Glean 拾遗
专辑 / Paul Graham 文集 / Web创业的廉价化与生态变迁

Web创业的廉价化与生态变迁

原文 www.paulgraham.com 收录 2026-07-07 16:05 阅读 20 min
AI 解读

Paul Graham 在2007年预测,当 Web 创业成本降至只需勇气时,创业数量将激增,并引发标准化、收购流程简化、风险策略升级、创始人年轻化、创业中心持续聚集、评判体系改进、大学教育变革、竞争加剧和技术加速等连锁反应。文章基于 Y Combinator 的投资经验,虽未提供具体数据,但系统阐述了低成本创业对行业生态的深远影响。适合对创业趋势和科技商业史感兴趣的读者,但与本刊关注的 AI 工程与前沿技术主题无关。

原文 20 分钟
原文 www.paulgraham.com ↗
§ 1

October 2007

(This essay is derived from a keynote at FOWA in October 2007.)

There's something interesting happening right now. Startups are undergoing the same transformation that technology does when it becomes cheaper.

It's a pattern we see over and over in technology. Initially there's some device that's very expensive and made in small quantities. Then someone discovers how to make them cheaply; many more get built; and as a result they can be used in new ways.

Computers are a familiar example. When I was a kid, computers were big, expensive machines built one at a time. Now they're a commodity. Now we can stick computers in everything.

This pattern is very old. Most of the turning points in economic history are instances of it. It happened to steel in the 1850s, and to power in the 1780s. It happened to cloth manufacture in the thirteenth century, generating the wealth that later brought about the Renaissance. Agriculture itself was an instance of this pattern.

Now as well as being produced by startups, this pattern is happening to startups. It's so cheap to start web startups that orders of magnitudes more will be started. If the pattern holds true, that should cause dramatic changes.

2007年10月

(本文源自2007年10月在FOWA上的主题演讲。)

此刻正发生一件有趣的事。创业公司正在经历当一项技术变得便宜时通常会经历的转变。

这是我们在技术领域反复看到的模式:起初,某种设备非常昂贵,产量很小。然后有人发现了低成本制造的方法;产量大增,于是新的用途随之出现。

计算机就是一个熟悉的例子。我小时候,计算机是昂贵的大型机器,一次只造一台。如今它们是商品,我们可以把计算机塞进任何东西里。

这种模式非常古老。经济史上的大多数转折点都是它的实例:19世纪50年代的钢铁,18世纪80年代的电力,13世纪的纺织业——后者积累的财富最终催生了文艺复兴。农业本身也是这一模式的例子。

现在,除了由创业公司生产产品外,这一模式本身也在发生在创业公司身上。创办网络创业公司已经便宜到数量级地增长。如果模式成立,这将引发巨变。

§ 2
  1. Lots of Startups

So my first prediction about the future of web startups is pretty straightforward: there will be a lot of them. When starting a startup was expensive, you had to get the permission of investors to do it. Now the only threshold is courage.

Even that threshold is getting lower, as people watch others take the plunge and survive. In the last batch of startups we funded, we had several founders who said they'd thought of applying before, but weren't sure and got jobs instead. It was only after hearing reports of friends who'd done it that they decided to try it themselves.

Starting a startup is hard, but having a 9 to 5 job is hard too, and in some ways a worse kind of hard. In a startup you have lots of worries, but you don't have that feeling that your life is flying by like you do in a big company. Plus in a startup you could make much more money.

As word spreads that startups work, the number may grow to a point that would now seem surprising.

We now think of it as normal to have a job at a company, but this is the thinnest of historical veneers. Just two or three lifetimes ago, most people in what are now called industrialized countries lived by farming. So while it may seem surprising to propose that large numbers of people will change the way they make a living, it would be more surprising if they didn't.

