorical way. If you sell your car, you'll get more for it.

In restoring your old car you have made yourself richer. You haven't made anyone else poorer. So there is obviously not a fixed pie. And in fact, when you look at it this way, you wonder why anyone would think there was. [5]

Kids know, without knowing they know, that they can create wealth. If you need to give someone a present and don't have any money, you make one. But kids are so bad at making things that they consider home-made presents to be a distinct, inferior, sort of thing to store-bought ones-- a mere expression of the proverbial thought that counts. And indeed, the lumpy ashtrays we made for our parents did not have much of a resale market. [5b]

馅饼谬误

相当多的人从童年起就保留着世界上财富总量固定的观念。在任何普通家庭中,任何时候的金钱数量是固定的。但这不是一回事。

当财富在这种语境下被讨论时,它常被描述为一个馅饼。“你不能把馅饼做大,”政客们说。当你谈论一个家庭银行账户中的金额,或政府一年税收收入时,这是真的。如果一个人得到更多,另一个人就必须少得。

我记得小时候相信,如果少数富人拥有所有钱,那就给其他人留下的更少。许多人似乎到了成年依然相信类似观点。当你听到有人谈论百分之X的人口拥有百分之Y的财富时,这种谬误通常就在背景中。如果你计划创办一家初创公司,那么无论你是否意识到,你都在计划反驳馅饼谬误。

这里让人迷惑的是金钱的抽象性。金钱不是财富。它只是我们用来转移财富的东西。因此,虽然在某些特定时刻(比如你这个月的家庭预算)用来与人交换所需物品的金钱数量是固定的,但世界上的财富总量并非固定。你可以创造更多财富。财富在整个人类历史中被创造和毁灭(但总体上被创造)。

假设你有一辆破旧的老爷车。与其明年夏天懒散地坐着,你可以花时间把车恢复到完美状态。这样做你就创造了财富。世界——特别是你——有了一辆完美的老爷车而变得更富有。而且不仅仅在某种隐喻意义上。如果你卖掉车,你得到的钱会更多。

修复老爷车让你自己更富有。你没有让任何人变得更穷。所以显然不存在一个固定的馅饼。事实上,当你这样看时,你会奇怪为什么会有人觉得有。[5]

孩子们知道——尽管他们不知道他们知道——他们可以创造财富。如果你需要送礼物但没钱,你会自己做一个。但孩子们做东西太差劲,以至于他们认为自制礼物是一种明显劣于购买的礼物——仅仅是表达“心意”的东西。的确,我们为父母做的歪歪扭扭的烟灰缸没有多大的转售市场。[5b]

§ 6

Craftsmen

The people most likely to grasp that wealth can be created are the ones who are good at making things, the craftsmen. Their hand-made objects become store-bought ones. But with the rise of industrialization there are fewer and fewer craftsmen. One of the biggest remaining groups is computer programmers.

A programmer can sit down in front of a computer and create wealth. A good piece of software is, in itself, a valuable thing. There is no manufacturing to confuse the issue. Those characters you type are a complete, finished product. If someone sat down and wrote a web browser that didn't suck (a fine idea, by the way), the world would be that much richer.

Everyone in a company works together to create wealth, in the sense of making more things people want. Many of the employees (e.g. the people in the mailroom or the personnel department) work at one remove from the actual making of stuff. Not the programmers. They literally think the product, one line at a time. And so it's clearer to programmers that wealth is something that's made, rather than being distributed, like slices of a pie, by some imaginary Daddy.

It's also obvious to programmers that there are huge variations in the rate at which wealth is created. At Viaweb we had one programmer who was a sort of monster of productivity. I remember watching what he did one long day and estimating that he had added several hundred thousand dollars to the market value of the company. A great programmer, on a roll, could create a million dollars worth of wealth in a couple weeks. A mediocre programmer over the same period will generate zero or even negative wealth (e.g. by introducing bugs).

This is why so many of the best programmers are libertarians. In our world, you sink or swim, and there are no excuses. When those far removed from the creation of wealth-- undergraduates, reporters, politicians-- hear that the richest 5% of the people have half the total wealth, they tend to think injustice! An experienced programmer would be more likely to think is that all? The top 5% of programmers probably write 99% of the good software.

Wealth can be created without being sold. Scientists, till recently at least, effectively donated the wealth they created. We are all richer for knowing about penicillin, because we're less likely to die from infections. Wealth is whatever people want, and not dying is certainly something we want. Hackers often donate their work by writing open source software that anyone can use for free. I am much the richer for the operating system FreeBSD, which I'm running on the computer I'm using now, and so is Yahoo, which runs it on all their servers.

工匠

最有可能理解财富可以被创造的人是那些擅长制造东西的人——工匠。他们手工制作的物品变成了商店里买来的东西。但随着工业化的发展,工匠越来越少。现存的最大群体之一是计算机程序员。

程序员可以坐在电脑前创造财富。一个好的软件本身就是有价值的东西。没有制造业来混淆问题。你输入的字符就是一个完整的产品。如果有人坐下来写了一个不糟糕的网页浏览器(顺便说一句,这是个好主意),世界就会因此变得更富有。

公司里的每个人都一起创造财富,即做出更多人们想要的东西。许多员工(例如收发室或人事部门的人)的工作与实际制造之间隔了一层。程序员则不是。他们实际上是在逐行思考产品。因此,程序员更清楚财富是制造出来的,而不是像馅饼切片一样被某个想象中的“爸爸”分配的。

对程序员来说同样明显的是,财富创造的速度差异巨大。在Viaweb,我们有一个程序员,他简直是生产力怪物。我记得有一次观察他一整天的劳动,估计算他给公司市值增加了数十万美元。一个伟大的程序员,状态好时,可以在几周内创造价值百万美元的财富。一个平庸的程序员在同一时期会产生零甚至负财富(例如引入bug)。

这就是为什么那么多最优秀的程序员是自由意志主义者。在我们的世界里,要么沉要么游,没有借口。当那些远离财富创造的人——本科生、记者、政客——听到最富有的5%的人拥有总财富的一半时,他们倾向于认为这不公平!一个有经验的程序员更可能会想:就这么点?最顶尖的5%程序员可能写了99%的好软件。

财富可以在不销售的情况下被创造。科学家——至少直到最近——实际上捐赠了他们创造的财富。我们都因为了解青霉素而变得更富有,因为我们更不可能死于感染。财富是任何人们想要的东西,而不死当然是人们想要的。黑客经常通过编写任何人都可以免费使用的开源软件来捐赠他们的工作。我现在使用的电脑上运行着FreeBSD操作系统,它让我变得更富有,雅虎也如此,他们在所有服务器上都运行它。

§ 7

What a Job Is

In industrialized countries, people belong to one institution or another at least until their twenties. After all those years you get used to the idea of belonging to a group of people who all get up in the morning, go to some set of buildings, and do things that they do not, ordinarily, enjoy doing. Belonging to such a group becomes part of your identity: name, age, role, institution. If you have to introduce yourself, or someone else describes you, it will be as something like, John Smith, age 10, a student at such and such elementary school, or John Smith, age 20, a student at such and such college.

When John Smith finishes school he is expected to get a job. And what getting a job seems to mean is joining another institution. Superficially it's a lot like college. You pick the companies you want to work for and apply to join them. If one likes you, you become a member of this new group. You get up in the morning and go to a new set of buildings, and do things that you do not, ordinarily, enjoy doing. There are a few differences: life is not as much fun, and you get paid, instead of paying, as you did in college. But the similarities feel greater than the differences. John Smith is now John Smith, 22, a software developer at such and such corporation.

