创业公司的真实面目
本文基于Paul Graham对YC所投创业公司创始人的调查,总结了19个最常见的意外发现。核心论点:创业与普通工作的差距远超大多数人想象。关键发现包括:创始人关系比能力更重要;创业会占据全部生活;情绪波动极端;坚持比智力更关键;必须尽快发布最小可行产品;要与用户持续对话并愿意改变方向;投资者往往无知;运气作用巨大;外界对创业者缺乏尊重等。文章以创始人原话为证据,揭示了创业的残酷与自由。适合潜在创业者及对创业现实感兴趣的工程师阅读。


October 2009
(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2009 Startup School.)
I wasn't sure what to talk about at Startup School, so I decided to ask the founders of the startups we'd funded. What hadn't I written about yet?
I'm in the unusual position of being able to test the essays I write about startups. I hope the ones on other topics are right, but I have no way to test them. The ones on startups get tested by about 70 people every 6 months.
So I sent all the founders an email asking what surprised them about starting a startup. This amounts to asking what I got wrong, because if I'd explained things well enough, nothing should have surprised them.
I'm proud to report I got one response saying:
What surprised me the most is that everything was actually fairly predictable!
The bad news is that I got over 100 other responses listing the surprises they encountered.
There were very clear patterns in the responses; it was remarkable how often several people had been surprised by exactly the same thing. These were the biggest:
2009年10月
(本文源自2009年创业学校的一次演讲。)
我不太确定在创业学校该讲些什么,所以我决定向我们投资过的公司的创始人请教:我还有什么没有写过的?
我处在一个特殊的位置上,能够验证自己写过的关于创业的文章。我希望其他主题的文章是对的,但无法验证。而关于创业的文章,每6个月就会有大约70个人来验证。
于是我向所有创始人发了一封邮件,问他们创业过程中最让他们感到意外的是什么。这相当于在问我的文章中哪些地方说得不对,因为如果我解释得足够好,他们本不该感到意外。
我很自豪地报告,有一条回复说:
最让我意外的是,一切实际上都非常可预测!
坏消息是,我收到了另外100多条回复,列出了他们遇到的意外。
回复中有非常明显的模式;令人惊讶的是,好几个人对完全同一件事感到意外。以下是最大的几点:
- Be Careful with Cofounders
This was the surprise mentioned by the most founders. There were two types of responses: that you have to be careful who you pick as a cofounder, and that you have to work hard to maintain your relationship.
What people wished they'd paid more attention to when choosing cofounders was character and commitment, not ability. This was particularly true with startups that failed. The lesson: don't pick cofounders who will flake.
Here's a typical reponse:
You haven't seen someone's true colors unless you've worked with them on a startup.
The reason character is so important is that it's tested more severely than in most other situations. One founder said explicitly that the relationship between founders was more important than ability:
I would rather cofound a startup with a friend than a stranger with higher output. Startups are so hard and emotional that the bonds and emotional and social support that come with friendship outweigh the extra output lost.
We learned this lesson a long time ago. If you look at the YC application, there are more questions about the commitment and relationship of the founders than their ability.
Founders of successful startups talked less about choosing cofounders and more about how hard they worked to maintain their relationship.
One thing that surprised me is how the relationship of startup founders goes from a friendship to a marriage. My relationship with my cofounder went from just being friends to seeing each other all the time, fretting over the finances and cleaning up shit. And the startup was our baby. I summed it up once like this: "It's like we're married, but we're not fucking."
Several people used that word "married." It's a far more intense relationship than you usually see between coworkers—partly because the stresses are so much greater, and partly because at first the founders are the whole company. So this relationship has to be built of top quality materials and carefully maintained. It's the basis of everything.