  1. 大量创业公司

所以我关于网络创业公司未来的第一个预测很直接:数量会很多。当创业成本高昂时,你必须获得投资者的许可才能创办。现在唯一的门槛是勇气。

就连这个门槛也在降低,因为人们看到别人尝试后活了下来。在我们最近资助的一批创业公司中,有几位创始人说他们以前想过申请,但不确定,于是去工作了。直到听到朋友成功了的消息,他们才决定自己试试。

创业很难,但朝九晚五的工作也很难,而且在某些方面更糟糕。创业时你有很多担忧,但不会有在大公司里那种生命飞逝的感觉。此外,创业可能赚更多的钱。

随着创业成功的消息传开,数量可能会增长到如今看来令人惊讶的程度。

我们现在认为在公司工作很正常,但这只是历史的一层薄薄伪装。就在两三辈人之前,如今所谓工业化国家的大多数人还以务农为生。所以,如果说很多人会改变谋生方式令人惊讶,那么如果他们不改变,反而更令人惊讶。

§ 3
  1. Standardization

When technology makes something dramatically cheaper, standardization always follows. When you make things in large volumes you tend to standardize everything that doesn't need to change.

At Y Combinator we still only have four people, so we try to standardize everything. We could hire employees, but we want to be forced to figure out how to scale investing.

We often tell startups to release a minimal version one quickly, then let the needs of the users determine what to do next. In essence, let the market design the product. We've done the same thing ourselves. We think of the techniques we're developing for dealing with large numbers of startups as like software. Sometimes it literally is software, like Hacker News and our application system.

One of the most important things we've been working on standardizing are investment terms. Till now investment terms have been individually negotiated. This is a problem for founders, because it makes raising money take longer and cost more in legal fees. So as well as using the same paperwork for every deal we do, we've commissioned generic angel paperwork that all the startups we fund can use for future rounds.

Some investors will still want to cook up their own deal terms. Series A rounds, where you raise a million dollars or more, will be custom deals for the foreseeable future. But I think angel rounds will start to be done mostly with standardized agreements. An angel who wants to insert a bunch of complicated terms into the agreement is probably not one you want anyway.

  1. 标准化

当技术使某样东西大幅降价时,标准化随之而来。当你大规模生产时,倾向于将一切不需要改变的东西标准化。

在Y Combinator,我们仍然只有四个人,所以我们力求标准化一切。我们可以雇佣员工,但我们希望被迫找出如何规模化投资的方法。

我们经常告诉创业公司快速发布最小化版本,然后让用户的需求决定下一步。本质上,让市场设计产品。我们自己也这么做了。我们把为处理大量创业公司而开发的技术视为软件。有时它确实是软件,比如Hacker News和我们的申请系统。

我们一直在努力标准化的最重要的事情之一是投资条款。迄今为止,投资条款都是逐一谈判的。这对创始人来说是个问题,因为它使融资时间更长、法律费用更高。因此,除了每笔交易使用相同的文件外,我们还委托制作了通用的天使投资人文件,我们资助的所有创业公司都可以在后续融资中使用。

有些投资者仍然会定制自己的交易条款。A轮融资(筹集一百万美元或更多)在未来可预见的时间内仍将是定制交易。但我认为天使轮将开始主要使用标准化协议。一个想在协议中塞入一堆复杂条款的天使投资人,可能根本不是你想要的那种天使。

§ 4
  1. New Attitude to Acquisition

Another thing I see starting to get standardized is acquisitions. As the volume of startups increases, big companies will start to develop standardized procedures that make acquisitions little more work than hiring someone.

Google is the leader here, as in so many areas of technology. They buy a lot of startups — more than most people realize, because they only announce a fraction of them. And being Google, they're figuring out how to do it efficiently.

One problem they've solved is how to think about acquisitions. For most companies, acquisitions still carry some stigma of inadequacy. Companies do them because they have to, but there's usually some feeling they shouldn't have to — that their own programmers should be able to build everything they need.

Google's example should cure the rest of the world of this idea. Google has by far the best programmers of any public technology company. If they don't have a problem doing acquisitions, the others should have even less problem. However many Google does, Microsoft should do ten times as many.

One reason Google doesn't have a problem with acquisitions is that they know first-hand the quality of the people they can get that way. Larry and Sergey only started Google after making the rounds of the search engines trying to sell their idea and finding no takers. They've been the guys coming in to visit the big company, so they know who might be sitting across that conference table from them.