In fact John Smith's life has changed more than he realizes. Socially, a company looks much like college, but the deeper you go into the underlying reality, the more different it gets.

What a company does, and has to do if it wants to continue to exist, is earn money. And the way most companies make money is by creating wealth. Companies can be so specialized that this similarity is concealed, but it is not only manufacturing companies that create wealth. A big component of wealth is location. Remember that magic machine that could make you cars and cook you dinner and so on? It would not be so useful if it delivered your dinner to a random location in central Asia. If wealth means what people want, companies that move things also create wealth. Ditto for many other kinds of companies that don't make anything physical. Nearly all companies exist to do something people want.

And that's what you do, as well, when you go to work for a company. But here there is another layer that tends to obscure the underlying reality. In a company, the work you do is averaged together with a lot of other people's. You may not even be aware you're doing something people want. Your contribution may be indirect. But the company as a whole must be giving people something they want, or they won't make any money. And if they are paying you x dollars a year, then on average you must be contributing at least x dollars a year worth of work, or the company will be spending more than it makes, and will go out of business.

Someone graduating from college thinks, and is told, that he needs to get a job, as if the important thing were becoming a member of an institution. A more direct way to put it would be: you need to start doing something people want. You don't need to join a company to do that. All a company is is a group of people working together to do something people want. It's doing something people want that matters, not joining the group. [6]

For most people the best plan probably is to go to work for some existing company. But it is a good idea to understand what's happening when you do this. A job means doing something people want, averaged together with everyone else in that company.

工作是什么

在工业化国家,人们至少到二十多岁都归属于某个机构。经过这么多年,你习惯了这样一种观念:属于一群早上起床、去某栋建筑、做他们通常不喜欢做的事情的人。属于这样一个群体成为你身份的一部分:姓名、年龄、角色、机构。如果你需要自我介绍,或者别人描述你,通常会是这样:约翰·史密斯,10岁,某小学学生;或者约翰·史密斯,20岁,某大学学生。

当约翰·史密斯完成学业后,他需要找份工作。而找工作似乎意味着加入另一个机构。表面上很像大学。你选择你想去的公司并申请加入。如果某家公司看中你,你就成为这个新群体的成员。你早上起床,去一栋新建筑,做你通常不喜欢做的事情。有一些区别:生活没那么有趣了,而且你得到报酬,而不是像大学那样付钱。但相似之处感觉大于不同。约翰·史密斯现在成了22岁的约翰·史密斯,某公司的软件开发者。

实际上,约翰·史密斯的生活变化比他意识到的更大。从社会角度看,公司看起来很像大学,但当你深入底层现实,就越来越不同。

一个公司要做并且必须做(如果它想继续存在)的是赚钱。而大多数公司赚钱的方式是创造财富。公司可能非常专业化,以至于这种相似性被掩盖,但并非只有制造业公司创造财富。财富的一个主要组成部分是位置。还记得那个可以为你造车、做饭等等的魔法机器吗?如果它把你的晚餐送到中亚的某个随机位置,就没那么有用了。如果财富意味着人们想要的东西,那么运输东西的公司也创造财富。许多其他不制造实体产品的公司也是如此。几乎所有的公司都是为了做人们需要的事而存在。

当你为一家公司工作时,你也是在这样做。但这里又有一层往往掩盖了底层现实。在公司里,你的工作与许多其他人的工作平均在一起。你甚至可能没有意识到你在做人们需要的事。你的贡献可能是间接的。但公司整体必须给人们提供他们想要的东西,否则他们赚不到钱。如果他们每年付你x美元,那么平均而言,你每年至少必须贡献价值x美元的工作,否则公司就会入不敷出,最终倒闭。

大学毕业生认为——并被告知——他需要找一份工作,仿佛重要的是成为某个机构的成员。更直接的说法是:你需要开始做人们需要的事。你不需要加入公司来做这个。公司只是一群人一起做人们需要的事而已。重要的是做人们需要的事,而不是加入群体。[6]

对大多数人来说,最好的计划可能是去某家现有公司工作。但理解其中发生了什么是个好主意。一份工作意味着做人们需要的事,但与其他同事平均化。

§ 8

Working Harder

That averaging gets to be a problem. I think the single biggest problem afflicting large companies is the difficulty of assigning a value to each person's work. For the most part they punt. In a big company you get paid a fairly predictable salary for working fairly hard. You're expected not to be obviously incompetent or lazy, but you're not expected to devote your whole life to your work.

It turns out, though, that there are economies of scale in how much of your life you devote to your work. In the right kind of business, someone who really devoted himself to work could generate ten or even a hundred times as much wealth as an average employee. A programmer, for example, instead of chugging along maintaining and updating an existing piece of software, could write a whole new piece of software, and with it create a new source of revenue.

Companies are not set up to reward people who want to do this. You can't go to your boss and say, I'd like to start working ten times as hard, so will you please pay me ten times as much? For one thing, the official fiction is that you are already working as hard as you can. But a more serious problem is that the company has no way of measuring the value of your work.

Salesmen are an exception. It's easy to measure how much revenue they generate, and they're usually paid a percentage of it. If a salesman wants to work harder, he can just start doing it, and he will automatically get paid proportionally more.

There is one other job besides sales where big companies can hire first-rate people: in the top management jobs. And for the same reason: their performance can be measured. The top managers are held responsible for the performance of the entire company. Because an ordinary employee's performance can't usually be measured, he is not expected to do more than put in a solid effort. Whereas top management, like salespeople, have to actually come up with the numbers. The CEO of a company that tanks cannot plead that he put in a solid effort. If the company does badly, he's done badly.

A company that could pay all its employees so straightforwardly would be enormously successful. Many employees would work harder if they could get paid for it. More importantly, such a company would attract people who wanted to work especially hard. It would crush its competitors.

Unfortunately, companies can't pay everyone like salesmen. Salesmen work alone. Most employees' work is tangled together. Suppose a company makes some kind of consumer gadget. The engineers build a reliable gadget with all kinds of new features; the industrial designers design a beautiful case for it; and then the marketing people convince everyone that it's something they've got to have. How do you know how much of the gadget's sales are due to each group's efforts? Or, for that matter, how much is due to the creators of past gadgets that gave the company a reputation for quality? There's no way to untangle all their contributions. Even if you could read the minds of the consumers, you'd find these factors were all blurred together.

If you want to go faster, it's a problem to have your work tangled together with a large number of other people's. In a large group, your performance is not separately measurable-- and the rest of the group slows you down.