- 谨慎选择联合创始人
这是最多创始人提到的意外。回复分为两种:一是必须谨慎选择联合创始人,二是必须努力维护关系。
人们在选择联合创始人时,希望自己当初更关注的是性格和承诺,而不是能力。在那些失败的创业公司中尤为如此。教训是:不要选择会退缩的联合创始人。
以下是一个典型回复:
不和他们一起创业,你永远看不到一个人的真面目。
性格之所以如此重要,是因为它受到的考验比大多数其他情况更严酷。一位创始人明确表示,创始人的关系比能力更重要:
我宁愿和朋友一起创业,也不愿和一个产出更高但陌生的人一起。创业如此艰难和情绪化,友谊带来的纽带以及情感和社会支持,超过了额外产出的损失。
我们很久以前就学到了这个教训。如果你看YC的申请表,关于创始人承诺和关系的问题比能力的问题更多。
成功创业公司的创始人谈得较少的反而是选择联合创始人,更多是谈论他们如何努力维护关系。
有一件事让我感到意外:创业公司创始人的关系如何从友情转变为婚姻。我和联合创始人的关系从只是朋友变成了全天候相处,担心财务,清理烂摊子。而创业公司就是我们的孩子。我曾这样总结:“就像我们结婚了,但我们没有性生活。”
好几个人用了“结婚”这个词。这比通常同事之间的关系要紧张得多——部分原因是压力大得多,部分原因是一开始创始人就是整个公司。所以这种关系必须由高质量的材料构成并小心维护。这是一切的基础。
- Startups Take Over Your Life
Just as the relationship between cofounders is more intense than it usually is between coworkers, so is the relationship between the founders and the company. Running a startup is not like having a job or being a student, because it never stops. This is so foreign to most people's experience that they don't get it till it happens. [1]
I didn't realize I would spend almost every waking moment either working or thinking about our startup. You enter a whole different way of life when it's your company vs. working for someone else's company.
It's exacerbated by the fast pace of startups, which makes it seem like time slows down:
I think the thing that's been most surprising to me is how one's perspective on time shifts. Working on our startup, I remember time seeming to stretch out, so that a month was a huge interval.
In the best case, total immersion can be exciting:
It's surprising how much you become consumed by your startup, in that you think about it day and night, but never once does it feel like "work."
Though I have to say, that quote is from someone we funded this summer. In a couple years he may not sound so chipper.
- 创业占据生活全部
就像联合创始人之间的关系比通常同事之间更紧密一样,创始人与公司之间的关系也是如此。经营一家创业公司不像拥有一份工作或当学生,因为它永不停歇。这对大多数人来说如此陌生,以至于他们只有在经历时才明白。[1]
我没有意识到我会把几乎所有的清醒时间都用于工作或思考我们的创业公司。当创业公司是你自己的而不是为别人工作时,你会进入一种完全不同的生活方式。
创业的快节奏加剧了这一点,使时间看起来变慢了:
最让我意外的是人的时间视角如何转变。在创业公司工作,我记得时间似乎被拉长了,一个月变得非常漫长。
在最理想的情况下,完全沉浸可能是令人兴奋的:
令人惊讶的是,你会被你的创业公司如此完全地消耗,以至于你日日夜夜思考它,但从未感觉像是在“工作”。
不过我得说,这句话来自我们今年夏天资助的一位创始人。几年后他可能不会这么欢快了。
- It's an Emotional Roller-coaster
This was another one lots of people were surprised about. The ups and downs were more extreme than they were prepared for.
In a startup, things seem great one moment and hopeless the next. And by next, I mean a couple hours later.
The emotional ups and downs were the biggest surprise for me. One day, we'd think of ourselves as the next Google and dream of buying islands; the next, we'd be pondering how to let our loved ones know of our utter failure; and on and on.
The hard part, obviously, is the lows. For a lot of founders that was the big surprise:
How hard it is to keep everyone motivated during rough days or weeks, i.e. how low the lows can be.
After a while, if you don't have significant success to cheer you up, it wears you out:
Your most basic advice to founders is "just don't die," but the energy to keep a company going in lieu of unburdening success isn't free; it is siphoned from the founders themselves.
There's a limit to how much you can take. If you get to the point where you can't keep working anymore, it's not the end of the world. Plenty of famous founders have had some failures along the way.