  1. 收购态度的转变

另一个我开始看到标准化的东西是收购。随着创业公司数量的增加,大公司会开始制定标准化的流程,使收购比招聘一个人多不了多少工夫。

谷歌在这方面是领先者,正如它在许多技术领域一样。他们收购了很多创业公司——比大多数人意识到的要多,因为他们只宣布了其中的一小部分。作为谷歌,他们在摸索如何高效地完成这件事。

他们解决的一个问题是如何看待收购。对大多数公司来说,收购仍带有某种不光彩的意味——意味着自身能力的不足。公司进行收购是因为不得不这样做,但通常有一种感觉,即他们本不需要这样做——自己的程序员应该能构建所需的一切。

谷歌的例子应该能让其他公司放弃这种想法。谷歌拥有任何上市科技公司中最优秀的程序员。如果他们不认为收购有问题,那么其他公司更不应该有问题。无论谷歌收购多少,微软都应该是它的十倍。

谷歌对收购没有抗拒的原因之一是他们亲身了解通过这种方式能获得的人才质量。拉里和谢尔盖是在走访各大搜索引擎推销他们的想法却无人问津之后,才创办了谷歌。他们曾是以小公司身份去拜访大公司的人,所以知道会议桌对面可能坐的是谁。

§ 5
  1. Riskier Strategies are Possible

Risk is always proportionate to reward. The way to get really big returns is to do things that seem crazy, like starting a new search engine in 1998, or turning down a billion dollar acquisition offer.

This has traditionally been a problem in venture funding. Founders and investors have different attitudes to risk. Knowing that risk is on average proportionate to reward, investors like risky strategies, while founders, who don't have a big enough sample size to care what's true on average, tend to be more conservative.

If startups are easy to start, this conflict goes away, because founders can start them younger, when it's rational to take more risk, and can start more startups total in their careers. When founders can do lots of startups, they can start to look at the world in the same portfolio-optimizing way as investors. And that means the overall amount of wealth created can be greater, because strategies can be riskier.

  1. 风险更大的策略成为可能

风险总是与回报成正比。获得巨大回报的方法是做那些看似疯狂的事,比如在1998年创办新的搜索引擎,或者拒绝十亿美元的收购要约。

这在传统上是风险投资中的一个问题。创始人和投资者对风险的态度不同。投资者知道风险平均与回报成正比,因此喜欢高风险策略;而创始人因为没有足够大的样本量来关心平均值,往往更保守。

如果创业很容易,这种冲突就消失了,因为创始人可以在更年轻的时候开始创业,那时承担更多风险是理性的,而且他们整个职业生涯中可以创办更多公司。当创始人可以创办很多家公司时,他们就能像投资者那样以投资组合优化的角度看待世界。这意味着创造的财富总量可以更大,因为可以采取风险更高的策略。

§ 6
  1. Younger, Nerdier Founders

If startups become a cheap commodity, more people will be able to have them, just as more people could have computers once microprocessors made them cheap. And in particular, younger and more technical founders will be able to start startups than could before.

Back when it cost a lot to start a startup, you had to convince investors to let you do it. And that required very different skills from actually doing the startup. If investors were perfect judges, the two would require exactly the same skills. But unfortunately most investors are terrible judges. I know because I see behind the scenes what an enormous amount of work it takes to raise money, and the amount of selling required in an industry is always inversely proportional to the judgement of the buyers.

Fortunately, if startups get cheaper to start, there's another way to convince investors. Instead of going to venture capitalists with a business plan and trying to convince them to fund it, you can get a product launched on a few tens of thousands of dollars of seed money from us or your uncle, and approach them with a working company instead of a plan for one. Then instead of having to seem smooth and confident, you can just point them to Alexa.

This way of convincing investors is better suited to hackers, who often went into technology in part because they felt uncomfortable with the amount of fakeness required in other fields.

  1. 更年轻、更书呆子气的创始人

如果创业公司成为一种廉价商品,更多人能拥有它们,就像微处理器使计算机变得便宜后,更多人能拥有计算机一样。特别是,更年轻、更懂技术的创始人将比以往更容易创办公司。

在过去创业成本高昂时,你必须说服投资者让你做这件事。这需要的技能与实际运营公司截然不同。如果投资者是完美的判断者,两者需要完全相同的技能。但不幸的是,大多数投资者的判断力都很糟糕。我知道这一点,因为我在幕后看到融资需要巨大的工作量,而一个行业中所需的推销程度总是与买家的判断力成反比。

幸运的是,如果创业成本降低,就有了另一种说服投资者的方式。你不必拿着商业计划书去找风投并试图说服他们投资,而是可以用我们从你叔叔那里筹集到的几万美元种子资金启动产品,然后拿着一个已经运营的公司而不是一个计划去找他们。这样,你不需要显得圆滑自信,只需指给他们看Alexa数据。

这种说服投资者的方式更适合黑客,他们当初选择技术领域,部分原因是对其他领域所需的虚伪程度感到不适。

§ 7
  1. Startup Hubs Will Persist

It might seem that if startups get cheap to start, it will mean the end of startup hubs like Silicon Valley. If all you need to start a startup is rent money, you should be able to do it anywhere.