更努力工作

这种平均化成了问题。我认为困扰大公司的最大问题是为每个人的工作分配价值的困难。大多数情况下,他们回避了。在大公司里,你工作相当努力,拿到相当可预测的薪水。你被期望不要明显无能或懒惰,但不被期望把整个人生奉献给工作。

然而,事实证明,你投入工作的精力存在规模经济。在合适的行业中,真正全身心投入工作的人可以创造出普通员工十倍甚至百倍的财富。例如,一个程序员,不是按部就班地维护和更新现有软件,而是可以写一个全新的软件,从而创造新的收入来源。

公司并没有设立来奖励想做这种事的人。你无法去找老板说:我想开始十倍努力地工作,所以请你付我十倍工资?一方面,官方的说法是你已经在尽力工作了。但更严重的问题是公司无法衡量你工作的价值。

销售人员是例外。衡量他们带来多少收入很容易,他们通常按比例获得报酬。如果一个销售人员想更努力,他可以直接开始做,然后自动按比例得到更多报酬。

除了销售,大公司还能在第一流职位上雇佣顶尖人才的另一种工作是高层管理。原因相同:他们的绩效可以被衡量。高层管理者对全公司的绩效负责。由于普通员工的绩效通常无法衡量,他们不被期望做得比踏实努力更多。而高层管理,像销售人员一样,必须实际拿出数字。一家公司倒闭的CEO不能辩解说他踏实努力了。如果公司做得不好,他就做得不好。

一家能够如此直接地支付所有员工的公司会极其成功。许多员工如果能因此得到报酬,会更努力工作。更重要的是,这样的公司会吸引那些想特别努力工作的人。它将碾压竞争对手。

不幸的是,公司不能像销售人员那样付薪给每个人。销售人员独自工作。大多数员工的工作纠缠在一起。假设一家公司制造某种消费小工具。工程师构建了具有各种新功能的可靠小工具;工业设计师为它设计了漂亮的外壳;然后市场营销人员说服每个人这是他们必须拥有的东西。你怎么知道小工具的销售中有多少来自每个群体的努力?或者,又有多少来自过去制造了让公司享有质量声誉的小工具的创造者?没有办法理清他们所有的贡献。即使你能读懂消费者的心思,你会发现这些因素都模糊地混在一起。

如果你想加速,让你的工作与大量其他人的工作纠缠在一起是个问题。在大型群体中,你的表现无法单独衡量——而群体中的其他人会拖慢你。

§ 9

Measurement and Leverage

To get rich you need to get yourself in a situation with two things, measurement and leverage. You need to be in a position where your performance can be measured, or there is no way to get paid more by doing more. And you have to have leverage, in the sense that the decisions you make have a big effect.

Measurement alone is not enough. An example of a job with measurement but not leverage is doing piecework in a sweatshop. Your performance is measured and you get paid accordingly, but you have no scope for decisions. The only decision you get to make is how fast you work, and that can probably only increase your earnings by a factor of two or three.

An example of a job with both measurement and leverage would be lead actor in a movie. Your performance can be measured in the gross of the movie. And you have leverage in the sense that your performance can make or break it.

CEOs also have both measurement and leverage. They're measured, in that the performance of the company is their performance. And they have leverage in that their decisions set the whole company moving in one direction or another.

I think everyone who gets rich by their own efforts will be found to be in a situation with measurement and leverage. Everyone I can think of does: CEOs, movie stars, hedge fund managers, professional athletes. A good hint to the presence of leverage is the possibility of failure. Upside must be balanced by downside, so if there is big potential for gain there must also be a terrifying possibility of loss. CEOs, stars, fund managers, and athletes all live with the sword hanging over their heads; the moment they start to suck, they're out. If you're in a job that feels safe, you are not going to get rich, because if there is no danger there is almost certainly no leverage.

But you don't have to become a CEO or a movie star to be in a situation with measurement and leverage. All you need to do is be part of a small group working on a hard problem.

衡量与杠杆

要致富,你需要让自己置身于同时具备两种东西的情景:衡量和杠杆。你需要处在一个你的表现可以被衡量的位置,否则就无法通过付出更多来获得更多报酬。而且你必须拥有杠杆,即你所做的决策会产生重大影响。

仅有衡量是不够的。一个有衡量但没有杠杆的例子是在血汗工厂做计件工。你的表现被衡量并相应获得报酬,但你没有决策空间。你唯一能做的决定是工作速度有多快,而这大概只能让你的收入增加两到三倍。

既有衡量又有杠杆的工作例子是电影主角。你的表现可以通过电影票房来衡量。而且你有杠杆,因为你的表现可以成就或毁掉一部电影。

CEO也同时拥有衡量和杠杆。他们被衡量,因为公司的表现就是他们的表现。他们有杠杆,因为他们的决策决定了整个公司的方向。

我认为所有通过自己努力致富的人都会处于有衡量和杠杆的处境。我能想到的每个人都是:CEO、电影明星、对冲基金经理、职业运动员。杠杆存在的一个良好迹象是失败的可能性。上行必须有下行平衡,所以如果存在巨大的收益潜力,也一定存在可怕的损失可能性。CEO、明星、基金经理和运动员都头顶悬剑;一旦他们开始表现糟糕,就被淘汰。如果你身处一份感觉安全的工作,你不会致富,因为如果没有危险,几乎肯定没有杠杆。

但你不必成为CEO或电影明星才能处于有衡量和杠杆的处境。你所需要的只是成为一个小团队的一员,致力于解决一个难题。

§ 10

Smallness = Measurement

If you can't measure the value of the work done by individual employees, you can get close. You can measure the value of the work done by small groups.

One level at which you can accurately measure the revenue generated by employees is at the level of the whole company. When the company is small, you are thereby fairly close to measuring the contributions of individual employees. A viable startup might only have ten employees, which puts you within a factor of ten of measuring individual effort.

Starting or joining a startup is thus as close as most people can get to saying to one's boss, I want to work ten times as hard, so please pay me ten times as much. There are two differences: you're not saying it to your boss, but directly to the customers (for whom your boss is only a proxy after all), and you're not doing it individually, but along with a small group of other ambitious people.

It will, ordinarily, be a group. Except in a few unusual kinds of work, like acting or writing books, you can't be a company of one person. And the people you work with had better be good, because it's their work that yours is going to be averaged with.

A big company is like a giant galley driven by a thousand rowers. Two things keep the speed of the galley down. One is that individual rowers don't see any result from working harder. The other is that, in a group of a thousand people, the average rower is likely to be pretty average.

If you took ten people at random out of the big galley and put them in a boat by themselves, they could probably go faster. They would have both carrot and stick to motivate them. An energetic rower would be encouraged by the thought that he could have a visible effect on the speed of the boat. And if someone was lazy, the others would be more likely to notice and complain.

But the real advantage of the ten-man boat shows when you take the ten best rowers out of the big galley and put them in a boat together. They will have all the extra motivation that comes from being in a small group. But more importantly, by selecting that small a group you can get the best rowers. Each one will be in the top 1%. It's a much better deal for them to average their work together with a small group of their peers than to average it with everyone.

That's the real point of startups. Ideally, you are getting together with a group of other people who also want to work a lot harder, and get paid a lot more, than they would in a big company. And because startups tend to get founded by self-selecting groups of ambitious people who already know one another (at least by reputation), the level of measurement is more precise than you get from smallness alone. A startup is not merely ten people, but ten people like you.

Steve Jobs once said that the success or failure of a startup depends on the first ten employees. I agree. If anything, it's more like the first five. Being small is not, in itself, what makes startups kick butt, but rather that small groups can be select. You don't want small in the sense of a village, but small in the sense of an all-star team.

The larger a group, the closer its average member will be to the average for the population as a whole. So all other things being equal, a very able person in a big company is probably getting a bad deal, because his performance is dragged down by the overall lower performance of the others. Of course, all other things often are not equal: the able person may not care about money, or may prefer the stability of a large company. But a very able person who does care about money will ordinarily do better to go off and work with a small group of peers.