- 情绪过山车
这也是很多人感到意外的地方。起伏比他们预想的更极端。
在创业公司中,事情上一秒看起来很棒,下一秒就毫无希望。而“下一秒”指的就是几个小时后。
情绪起伏对我来说是最大的意外。有一天,我们觉得自己是下一个Google,梦想买岛;第二天,我们就在思考如何让亲人知道我们的彻底失败;如此往复。
困难的部分显然是低谷。对很多创始人来说,这是最大的意外:
在艰难的日子或几周里,保持每个人的积极性有多难,也就是说低谷可以有多低。
过了一段时间,如果没有显著的成功提振士气,你会精疲力竭:
你对创始人最根本的建议是“别死”,但维持公司运转而不依靠成功来缓解压力所需要的能量并非免费;它从创始人自身汲取。
人的承受力是有限的。如果你到了无法继续工作的地步,那并不是世界末日。许多著名的创始人一路上都有过一些失败。
- It Can Be Fun
The good news is, the highs are also very high. Several founders said what surprised them most about doing a startup was how fun it was:
I think you've left out just how fun it is to do a startup. I am more fulfilled in my work than pretty much any of my friends who did not start companies.
What they like most is the freedom:
I'm surprised by how much better it feels to be working on something that is challenging and creative, something I believe in, as opposed to the hired-gun stuff I was doing before. I knew it would feel better; what's surprising is how much better.
Frankly, though, if I've misled people here, I'm not eager to fix that. I'd rather have everyone think starting a startup is grim and hard than have founders go into it expecting it to be fun, and a few months later saying "This is supposed to be fun? Are you kidding?"
The truth is, it wouldn't be fun for most people. A lot of what we try to do in the application process is to weed out the people who wouldn't like it, both for our sake and theirs.
The best way to put it might be that starting a startup is fun the way a survivalist training course would be fun, if you're into that sort of thing. Which is to say, not at all, if you're not.
- 创业也可以有趣
好消息是,高潮也非常高。几位创始人说,创业最让他们意外的是有多么有趣:
我认为你忽略了创业是多么有趣。我在工作中比那些没有创业的朋友们要充实得多。
他们最喜欢的是自由:
令我惊讶的是,从事有挑战性和创造性、我相信的事情,与之前做的雇佣兵工作相比,感觉好太多了。我知道会更好,但令人惊讶的是好太多。
不过坦率地说,如果我在这方面误导了人们,我并不急于纠正。我宁愿每个人都认为创业是艰难严酷的,也不愿创始人们期望它有趣,几个月后说“这应该有趣?你在开玩笑吗?”
事实是,对大多数人来说它不会有趣。我们在申请流程中努力做的事情之一就是淘汰那些不会喜欢的人,为了我们好也是为了他们好。
最好的说法可能是,创业的有趣就像野外生存训练课程——如果你喜欢那种事情的话。也就是说,如果你不喜欢,那就一点也不有趣。
- Persistence Is the Key
A lot of founders were surprised how important persistence was in startups. It was both a negative and a positive surprise: they were surprised both by the degree of persistence required
Everyone said how determined and resilient you must be, but going through it made me realize that the determination required was still understated.
and also by the degree to which persistence alone was able to dissolve obstacles:
If you are persistent, even problems that seem out of your control (i.e. immigration) seem to work themselves out.
Several founders mentioned specifically how much more important persistence was than intelligence.
I've been surprised again and again by just how much more important persistence is than raw intelligence.
This applies not just to intelligence but to ability in general, and that's why so many people said character was more important in choosing cofounders.
- 坚持是关键
很多创始人惊讶于坚持在创业中的重要性。这既是负面也是正面的意外:他们既惊讶于所需要的坚持程度
每个人都说你必须多么坚定和坚韧,但经历过之后我意识到所需的决心仍然被低估了。
也惊讶于仅靠坚持就能化解障碍的程度:
如果你坚持不懈,即使是看似无法控制的问题(如移民问题)似乎也会自行解决。
几位创始人特别提到坚持比智力重要得多。
我一再惊讶于坚持比原始智力重要多少。
这不仅适用于智力,也适用于一般能力,这就是为什么那么多人在选择联合创始人时说性格更重要。
- Think Long-Term
You need persistence because everything takes longer than you expect. A lot of people were surprised by that.