This is kind of true and kind of false. It's true that you can now start a startup anywhere. But you have to do more with a startup than just start it. You have to make it succeed. And that is more likely to happen in a startup hub.

I've thought a lot about this question, and it seems to me the increasing cheapness of web startups will if anything increase the importance of startup hubs. The value of startup hubs, like centers for any kind of business, lies in something very old-fashioned: face to face meetings. No technology in the immediate future will replace walking down University Ave and running into a friend who tells you how to fix a bug that's been bothering you all weekend, or visiting a friend's startup down the street and ending up in a conversation with one of their investors.

The question of whether to be in a startup hub is like the question of whether to take outside investment. The question is not whether you need it, but whether it brings any advantage at all. Because anything that brings an advantage will give your competitors an advantage over you if they do it and you don't. So if you hear someone saying "we don't need to be in Silicon Valley," that use of the word "need" is a sign they're not even thinking about the question right.

And while startup hubs are as powerful magnets as ever, the increasing cheapness of starting a startup means the particles they're attracting are getting lighter. A startup now can be just a pair of 22 year old guys. A company like that can move much more easily than one with 10 people, half of whom have kids.

We know because we make people move for Y Combinator, and it doesn't seem to be a problem. The advantage of being able to work together face to face for three months outweighs the inconvenience of moving. Ask anyone who's done it.

The mobility of seed-stage startups means that seed funding is a national business. One of the most common emails we get is from people asking if we can help them set up a local clone of Y Combinator. But this just wouldn't work. Seed funding isn't regional, just as big research universities aren't.

Is seed funding not merely national, but international? Interesting question. There are signs it may be. We've had an ongoing stream of founders from outside the US, and they tend to do particularly well, because they're all people who were so determined to succeed that they were willing to move to another country to do it.

The more mobile startups get, the harder it would be to start new silicon valleys. If startups are mobile, the best local talent will go to the real Silicon Valley, and all they'll get at the local one will be the people who didn't have the energy to move.

This is not a nationalistic idea, incidentally. It's cities that compete, not countries. Atlanta is just as hosed as Munich.

  1. 创业中心将长期存在

也许有人会认为,创业成本降低意味着硅谷这类创业中心的终结。如果创办一个创业公司只需要房租,那在任何地方都可以做到。

这既对也不对。确实,如今你可以在任何地方创办公司。但你不仅要创办它,还要让它成功。而在创业中心,成功的可能性更大。

我对这个问题思考了很多,在我看来,网络创业公司成本的降低反而会增强创业中心的重要性。创业中心的价值,如同任何商业中心一样,在于非常古老的东西:面对面的交流。在可预见的未来,没有任何技术能取代在University Avenue上散步时偶遇朋友,他告诉你如何修复困扰你整个周末的bug;或者拜访街对面朋友的创业公司,结果与他们的投资者聊了起来。

是否要在创业中心的问题,类似于是否接受外部投资的问题。问题不在于你是否需要它,而在于它是否能带来任何优势。因为任何能带来优势的东西,如果你的竞争对手做了而你没做,他们就会获得优势。所以如果你听到有人说“我们不需要在硅谷”,这个“需要”的用法就表明他们思考这个问题的方式不对。

尽管创业中心像以往一样具有强大的吸引力,但创业成本的降低意味着它们吸引的“粒子”变得更轻了。如今一个创业公司可能只是两个22岁的年轻人。这样的公司比一个10人、一半有孩子的公司更容易搬迁。

我们知道这一点,因为我们让创业者为了Y Combinator而搬迁,而且这似乎不是问题。能够面对面工作三个月的优势超过了搬迁的不便。问问任何一个这样做过的人就知道了。

种子阶段创业公司的流动性意味着种子投资是全国性的业务。我们收到的最常见的邮件之一是有人询问能否帮助他们建立Y Combinator的地方分站。但这行不通。种子投资不是区域性的,正如大型研究型大学不是区域性的。