小 = 衡量

如果你无法衡量单个员工工作的价值,你可以接近它。你可以衡量小团队工作的价值。

可以准确衡量员工产生收入的层次之一是整个公司。当公司小时,你就相当接近衡量单个员工的贡献。一个可行的初创公司可能只有十名员工,这让你在衡量个人努力时精确到十分之一。

因此,创办或加入初创公司是大多数人最能接近对老板说“我想十倍努力地工作,所以请付我十倍工资”的方式。有两个不同:你不是对老板说,而是直接对客户说(毕竟老板只是客户的代理),而且你不是单独做,而是与一小群其他有抱负的人一起。

通常这是一个团队。除了少数不寻常的工作,比如表演或写书,你无法成为单人公司。并且与你合作的人必须很优秀,因为你的工作将与他们的平均在一起。

一家大公司就像一艘由一千名划手驱动的大船。两件事拖慢了速度。一是单个划手看不到更努力的结果。二是在一千人的群体中,平均划手很可能相当平庸。

如果你从大船中随机抽出十个人,放进他们自己的小船,他们可能会划得更快。他们既有胡萝卜也有大棒来激励。精力充沛的划手会因为想到自己能对船速产生可见影响而受到鼓舞。如果有人懒惰,其他人更可能注意到并抱怨。

但当从大船里选出十名最佳划手放进小船时,十人小船的真正优势就显现了。他们将拥有来自小团队的所有额外动力。但更重要的是,通过选择这么小的群体,你可以得到最好的划手。每个人都在前1%。与他们的小团队同行平均工作,比与所有人平均好得多。

这就是初创公司的真正意义。理想情况下,你与一群其他人聚在一起,他们都想比在大公司里更努力地工作并得到多得多的报酬。而且因为初创公司通常由自我选择的有抱负的人创立,他们彼此认识(至少认识其名声),衡量的精确度比单纯从人数少获得的更高。初创公司不仅仅是十个人,而是十个像你一样的人。

史蒂夫·乔布斯曾说过,初创公司的成败取决于最初的十名员工。我同意。实际上更像是前五名。小本身并不是初创公司厉害的原因,而是小团队可以被选择。你不想要村庄意义上的小,而是全明星团队意义上的小。

群体越大,其平均成员越接近整体人口的平均值。因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,一个非常有能力的人在大公司很可能吃了亏,因为他的表现被其他人较低的整体表现拖累了。当然,其他条件往往并不相同:有能力的人可能不在乎钱,或者更喜欢大公司的稳定。但一个在乎钱的有能力的人,通常最好离开并与一小群同行合作。

§ 11

Technology = Leverage

Startups offer anyone a way to be in a situation with measurement and leverage. They allow measurement because they're small, and they offer leverage because they make money by inventing new technology.

What is technology? It's technique. It's the way we all do things. And when you discover a new way to do things, its value is multiplied by all the people who use it. It is the proverbial fishing rod, rather than the fish. That's the difference between a startup and a restaurant or a barber shop. You fry eggs or cut hair one customer at a time. Whereas if you solve a technical problem that a lot of people care about, you help everyone who uses your solution. That's leverage.

If you look at history, it seems that most people who got rich by creating wealth did it by developing new technology. You just can't fry eggs or cut hair fast enough. What made the Florentines rich in 1200 was the discovery of new techniques for making the high-tech product of the time, fine woven cloth. What made the Dutch rich in 1600 was the discovery of shipbuilding and navigation techniques that enabled them to dominate the seas of the Far East.

Fortunately there is a natural fit between smallness and solving hard problems. The leading edge of technology moves fast. Technology that's valuable today could be worthless in a couple years. Small companies are more at home in this world, because they don't have layers of bureaucracy to slow them down. Also, technical advances tend to come from unorthodox approaches, and small companies are less constrained by convention.

Big companies can develop technology. They just can't do it quickly. Their size makes them slow and prevents them from rewarding employees for the extraordinary effort required. So in practice big companies only get to develop technology in fields where large capital requirements prevent startups from competing with them, like microprocessors, power plants, or passenger aircraft. And even in those fields they depend heavily on startups for components and ideas.

It's obvious that biotech or software startups exist to solve hard technical problems, but I think it will also be found to be true in businesses that don't seem to be about technology. McDonald's, for example, grew big by designing a system, the McDonald's franchise, that could then be reproduced at will all over the face of the earth. A McDonald's franchise is controlled by rules so precise that it is practically a piece of software. Write once, run everywhere. Ditto for Wal-Mart. Sam Walton got rich not by being a retailer, but by designing a new kind of store.

Use difficulty as a guide not just in selecting the overall aim of your company, but also at decision points along the way. At Viaweb one of our rules of thumb was run upstairs. Suppose you are a little, nimble guy being chased by a big, fat, bully. You open a door and find yourself in a staircase. Do you go up or down? I say up. The bully can probably run downstairs as fast as you can. Going upstairs his bulk will be more of a disadvantage. Running upstairs is hard for you but even harder for him.

What this meant in practice was that we deliberately sought hard problems. If there were two features we could add to our software, both equally valuable in proportion to their difficulty, we'd always take the harder one. Not just because it was more valuable, but because it was harder. We delighted in forcing bigger, slower competitors to follow us over difficult ground. Like guerillas, startups prefer the difficult terrain of the mountains, where the troops of the central government can't follow. I can remember times when we were just exhausted after wrestling all day with some horrible technical problem. And I'd be delighted, because something that was hard for us would be impossible for our competitors.

This is not just a good way to run a startup. It's what a startup is. Venture capitalists know about this and have a phrase for it: barriers to entry. If you go to a VC with a new idea and ask him to invest in it, one of the first things he'll ask is, how hard would this be for someone else to develop? That is, how much difficult ground have you put between yourself and potential pursuers? [7] And you had better have a convincing explanation of why your technology would be hard to duplicate. Otherwise as soon as some big company becomes aware of it, they'll make their own, and with their brand name, capital, and distribution clout, they'll take away your market overnight. You'd be like guerillas caught in the open field by regular army forces.

One way to put up barriers to entry is through patents. But patents may not provide much protection. Competitors commonly find ways to work around a patent. And if they can't, they may simply violate it and invite you to sue them. A big company is not afraid to be sued; it's an everyday thing for them. They'll make sure that suing them is expensive and takes a long time. Ever heard of Philo Farnsworth? He invented television. The reason you've never heard of him is that his company was not the one to make money from it. [8] The company that did was RCA, and Farnsworth's reward for his efforts was a decade of patent litigation.

Here, as so often, the best defense is a good offense. If you can develop technology that's simply too hard for competitors to duplicate, you don't need to rely on other defenses. Start by picking a hard problem, and then at every decision point, take the harder choice. [9]

技术 = 杠杆

初创公司为任何人提供了身处有衡量和杠杆处境的方式。它们因为小而允许衡量,因为它们通过发明新技术来赚钱而提供杠杆。

什么是技术?技术就是方法。是我们做事的方式。当你发现一种新的做事方式,它的价值被所有使用它的人放大。它是传说中的鱼竿,而不是鱼。这就是初创公司与餐馆或理发店的区别。你一次煎一个鸡蛋或剪一个头发。而如果你解决了一个很多人在意的技术问题,你就帮助了所有使用你解决方案的人。这就是杠杆。

回顾历史,似乎大多数通过创造财富致富的人都是通过开发新技术实现的。你煎鸡蛋或剪头发的速度根本不够快。让佛罗伦萨人在1200年变富的是发现了当时的高科技产品——精细纺织物的新制造技术。让荷兰人在1600年变富的是发现了造船和航海技术,使他们得以主宰远东海域。

幸运的是,小规模与解决难题之间存在自然契合。技术前沿发展迅速。今天有价值的技术可能几年后就一文不值。小公司在这个世界里更自在,因为它们没有层层官僚机构拖慢速度。而且,技术进步往往来自非正统方法,小公司受惯例约束较少。