I'm continually surprised by how long everything can take. Assuming your product doesn't experience the explosive growth that very few products do, everything from development to dealmaking (especially dealmaking) seems to take 2-3x longer than I always imagine.
One reason founders are surprised is that because they work fast, they expect everyone else to. There's a shocking amount of shear stress at every point where a startup touches a more bureaucratic organization, like a big company or a VC fund. That's why fundraising and the enterprise market kill and maim so many startups. [2]
But I think the reason most founders are surprised by how long it takes is that they're overconfident. They think they're going to be an instant success, like YouTube or Facebook. You tell them only 1 out of 100 successful startups has a trajectory like that, and they all think "we're going to be that 1."
Maybe they'll listen to one of the more successful founders:
The top thing I didn't understand before going into it is that persistence is the name of the game. For the vast majority of startups that become successful, it's going to be a really long journey, at least 3 years and probably 5+.
There is a positive side to thinking longer-term. It's not just that you have to resign yourself to everything taking longer than it should. If you work patiently it's less stressful, and you can do better work:
Because we're relaxed, it's so much easier to have fun doing what we do. Gone is the awkward nervous energy fueled by the desperate need to not fail guiding our actions. We can concentrate on doing what's best for our company, product, employees and customers.
That's why things get so much better when you hit ramen profitability. You can shift into a different mode of working.
- 着眼长远
你需要坚持,因为所有事情花费的时间都比预期长。很多人对此感到意外。
我不断惊讶于一切事情需要多长时间。假设你的产品没有经历极为罕见的爆炸式增长,那么从开发到交易(尤其是交易)似乎总是比我预想的多花2-3倍时间。
创始人惊讶的一个原因是,因为他们自己工作快,所以期望别人也快。在创业公司与更官僚的组织(如大公司或VC基金)接触的每一个点上,都存在惊人的切应力。这就是为什么融资和企业市场让那么多创业公司受伤甚至死去的原因。[2]
但我认为大多数创始人惊讶于时间漫长是因为他们过于自信。他们认为自己会像YouTube或Facebook那样瞬间成功。你告诉他们只有百分之一成功的创业公司有这样的轨迹,而他们都认为“我们会是那百分之一”。
也许他们会听一位更成功的创始人的话:
我进入之前最不理解的是,坚持才是关键。对绝大多数成功的创业公司来说,这将是一段非常漫长的旅程,至少3年,很可能5年以上。
着眼长远也有积极的一面。这不仅仅是你必须接受一切花费比预期更长的时间。如果你耐心工作,压力会更小,并且可以做出更好的工作:
因为我们放松了,所以做我们做的事情更容易获得乐趣。那种由害怕失败的绝望驱动的紧张能量消失了。我们可以专注于做对公司、产品、员工和客户最有利的事情。
这就是为什么当你达到拉面盈利时,一切都会变得好得多。你可以切换到不同的工作模式。
- Lots of Little Things
We often emphasize how rarely startups win simply because they hit on some magic idea. I think founders have now gotten that into their heads. But a lot were surprised to find this also applies within startups. You have to do lots of different things:
It's much more of a grind than glamorous. A timeslice selected at random would more likely find me tracking down a weird DLL loading bug on Swedish Windows, or tracking down a bug in the financial model Excel spreadsheet the night before a board meeting, rather than having brilliant flashes of strategic insight.
Most hacker-founders would like to spend all their time programming. You won't get to, unless you fail. Which can be transformed into: If you spend all your time programming, you will fail.
The principle extends even into programming. There is rarely a single brilliant hack that ensures success:
I learnt never to bet on any one feature or deal or anything to bring you success. It is never a single thing. Everything is just incremental and you just have to keep doing lots of those things until you strike something.
Even in the rare cases where a clever hack makes your fortune, you probably won't know till later:
There is no such thing as a killer feature. Or at least you won't know what it is.
So the best strategy is to try lots of different things. The reason not to put all your eggs in one basket is not the usual one, which applies even when you know which basket is best. In a startup you don't even know that.