种子投资不仅是全国性,甚至是国际性的?这是个有趣的问题。有迹象表明可能是的。我们持续收到来自美国以外的创始人申请,而且他们往往做得特别好,因为他们都是决心如此之大以至于愿意搬到另一个国家去实现成功的人。

创业公司流动性越强,就越难建立新的硅谷。如果创业公司可以移动,最好的本地人才会流向真正的硅谷,而本地剩下的只是那些没有精力搬迁的人。

这并非民族主义观点,顺便说一句。竞争的是城市,而不是国家。亚特兰大和慕尼黑一样处境艰难。

§ 8
  1. Better Judgement Needed

If the number of startups increases dramatically, then the people whose job is to judge them are going to have to get better at it. I'm thinking particularly of investors and acquirers. We now get on the order of 1000 applications a year. What are we going to do if we get 10,000?

That's actually an alarming idea. But we'll figure out some kind of answer. We'll have to. It will probably involve writing some software, but fortunately we can do that.

Acquirers will also have to get better at picking winners. They generally do better than investors, because they pick later, when there's more performance to measure. But even at the most advanced acquirers, identifying companies to buy is extremely ad hoc, and completing the acquisition often involves a great deal of unnecessary friction.

I think acquirers may eventually have chief acquisition officers who will both identify good acquisitions and make the deals happen. At the moment those two functions are separate. Promising new startups are often discovered by developers. If someone powerful enough wants to buy them, the deal is handed over to corp dev guys to negotiate. It would be better if both were combined in one group, headed by someone with a technical background and some vision of what they wanted to accomplish. Maybe in the future big companies will have both a VP of Engineering responsible for technology developed in-house, and a CAO responsible for bringing technology in from outside.

At the moment, there is no one within big companies who gets in trouble when they buy a startup for $200 million that they could have bought earlier for $20 million. There should start to be someone who gets in trouble for that.

  1. 需要更好的判断力

如果创业公司数量急剧增加,那么负责评判它们的人就必须提高水平。我尤其指的是投资者和收购方。我们现在每年收到大约1000份申请。如果收到10000份,我们该怎么办?

这实际上是个令人担忧的想法。但我们会找到答案的。我们必须找到。可能涉及编写一些软件,但幸运的是我们能做到。

收购方也必须更善于挑选赢家。他们通常比投资者做得更好,因为他们挑选的时间更晚,有更多的业绩数据可参考。但即使在最先进的收购方,识别值得收购的公司也极其随意,而完成收购往往伴随着大量不必要的摩擦。

我认为收购方最终可能会设立首席收购官,既负责识别好的收购目标,也负责促成交易。目前这两个职能是分离的。有潜力的新创业公司通常由开发者发现。如果某个有足够权力的人想收购它们,交易就被交给企业开发人员去谈判。更好的做法是将两者合并为一个团队,由具有技术背景和清晰愿景的人领导。也许未来大公司会有两位高管:一位是负责内部技术开发的工程副总裁,另一位是负责从外部引进技术的首席收购官。

目前,大公司里没有任何人因为以2亿美元收购一家本来可以2000万美元买下的创业公司而受到问责。应该开始有人为此负责了。

§ 9
  1. College Will Change

If the best hackers start their own companies after college instead of getting jobs, that will change what happens in college. Most of these changes will be for the better. I think the experience of college is warped in a bad way by the expectation that afterward you'll be judged by potential employers.

One change will be in the meaning of "after college," which will switch from when one graduates from college to when one leaves it. If you're starting your own company, why do you need a degree? We don't encourage people to start startups during college, but the best founders are certainly capable of it. Some of the most successful companies we've funded were started by undergrads.

I grew up in a time where college degrees seemed really important, so I'm alarmed to be saying things like this, but there's nothing magical about a degree. There's nothing that magically changes after you take that last exam. The importance of degrees is due solely to the administrative needs of large organizations. These can certainly affect your life — it's hard to get into grad school, or to get a work visa in the US, without an undergraduate degree — but tests like this will matter less and less.

As well as mattering less whether students get degrees, it will also start to matter less where they go to college. In a startup you're judged by users, and they don't care where you went to college. So in a world of startups, elite universities will play less of a role as gatekeepers. In the US it's a national scandal how easily children of rich parents game college admissions. But the way this problem ultimately gets solved may not be by reforming the universities but by going around them. We in the technology world are used to that sort of solution: you don't beat the incumbents; you redefine the problem to make them irrelevant.