大公司可以开发技术。只是无法快速做。它们的规模使它们缓慢,并且无法为所需的非凡努力奖励员工。所以实际上,大公司只能在需要大量资本投入、阻止初创公司竞争(如微处理器、发电厂或客机)的领域开发技术。即使在这些领域,它们也严重依赖初创公司提供组件和创意。

显然生物技术或软件初创公司是为了解决棘手的技术问题而存在,但我认为在那些似乎不涉及技术的行业中也同样如此。例如,麦当劳通过设计一个系统——麦当劳特许经营模式——而壮大,这个系统随后可以在地球上任意复制。麦当劳特许经营由如此精确的规则控制,以至于它实际上是一段软件。一次编写,到处运行。沃尔玛也是如此。山姆·沃尔顿致富不是通过做零售商,而是通过设计一种新商店。

不仅在选择公司的总体目标时,而且在沿途的决策点上,都要以困难为指南。在Viaweb,我们的经验法则之一是“上楼”。假设你是一个小而灵活的家伙,被一个大而胖的恶霸追赶。你打开一扇门,发现自己在一个楼梯间。你上还是下?我说上。恶霸下楼梯可能和你一样快。而上楼梯时,他的笨重身体更不利。跑上楼对你来说很难,但对他来说更难。

这在实际中意味着我们刻意寻找难题。如果我们能为软件增加两个功能,两者在难度比例上价值相当,我们总是选择更难的那个。不仅因为它更有价值,而且因为它更难。我们乐于迫使更大、更慢的竞争对手跟随我们穿越艰难地带。就像游击队,初创公司偏好山区的崎岖地形,中央政府的部队无法跟随。我记得有几次我们整天与某个可怕的技术问题搏斗后精疲力竭。而我很高兴,因为对我们难的东西,对竞争对手是不可能的。

这不仅是经营初创公司的好方法。这就是初创公司的本质。风险投资家知道这一点,并有一个术语:进入壁垒。如果你带着一个新创意去找VC,要求投资,他最先问的问题之一是:别人复制这个有多难?也就是说,你在自己和潜在追逐者之间设置了多难的障碍?[7] 你必须有一个令人信服的解释,说明为什么你的技术难以复制。否则一旦某家大公司注意到你,他们就会自己做,凭借品牌、资本和分销影响力,一夜之间夺走你的市场。你就会像被常规军队困在开阔地的游击队。

设置进入壁垒的一种方式是通过专利。但专利可能提供不了太多保护。竞争对手通常能找到绕过专利的方法。如果不行,他们可能直接侵权并邀请你起诉。大公司不怕被起诉;这对他们来说是家常便饭。他们会让起诉变得昂贵且耗时。听说过菲罗·法恩斯沃斯吗?他发明了电视。你从未听说过他的原因是他的公司没有从中赚钱。[8] 赚钱的是RCA,法恩斯沃斯努力的回报是十年的专利诉讼。

这里,一如既往,最好的防御是好的进攻。如果你能开发出竞争对手根本无法复制的技术,你就不需要依赖其他防御。从选一个难题开始,然后在每个决策点选择更难的那个。[9]

§ 12

The Catch(es)

If it were simply a matter of working harder than an ordinary employee and getting paid proportionately, it would obviously be a good deal to start a startup. Up to a point it would be more fun. I don't think many people like the slow pace of big companies, the interminable meetings, the water-cooler conversations, the clueless middle managers, and so on.

Unfortunately there are a couple catches. One is that you can't choose the point on the curve that you want to inhabit. You can't decide, for example, that you'd like to work just two or three times as hard, and get paid that much more. When you're running a startup, your competitors decide how hard you work. And they pretty much all make the same decision: as hard as you possibly can.

The other catch is that the payoff is only on average proportionate to your productivity. There is, as I said before, a large random multiplier in the success of any company. So in practice the deal is not that you're 30 times as productive and get paid 30 times as much. It is that you're 30 times as productive, and get paid between zero and a thousand times as much. If the mean is 30x, the median is probably zero. Most startups tank, and not just the dogfood portals we all heard about during the Internet Bubble. It's common for a startup to be developing a genuinely good product, take slightly too long to do it, run out of money, and have to shut down.

A startup is like a mosquito. A bear can absorb a hit and a crab is armored against one, but a mosquito is designed for one thing: to score. No energy is wasted on defense. The defense of mosquitos, as a species, is that there are a lot of them, but this is little consolation to the individual mosquito.

Startups, like mosquitos, tend to be an all-or-nothing proposition. And you don't generally know which of the two you're going to get till the last minute. Viaweb came close to tanking several times. Our trajectory was like a sine wave. Fortunately we got bought at the top of the cycle, but it was damned close. While we were visiting Yahoo in California to talk about selling the company to them, we had to borrow a conference room to reassure an investor who was about to back out of a new round of funding that we needed to stay alive.

The all-or-nothing aspect of startups was not something we wanted. Viaweb's hackers were all extremely risk-averse. If there had been some way just to work super hard and get paid for it, without having a lottery mixed in, we would have been delighted. We would have much preferred a 100% chance of $1 million to a 20% chance of $10 million, even though theoretically the second is worth twice as much. Unfortunately, there is not currently any space in the business world where you can get the first deal.

The closest you can get is by selling your startup in the early stages, giving up upside (and risk) for a smaller but guaranteed payoff. We had a chance to do this, and stupidly, as we then thought, let it slip by. After that we became comically eager to sell. For the next year or so, if anyone expressed the slightest curiosity about Viaweb we would try to sell them the company. But there were no takers, so we had to keep going.

陷阱

如果仅仅是比普通员工更努力并得到相应报酬,那么创办初创公司显然是一笔好交易。在某种程度上,它还会更有趣。我不认为很多人喜欢大公司的慢节奏、没完没了的会议、饮水机边的闲聊、无能的中层经理等等。

不幸的是,有几个陷阱。一个是你不能选择你想占据的曲线上的点。你不能决定说,我想只努力两三倍,然后拿到多倍的报酬。当你经营一家初创公司时,你的竞争对手决定了你有多努力。而且他们几乎都做出同样的决定:尽你最大可能努力。

另一个陷阱是回报仅平均与生产力成正比。正如我之前所说,任何公司的成功都有很大的随机乘数。所以实际上,交易不是你的生产力是30倍,你得到30倍报酬。而是你的生产力是30倍,但你得到的报酬在零到一千倍之间。如果均值是30倍,中位数可能为零。大多数初创公司都倒闭了,不仅仅是我们都在互联网泡沫期间听说的那些狗粮门户网站。初创公司经常开发出真正的好产品,但花的时间稍长,资金耗尽,不得不关门。

初创公司就像一只蚊子。熊能承受一击,螃蟹有装甲防护,但蚊子只为一件事而设计:得分。没有能量浪费在防御上。蚊子作为一个物种的防御是有很多蚊子,但这给单个蚊子带来不了什么安慰。

初创公司像蚊子一样,往往是一个全有或全无的赌注。而且你通常直到最后一刻才知道你会得到哪个。Viaweb好几次差点完蛋。我们的轨迹像正弦波。幸运的是我们在周期顶部被收购了,但实在太悬了。当我们正在加州拜访雅虎讨论将公司卖给他们时,我们不得不借用一个会议室来安抚一个即将退出新一轮融资的投资者——而我们需要那笔钱才能活下去。

初创公司的全有或全无特性并不是我们想要的。Viaweb的黑客们都极度厌恶风险。如果有某种方式可以只是超级努力工作并得到报酬,而不掺入彩票,我们会很高兴。我们宁愿100%得到100万美元,而不是20%得到1000万美元,即使理论上后者价值两倍。不幸的是,商业世界中目前没有能拿到第一种交易的空间。

你能得到的最接近的是在早期阶段出售你的初创公司,放弃上行空间(和风险)以换取更小但有保障的回报。我们曾有一次机会,但愚笨地——当时我们这么认为——让它溜走了。之后我们变得极其渴望出售。接下来的一年左右,如果有人对Viaweb表现出丝毫兴趣,我们都会试图把公司卖给他。但没有买主,所以我们只能继续前行。

§ 13

Get Users

I think it's a good idea to get bought, if you can. Running a business is different from growing one. It is just as well to let a big company take over once you reach cruising altitude. It's also financially wiser, because selling allows you to diversify. What would you think of a financial advisor who put all his client's assets into one volatile stock?