- 大量琐事
我们经常强调,创业公司很少仅仅因为碰上一个神奇的点子而成功。我想创始人们已经明白了这一点。但很多人惊讶地发现,这一点在创业公司内部也适用。你必须做很多不同的事情:
这更像是苦差事而非光彩夺目。随机选取一个时间切片,更可能发现我在追踪瑞典Windows上一个奇怪的DLL加载错误,或者在董事会会议前一晚追踪财务模型Excel电子表格中的错误,而不是拥有战略洞察的火花。
大多数黑客创始人希望把所有时间花在编程上。但你做不到,除非你失败。这可以转化为:如果你把所有时间花在编程上,你会失败。
这个原则甚至延伸到编程。很少有单一的巧妙黑客能确保成功:
我学会了永远不要押注于任何一个功能、交易或其他任何东西来带来成功。它从来不是单一的一件事。一切都只是渐进的,你必须不断地做很多这样的事,直到碰到什么。
即使在罕见的案例中,一个巧妙的黑客为你带来了财富,你可能直到后来才知道:
不存在所谓的杀手级功能。或者至少你不会知道它是什么。
所以最好的策略是尝试很多不同的事情。不要把鸡蛋放在一个篮子里的理由不是通常的那个,即使你知道哪个篮子最好,通常理由也适用。但在创业公司里,你甚至不知道哪个篮子最好。
- Start with Something Minimal
Lots of founders mentioned how important it was to launch with the simplest possible thing. By this point everyone knows you should release fast and iterate. It's practically a mantra at YC. But even so a lot of people seem to have been burned by not doing it:
Build the absolute smallest thing that can be considered a complete application and ship it.
Why do people take too long on the first version? Pride, mostly. They hate to release something that could be better. They worry what people will say about them. But you have to overcome this:
Doing something "simple" at first glance does not mean you aren't doing something meaningful, defensible, or valuable.
Don't worry what people will say. If your first version is so impressive that trolls don't make fun of it, you waited too long to launch. [3]
One founder said this should be your approach to all programming, not just startups, and I tend to agree.
Now, when coding, I try to think "How can I write this such that if people saw my code, they'd be amazed at how little there is and how little it does?"
Over-engineering is poison. It's not like doing extra work for extra credit. It's more like telling a lie that you then have to remember so you don't contradict it.
- 从最小可行产品开始
很多创始人提到,以最简单的可能版本发布是多么重要。到目前为止,每个人都知道应该快速发布并迭代。这几乎成了YC的口头禅。但即便如此,很多人似乎因为没有这样做而吃过亏:
构建可以被视为完整应用的最小东西,然后发布它。
为什么人们在第一个版本上花费太长时间?主要是自豪感。他们讨厌发布可以做得更好的东西。他们担心别人会怎么说。但你必须克服这一点:
初看起来“简单”并不意味着你做的没有意义、不可防御或没有价值。
不要担心别人怎么说。如果你的第一个版本好到连喷子都不嘲笑,那你发布得太晚了。[3]
一位创始人说,这应该成为所有编程的方法,而不仅仅是创业公司,我倾向于同意。
现在,在编码时,我试着想:“我怎样才能写出这样的代码,如果人们看到它,他们会惊叹于代码如此之少、功能如此之少?”
过度设计是毒药。它不像做额外的工作以获得额外学分。更像是一个谎言,然后你必须记住它以免自相矛盾。
- Engage Users
Product development is a conversation with the user that doesn't really start till you launch. Before you launch, you're like a police artist before he's shown the first version of his sketch to the witness.
It's so important to launch fast that it may be better to think of your initial version not as a product, but as a trick for getting users to start talking to you.
I learned to think about the initial stages of a startup as a giant experiment. All products should be considered experiments, and those that have a market show promising results extremely quickly.
Once you start talking to users, I guarantee you'll be surprised by what they tell you.
When you let customers tell you what they're after, they will often reveal amazing details about what they find valuable as well what they're willing to pay for.
The surprise is generally positive as well as negative. They won't like what you've built, but there will be other things they would like that would be trivially easy to implement. It's not till you start the conversation by launching the wrong thing that they can express (or perhaps even realize) what they're looking for.