The greatest value of universities is not the brand name or perhaps even the classes so much as the people you meet. If it becomes common to start a startup after college, students may start trying to maximize this. Instead of focusing on getting internships at companies they want to work for, they may start to focus on working with other students they want as cofounders.

What students do in their classes will change too. Instead of trying to get good grades to impress future employers, students will try to learn things. We're talking about some pretty dramatic changes here.

  1. 大学教育将改变

如果最优秀的黑客在毕业后创办自己的公司而不是找工作,那么大学里发生的一切将会改变。这些改变大多将是好的。我认为大学的经历被一种不好的期望扭曲了:毕业后要接受潜在雇主的评判。

一个变化是“大学后”的含义,它将从大学毕业转为离开大学。如果你要创办自己的公司,为什么需要学位?我们不鼓励人们在大学期间创业,但最优秀的创始人当然有能力做到。我们资助的一些最成功的公司就是由本科生创办的。

我成长的那个年代,大学学位似乎非常重要,所以我很惊讶自己会说出这样的话,但学位并没有什么神奇之处。最后一门考试结束后,没有什么会神奇地改变。学位的重要性完全源于大型组织的管理需求。这些需求当然会影响你的生活——没有本科学位很难进入研究生院,或在美国获得工作签证——但这类障碍将变得越来越不重要。

不仅学生是否获得学位变得不那么重要,他们上哪所大学也开始变得不那么重要。在创业公司里,你由用户评判,他们不关心你上过什么大学。所以在一个创业公司的世界里,精英大学作为守门人的角色将减弱。在美国,富裕家庭的孩子如何轻易地操纵大学录取是一个全国性的丑闻。但这个问题最终解决的方式可能不是改革大学,而是绕过它们。我们技术界对这种解决方案习以为常:你不是击败现有玩家,而是重新定义问题,使其变得无关紧要。

大学最大的价值不是品牌名称,甚至也不是课程,而是你遇到的人。如果大学毕业后创业成为常态,学生们可能会开始最大限度地利用这一点。他们可能不再专注于在理想的公司实习,而是专注于与想要成为联合创始人的其他同学合作。

学生在课堂上的行为也会改变。他们不再为了给未来雇主留下好印象而追求高分,而是会尝试学习真东西。我们这里谈论的是一些相当剧烈的变化。

§ 10
  1. Lots of Competitors

If it gets easier to start a startup, it's easier for competitors too. That doesn't erase the advantage of increased cheapness, however. You're not all playing a zero-sum game. There's not some fixed number of startups that can succeed, regardless of how many are started.

In fact, I don't think there's any limit to the number of startups that could succeed. Startups succeed by creating wealth, which is the satisfaction of people's desires. And people's desires seem to be effectively infinite, at least in the short term.

What the increasing number of startups does mean is that you won't be able to sit on a good idea. Other people have your idea, and they'll be increasingly likely to do something about it.

  1. 大量竞争对手

如果创办创业公司变得更容易,对竞争对手来说也更容易。但这并不会抹去成本降低带来的优势。你们并不是在玩零和游戏。无论创办多少公司,都没有一个固定的成功数量。

事实上,我认为创业公司成功的数量没有上限。创业成功是通过创造财富实现的,而财富就是满足人们的欲望。而人们的欲望似乎是无限的,至少在短期内如此。

创业公司数量增加意味着你不能守着一个好点子坐等。别人也有你的想法,而且他们越来越有可能付诸行动。

§ 11
  1. Faster Advances

There's a good side to that, at least for consumers of technology. If people get right to work implementing ideas instead of sitting on them, technology will evolve faster.

Some kinds of innovations happen a company at a time, like the punctuated equilibrium model of evolution. There are some kinds of ideas that are so threatening that it's hard for big companies even to think of them. Look at what a hard time Microsoft is having discovering web apps. They're like a character in a movie that everyone in the audience can see something bad is about to happen to, but who can't see it himself. The big innovations that happen a company at a time will obviously happen faster if the rate of new companies increases.

But in fact there will be a double speed increase. People won't wait as long to act on new ideas, but also those ideas will increasingly be developed within startups rather than big companies. Which means technology will evolve faster per company as well.