How do you get bought? Mostly by doing the same things you'd do if you didn't intend to sell the company. Being profitable, for example. But getting bought is also an art in its own right, and one that we spent a lot of time trying to master.

Potential buyers will always delay if they can. The hard part about getting bought is getting them to act. For most people, the most powerful motivator is not the hope of gain, but the fear of loss. For potential acquirers, the most powerful motivator is the prospect that one of their competitors will buy you. This, as we found, causes CEOs to take red-eyes. The second biggest is the worry that, if they don't buy you now, you'll continue to grow rapidly and will cost more to acquire later, or even become a competitor.

In both cases, what it all comes down to is users. You'd think that a company about to buy you would do a lot of research and decide for themselves how valuable your technology was. Not at all. What they go by is the number of users you have.

In effect, acquirers assume the customers know who has the best technology. And this is not as stupid as it sounds. Users are the only real proof that you've created wealth. Wealth is what people want, and if people aren't using your software, maybe it's not just because you're bad at marketing. Maybe it's because you haven't made what they want.

Venture capitalists have a list of danger signs to watch out for. Near the top is the company run by techno-weenies who are obsessed with solving interesting technical problems, instead of making users happy. In a startup, you're not just trying to solve problems. You're trying to solve problems that users care about.

So I think you should make users the test, just as acquirers do. Treat a startup as an optimization problem in which performance is measured by number of users. As anyone who has tried to optimize software knows, the key is measurement. When you try to guess where your program is slow, and what would make it faster, you almost always guess wrong.

Number of users may not be the perfect test, but it will be very close. It's what acquirers care about. It's what revenues depend on. It's what makes competitors unhappy. It's what impresses reporters, and potential new users. Certainly it's a better test than your a priori notions of what problems are important to solve, no matter how technically adept you are.

Among other things, treating a startup as an optimization problem will help you avoid another pitfall that VCs worry about, and rightly-- taking a long time to develop a product. Now we can recognize this as something hackers already know to avoid: premature optimization. Get a version 1.0 out there as soon as you can. Until you have some users to measure, you're optimizing based on guesses.

The ball you need to keep your eye on here is the underlying principle that wealth is what people want. If you plan to get rich by creating wealth, you have to know what people want. So few businesses really pay attention to making customers happy. How often do you walk into a store, or call a company on the phone, with a feeling of dread in the back of your mind? When you hear "your call is important to us, please stay on the line," do you think, oh good, now everything will be all right?

A restaurant can afford to serve the occasional burnt dinner. But in technology, you cook one thing and that's what everyone eats. So any difference between what people want and what you deliver is multiplied. You please or annoy customers wholesale. The closer you can get to what they want, the more wealth you generate.

获取用户

我认为如果能被收购,那是个好主意。经营一家企业与增长一家企业是不同的。一旦达到巡航高度,让大公司接管也不错。在财务上更明智,因为出售可以让你多元化。你会怎么看待一个把所有客户资产都投入一只波动股票的财务顾问?

如何被收购?主要是做那些即使你不打算出售公司也会做的事。例如盈利。但被收购本身也是一门艺术,我们花了很多时间试图掌握。

潜在买家如果可能总会拖延。被收购的难点在于让他们行动。对大多数人来说,最强大的动力不是获利的希望,而是损失的恐惧。对于潜在收购者,最强大的动力是担心竞争对手会买下你。正如我们发现的那样,这会让CEO们坐红眼航班。第二大担心是,如果他们现在不买你,你会继续快速增长,以后收购成本会更高,甚至成为竞争对手。

两种情况下,归根结底都是用户。你可能会认为即将收购你的公司会做大量研究,自己判断你的技术价值。根本不是。他们只看你拥有的用户数量。

实际上,收购方假定客户知道谁有最好的技术。这并不像听起来那么蠢。用户是你创造了财富的唯一真正证明。财富是人们想要的东西,如果人们不用你的软件,也许不仅仅是因为你不擅长营销。也许是因为你没有做出他们想要的东西。

风险投资家有一份需要警惕的危险信号清单。排在前列的是由技术呆子经营的公司,他们痴迷于解决有趣的技术问题,而不是让用户满意。在初创公司,你不仅仅是在解决问题。你在解决用户关心的问题。

所以我认为你应该像收购方一样,把用户作为检验标准。把初创公司视为一个优化问题,其中性能由用户数量来衡量。任何尝试过优化软件的人都知道,关键是衡量。当你试图猜测程序哪里慢、什么能使其更快时,你几乎总是猜错。

用户数量可能不是完美的检验标准,但它非常接近。这是收购方关心的。这是收入所依赖的。这是让竞争对手不快的。这是给记者和潜在新用户留下印象的。当然,这比你先验地认为哪些问题重要要解决得好,无论你技术多么高超。

除此之外,把初创公司视为优化问题有助于避免另一个风险投资家担心的陷阱——而且有道理——花费很长时间开发产品。现在我们可以认识到,这是黑客们已经知道要避免的:过早优化。尽快推出1.0版本。在你有用户可供衡量之前,你是在基于猜测优化。

你需要盯住的球是基本原则:财富是人们想要的。如果你计划通过创造财富致富,你必须知道人们想要什么。很少有企业真正关注让客户满意。你多久会带着一丝恐惧走进一家商店或给公司打电话?当你听到“您的电话对我们很重要,请稍候”,你会想“哦,好了,现在一切都会没事了”吗?

一家餐馆可以偶尔提供烧焦的晚餐。但在技术领域,你只做一道菜,而每个人都吃这个。所以人们想要的和实际交付之间的任何差距都会被放大。你批发地取悦或惹恼客户。你越接近他们想要的,你创造的财富就越多。

§ 14

Wealth and Power

Making wealth is not the only way to get rich. For most of human history it has not even been the most common. Until a few centuries ago, the main sources of wealth were mines, slaves and serfs, land, and cattle, and the only ways to acquire these rapidly were by inheritance, marriage, conquest, or confiscation. Naturally wealth had a bad reputation.

Two things changed. The first was the rule of law. For most of the world's history, if you did somehow accumulate a fortune, the ruler or his henchmen would find a way to steal it. But in medieval Europe something new happened. A new class of merchants and manufacturers began to collect in towns. [10] Together they were able to withstand the local feudal lord. So for the first time in our history, the bullies stopped stealing the nerds' lunch money. This was naturally a great incentive, and possibly indeed the main cause of the second big change, industrialization.

A great deal has been written about the causes of the Industrial Revolution. But surely a necessary, if not sufficient, condition was that people who made fortunes be able to enjoy them in peace. [11] One piece of evidence is what happened to countries that tried to return to the old model, like the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent Britain under the labor governments of the 1960s and early 1970s. Take away the incentive of wealth, and technical innovation grinds to a halt.

Remember what a startup is, economically: a way of saying, I want to work faster. Instead of accumulating money slowly by being paid a regular wage for fifty years, I want to get it over with as soon as possible. So governments that forbid you to accumulate wealth are in effect decreeing that you work slowly. They're willing to let you earn $3 million over fifty years, but they're not willing to let you work so hard that you can do it in two. They are like the corporate boss that you can't go to and say, I want to work ten times as hard, so please pay me ten times a much. Except this is not a boss you can escape by starting your own company.

The problem with working slowly is not just that technical innovation happens slowly. It's that it tends not to happen at all. It's only when you're deliberately looking for hard problems, as a way to use speed to the greatest advantage, that you take on this kind of project. Developing new technology is a pain in the ass. It is, as Edison said, one percent inspiration and ninety-nine percent perspiration. Without the incentive of wealth, no one wants to do it. Engineers will work on sexy projects like fighter planes and moon rockets for ordinary salaries, but more mundane technologies like light bulbs or semiconductors have to be developed by entrepreneurs.

Startups are not just something that happened in Silicon Valley in the last couple decades. Since it became possible to get rich by creating wealth, everyone who has done it has used essentially the same recipe: measurement and leverage, where measurement comes from working with a small group, and leverage from developing new techniques. The recipe was the same in Florence in 1200 as it is in Santa Clara today.

Understanding this may help to answer an important question: why Europe grew so powerful. Was it something about the geography of Europe? Was it that Europeans are somehow racially superior? Was it their religion? The answer (or at least the proximate cause) may be that the Europeans rode on the crest of a powerful new idea: allowing those who made a lot of money to keep it.

Once you're allowed to do that, people who want to get rich can do it by generating wealth instead of stealing it. The resulting technological growth translates not only into wealth but into military power. The theory that led to the stealth plane was developed by a Soviet mathematician. But because the Soviet Union didn't have a computer industry, it remained for them a theory; they didn't have hardware capable of executing the calculations fast enough to design an actual airplane.

In that respect the Cold War teaches the same lesson as World War II and, for that matter, most wars in recent history. Don't let a ruling class of warriors and politicians squash the entrepreneurs. The same recipe that makes individuals rich makes countries powerful. Let the nerds keep their lunch money, and you rule the world.

财富与权力

创造财富并不是致富的唯一途径。在人类历史的大部分时间里,它甚至不是最常见的方式。直到几个世纪前,财富的主要来源是矿山、奴隶和农奴、土地和牲畜,而快速获取它们的唯一途径是继承、婚姻、征服或没收。自然,财富名声不佳。

两件事改变了这一点。第一是法治。在世界大部分历史中,如果你确实积累了一笔财富,统治者或其爪牙总会设法偷走它。但在中世纪的欧洲,新事物出现了。一个新的商人和制造商阶层开始在城镇聚集。[10] 他们团结起来,能够抵抗当地封建领主。于是,在人类历史上第一次,恶霸不再抢走书呆子的午餐钱。这自然是一个巨大的激励,甚至可能是第二个重大变化——工业化——的主要原因。

关于工业革命的原因已经有很多论述。但一个必要(即使不是充分)的条件肯定是:那些创造财富的人能够安心享用它们。[11] 一个证据是试图回归旧模式的国家发生了什么,比如苏联,以及在较小程度上1960年代和70年代初工党执政下的英国。拿走财富的激励,技术创新就会停滞。

记住初创公司在经济上的本质:一种说“我想更快工作”的方式。与其通过五十年定期工资慢慢积累金钱,我想尽快搞定。因此,禁止你积累财富的政府实际上是在命令你慢慢工作。他们愿意让你五十年赚300万美元,但不愿让你那么努力以致两年内完成。他们就像那个你无法去找的老板,说我想十倍努力地工作,所以请付我十倍工资。只不过这是一个你无法通过创办自己公司来逃离的老板。

慢慢工作的问题不仅是技术创新缓慢。而是它往往根本不会发生。只有当你刻意寻找难题,以充分利用速度优势时,你才会承担这种项目。开发新技术是个苦差事。就像爱迪生所说,百分之一的灵感加百分之九十九的汗水。没有财富激励,没人愿意做。工程师们会为了普通薪水去做战斗机和登月火箭这样的性感项目,但更平凡的技术如灯泡或半导体必须由企业家来开发。

初创公司不仅仅是过去几十年硅谷发生的事情。自从通过创造财富致富成为可能以来,每个这么做的人都使用了基本相同的配方:衡量和杠杆,其中衡量来自与一个小团队合作,杠杆来自开发新技术。这个配方在1200年的佛罗伦萨和今天的圣克拉拉是一样的。

理解这一点可能有助于回答一个重要问题:为什么欧洲变得如此强大。是因为欧洲的地理吗?是因为欧洲人在种族上更优越吗?是因为他们的宗教吗?答案(或至少是直接原因)可能是欧洲人驾驭了一个强大的新思想:允许那些赚了很多钱的人保留财富。

一旦你被允许这样做,想致富的人就可以通过创造财富而不是偷窃来致富。由此产生的技术增长不仅转化为财富,还转化为军事力量。导致隐形飞机的理论是由一位苏联数学家提出的。但由于苏联没有计算机工业,对他们来说这仍然只是一个理论;他们没有足够快的硬件来执行计算,无法设计出真正的飞机。

在这方面,冷战教给我们与二战以及近代大多数战争同样的教训:不要让战士和政客的统治阶级压制企业家。让个人致富的配方也让国家强大。让书呆子保住他们的午餐钱,你就能统治世界。

§ 15

[1] One valuable thing you tend to get only in startups is uninterruptability. Different kinds of work have different time quanta. Someone proofreading a manuscript could probably be interrupted every fifteen minutes with little loss of productivity. But the time quantum for hacking is very long: it might take an hour just to load a problem into your head. So the cost of having someone from personnel call you about a form you forgot to fill out can be huge.

This is why hackers give you such a baleful stare as they turn from their screen to answer your question. Inside their heads a giant house of cards is tottering.

The mere possibility of being interrupted deters hackers from starting hard projects. This is why they tend to work late at night, and why it's next to impossible to write great software in a cubicle (except late at night).

One great advantage of startups is that they don't yet have any of the people who interrupt you. There is no personnel department, and thus no form nor anyone to call you about it.

[1] 你在初创公司中往往能得到的一件好东西是免打扰状态。不同类型的工作有不同的时间量子。校对稿件的人可能每隔十五分钟被打断一次,生产力损失不大。但黑客的时间量子很长:可能花一个小时才能把一个问题加载进脑袋。所以人事部有人打电话告诉你一个你忘了填的表格,代价可能巨大。

这就是为什么黑客从屏幕前转过身来回答你的问题时,会投来如此恶狠狠的目光。他们脑袋里一座巨大的纸牌屋正摇摇欲坠。

仅仅是可能被打断这一点就阻止了黑客开始困难的项目。这就是为什么他们倾向于深夜工作,也为什么在格子间里(除非深夜)几乎不可能写出伟大的软件。

初创公司的一大优势是它们还没有那些会打断你的人。没有人事部门,因此没有表格,也没有人打电话给你。

§ 16

[2] Faced with the idea that people working for startups might be 20 or 30 times as productive as those working for large companies, executives at large companies will naturally wonder, how could I get the people working for me to do that? The answer is simple: pay them to.