Big companies are just not a good place to make things happen fast. I talked recently to a founder whose startup had been acquired by a big company. He was a precise sort of guy, so he'd measured their productivity before and after. He counted lines of code, which can be a dubious measure, but in this case was meaningful because it was the same group of programmers. He found they were one thirteenth as productive after the acquisition.

The company that bought them was not a particularly stupid one. I think what he was measuring was mostly the cost of bigness. I experienced this myself, and his number sounds about right. There's something about big companies that just sucks the energy out of you.

Imagine what all that energy could do if it were put to use. There is an enormous latent capacity in the world's hackers that most people don't even realize is there. That's the main reason we do Y Combinator: to let loose all this energy by making it easy for hackers to start their own startups.

  1. 技术进步加速

这也有好的一面,至少对技术消费者来说是这样。如果人们立即着手实施想法,而不是坐等,技术将进化得更快。

有些创新是一次一个公司发生的,就像进化论中的间断平衡模型。有些想法极具威胁性,以至于大公司甚至难以想到它们。看看微软在发现网络应用方面有多困难吧。他们就像电影里的角色,观众都能看到坏事即将发生,而他自己却看不见。如果新公司出现的速度加快,那么一次一个公司发生的重大创新显然会更快出现。

但事实上,速度会加倍提升。人们不仅会更早行动,而且这些想法将越来越多地在创业公司内部而非大公司中开发。这意味着每家公司内部的技术进化也会更快。

大公司根本不是快速推进事情的好地方。我最近与一位创始人聊天,他的创业公司被一家大公司收购了。他是个精确的人,所以测量了收购前后的生产力。他数代码行数——这可能是可疑的衡量标准,但在这里有意义,因为编程团队没变。他发现收购后生产力只有之前的十三分之一。

收购他们的公司并非特别愚蠢。我认为他测量的主要是“大”的成本。我自己经历过,他的数字听起来差不多。大公司就是有种东西会吸走你的能量。

想象一下,如果所有这些能量都能被利用起来,会是怎样一番景象。世界上黑客中蕴藏着巨大的潜在能力,大多数人都没有意识到。这就是我们做Y Combinator的主要原因:通过让黑客轻松创办自己的创业公司来释放所有这些能量。

§ 12

A Series of Tubes

The process of starting startups is currently like the plumbing in an old house. The pipes are narrow and twisty, and there are leaks in every joint. In the future this mess will gradually be replaced by a single, huge pipe. The water will still have to get from A to B, but it will get there faster and without the risk of spraying out through some random leak.

This will change a lot of things for the better. In a big, straight pipe like that, the force of being measured by one's performance will propagate back through the whole system. Performance is always the ultimate test, but there are so many kinks in the plumbing now that most people are insulated from it most of the time. So you end up with a world in which high school students think they need to get good grades to get into elite colleges, and college students think they need to get good grades to impress employers, within which the employees waste most of their time in political battles, and from which consumers have to buy anyway because there are so few choices. Imagine if that sequence became a big, straight pipe. Then the effects of being measured by performance would propagate all the way back to high school, flushing out all the arbitrary stuff people are measured by now. That is the future of web startups.

Thanks to Brian Oberkirch and Simon Willison for inviting me to speak, and the crew at Carson Systems for making everything run smoothly.

一系列管道

创业的过程目前就像老房子的管道。管子又窄又弯,每个接头都在漏水。未来,这种混乱将逐渐被一根巨大的直管取代。水仍然需要从A到B,但会流得更快,而且不会有从某个随机裂缝喷出的风险。

这将使很多事情变得更好。在那样一根巨大、笔直的管道里,以绩效来衡量一个人的力量会反向传播到整个系统。绩效始终是最终的考验,但现在管道有太多弯弯绕绕,大多数人在大多数时候都与之隔绝。于是我们身处这样一个世界:高中生认为他们需要取得好成绩才能进入精英大学,大学生认为他们需要取得好成绩才能给雇主留下印象,员工则把大部分时间浪费在政治斗争上,而消费者因为选择太少只能购买。想象一下,如果这个链条变成一根巨大的直管。那么绩效衡量的效应就会一路传回高中,冲刷掉所有人们现在被衡量的武断标准。这就是网络创业公司的未来。

感谢Brian Oberkirch和Simon Willison邀请我演讲,以及Carson Systems团队让一切顺利进行。

打开原文 ↗