Internally most companies are run like Communist states. If you believe in free markets, why not turn your company into one?

Hypothesis: A company will be maximally profitable when each employee is paid in proportion to the wealth they generate.

[2] 面对初创公司员工可能比大公司员工生产力高20或30倍的想法,大公司的高管们自然会想:我怎么能让我手下的人也这样?答案很简单:付钱给他们。

内部大多数公司的运作方式像共产主义国家。如果你相信自由市场,为什么不把自己的公司变成一个?

假设:当每个员工获得的报酬与其创造的财富成正比时,公司利润最大。

§ 17

[3] Until recently even governments sometimes didn't grasp the distinction between money and wealth. Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, v:i) mentions several that tried to preserve their "wealth" by forbidding the export of gold or silver. But having more of the medium of exchange would not make a country richer; if you have more money chasing the same amount of material wealth, the only result is higher prices.

[3] 直到最近,有时连政府也不理解金钱与财富的区别。亚当·斯密(《国富论》第五卷第一章)提到几个试图通过禁止金银出口来保护其“财富”的国家。但拥有更多交换媒介并不会使国家更富有;如果有更多的钱追逐同等数量的物质财富,唯一的结果是价格上涨。

§ 18

[4] There are many senses of the word "wealth," not all of them material. I'm not trying to make a deep philosophical point here about which is the true kind. I'm writing about one specific, rather technical sense of the word "wealth." What people will give you money for. This is an interesting sort of wealth to study, because it is the kind that prevents you from starving. And what people will give you money for depends on them, not you.

When you're starting a business, it's easy to slide into thinking that customers want what you do. During the Internet Bubble I talked to a woman who, because she liked the outdoors, was starting an "outdoor portal." You know what kind of business you should start if you like the outdoors? One to recover data from crashed hard disks.

What's the connection? None at all. Which is precisely my point. If you want to create wealth (in the narrow technical sense of not starving) then you should be especially skeptical about any plan that centers on things you like doing. That is where your idea of what's valuable is least likely to coincide with other people's.

[4] “财富”一词有多种含义,并非都是物质的。我并不是想在这里做深刻的哲学论述,探讨哪种是真正的财富。我写的是“财富”的一种特定、相当技术性的含义:人们愿意为之付钱的东西。研究这种财富很有趣,因为它是让你免于挨饿的那种。而人们愿意付钱的东西取决于他们,而不是你。

当你创业时,很容易滑向一种想法:顾客想要你做的事情。在互联网泡沫期间,我和一位女士聊过,她因为喜欢户外运动,正在创办一个“户外门户”。你知道如果你喜欢户外运动应该创办什么生意吗?一个从崩溃硬盘恢复数据的生意。

有什么关系?完全没有。这正是我的观点。如果你想创造财富(在“不挨饿”这个狭隘的技术意义上),那么你应该特别怀疑任何以你喜欢做的事情为核心的方案。这正是你对什么有价值的想法最不可能与他人一致的地方。

§ 19

[5] In the average car restoration you probably do make everyone else microscopically poorer, by doing a small amount of damage to the environment. While environmental costs should be taken into account, they don't make wealth a zero-sum game. For example, if you repair a machine that's broken because a part has come unscrewed, you create wealth with no environmental cost.

[5] 在一般的汽车修复中,你可能确实通过对环境造成少量损害,让其他每个人在微观上更穷一点。虽然环境成本应该被考虑在内,但它们并不使财富成为零和游戏。例如,如果你修理一台因为螺丝松动而坏掉的机器,你创造了财富而没有环境成本。

§ 20

[5b] This essay was written before Firefox.

[5b] 本文写于Firefox之前。

§ 21

[6] Many people feel confused and depressed in their early twenties. Life seemed so much more fun in college. Well, of course it was. Don't be fooled by the surface similarities. You've gone from guest to servant. It's possible to have fun in this new world. Among other things, you now get to go behind the doors that say "authorized personnel only." But the change is a shock at first, and all the worse if you're not consciously aware of it.

[6] 许多人在二十岁出头时感到困惑和沮丧。大学生活似乎有趣得多。当然,确实如此。不要被表面的相似性迷惑。你从客人变成了仆人。在这个新世界里也可能找到乐趣。比如,你现在可以走进写着“仅限授权人员”的门后面。但这种变化一开始是种冲击,如果你没有有意识地意识到它,感觉会更糟。

§ 22

[7] When VCs asked us how long it would take another startup to duplicate our software, we used to reply that they probably wouldn't be able to at all. I think this made us seem naive, or liars.

[7] 当风险投资家问我们另一家初创公司需要多长时间复制我们的软件时,我们过去常常回答他们可能根本做不到。我想这让我们显得天真,或者说谎者。

§ 23

[8] Few technologies have one clear inventor. So as a rule, if you know the "inventor" of something (the telephone, the assembly line, the airplane, the light bulb, the transistor) it is because their company made money from it, and the company's PR people worked hard to spread the story. If you don't know who invented something (the automobile, the television, the computer, the jet engine, the laser), it's because other companies made all the money.

[8] 很少有技术有一个明确的发明者。所以经验是,如果你知道某样东西(电话、流水线、飞机、灯泡、晶体管)的“发明者”,那是因为他们的公司从中赚了钱,并且公司的公关人员努力传播了这个故事。如果你不知道谁发明了某样东西(汽车、电视、计算机、喷气发动机、激光),那是因为其他公司赚了所有的钱。

§ 24

[9] This is a good plan for life in general. If you have two choices, choose the harder. If you're trying to decide whether to go out running or sit home and watch TV, go running. Probably the reason this trick works so well is that when you have two choices and one is harder, the only reason you're even considering the other is laziness. You know in the back of your mind what's the right thing to do, and this trick merely forces you to acknowledge it.

[9] 这通常是人生中一个好策略。如果你有两个选择,选更难的那个。如果你想决定是出去跑步还是坐在家里看电视,去跑步。这个技巧之所以如此有效,可能是因为当你有两个选择,其中一个更难时,你考虑另一个的唯一原因是懒惰。你在内心深处知道什么是正确的事,而这个技巧只是迫使你承认它。

§ 25

[10] It is probably no accident that the middle class first appeared in northern Italy and the low countries, where there were no strong central governments. These two regions were the richest of their time and became the twin centers from which Renaissance civilization radiated. If they no longer play that role, it is because other places, like the United States, have been truer to the principles they discovered.

[10] 中产阶级首先出现在北意大利和低地国家(荷兰、比利时等)大概不是偶然的,那里没有强大的中央政府。这两个地区是当时最富有的,并成为文艺复兴文明辐射的双中心。如果它们不再扮演那个角色,那是因为其他地方,比如美国,更忠实地遵循了它们发现的原则。

§ 26

[11] It may indeed be a sufficient condition. But if so, why didn't the Industrial Revolution happen earlier? Two possible (and not incompatible) answers: (a) It did. The Industrial Revolution was one in a series. (b) Because in medieval towns, monopolies and guild regulations initially slowed the development of new means of production.

[11] 这确实可能是一个充分条件。但如果是这样,为什么工业革命没有更早发生?两个可能(且不相斥的)答案:(a)它确实发生了。工业革命只是系列中的一次。(b)因为在中世纪城镇,垄断和行会规定最初阻碍了新的生产方式的发展。

§ 27

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