- 与用户互动
产品开发是与用户的对话,直到你发布才真正开始。发布之前,你就像一个刑侦画师,还没有向目击者展示他的草图第一版。
快速发布如此重要,以至于最好将初始版本视为一种让用户开始与你交谈的诡计,而不是一个产品。
我学会了将创业公司的初始阶段视为一个巨大的实验。所有产品都应被视为实验,那些有市场的产品会极其迅速地显示出有希望的结果。
一旦开始与用户交谈,我保证你会对他们告诉你的东西感到惊讶。
当你让客户告诉你他们想要什么时,他们通常会透露关于他们认为有价值以及愿意为之付费的惊人细节。
这种惊讶通常既有正面也有负面。他们不会喜欢你构建的东西,但会有其他他们喜欢且实现起来微不足道的东西。直到你通过发布错误的东西开始对话,他们才能表达(甚至意识到)他们真正在寻找什么。
- Change Your Idea
To benefit from engaging with users you have to be willing to change your idea. We've always encouraged founders to see a startup idea as a hypothesis rather than a blueprint. And yet they're still surprised how well it works to change the idea.
Normally if you complain about something being hard, the general advice is to work harder. With a startup, I think you should find a problem that's easy for you to solve. Optimizing in solution-space is familiar and straightforward, but you can make enormous gains playing around in problem-space.
Whereas mere determination, without flexibility, is a greedy algorithm that may get you nothing more than a mediocre local maximum:
When someone is determined, there's still a danger that they'll follow a long, hard path that ultimately leads nowhere.
You want to push forward, but at the same time twist and turn to find the most promising path. One founder put it very succinctly:
Fast iteration is the key to success.
One reason this advice is so hard to follow is that people don't realize how hard it is to judge startup ideas, particularly their own. Experienced founders learn to keep an open mind:
Now I don't laugh at ideas anymore, because I realized how terrible I was at knowing if they were good or not.
You can never tell what will work. You just have to do whatever seems best at each point. We do this with YC itself. We still don't know if it will work, but it seems like a decent hypothesis.
- 改变你的想法
要从与用户的互动中受益,你必须愿意改变你的想法。我们一直鼓励创始人将创业想法视为假设而非蓝图。但他们仍然惊讶于改变想法效果如此之好。
通常如果你抱怨某件事很难,一般的建议是更加努力。对于创业公司,我认为你应该找到一个容易解决的问题。在解空间中优化是熟悉且直接的,但在问题空间中探索可以带来巨大的收益。
而仅凭决心,没有灵活性,就像贪心算法,可能只会让你得到一个平庸的局部最优解:
当一个人下定决心时,仍然存在一种危险:他们可能会走上一条漫长而艰难的道路,最终一无所获。
你希望向前推进,但同时也要灵活转向,找到最有前途的道路。一位创始人非常简洁地总结道:
快速迭代是成功的关键。
这个建议之所以难以遵循,一个原因是人们没有意识到判断创业想法有多难,尤其是自己的。有经验的创始人学会保持开放的心态:
现在我不再嘲笑任何想法了,因为我意识到自己在判断它们好坏方面有多糟糕。
你永远无法预测什么会奏效。你只需要在每个时刻做看起来最好的事情。我们自己在YC也是如此。我们仍然不知道它是否会成功,但它看起来是一个不错的假设。
- Don't Worry about Competitors
When you think you've got a great idea, it's sort of like having a guilty conscience about something. All someone has to do is look at you funny, and you think "Oh my God, they know."
These alarms are almost always false:
Companies that seemed like competitors and threats at first glance usually never were when you really looked at it. Even if they were operating in the same area, they had a different goal.
One reason people overreact to competitors is that they overvalue ideas. If ideas really were the key, a competitor with the same idea would be a real threat. But it's usually execution that matters:
All the scares induced by seeing a new competitor pop up are forgotten weeks later. It always comes down to your own product and approach to the market.
This is generally true even if competitors get lots of attention.
Competitors riding on lots of good blogger perception aren't really the winners and can disappear from the map quickly. You need consumers after all.
Hype doesn't make satisfied users, at least not for something as complicated as technology.
- 不要担心竞争对手
当你认为自己有一个好主意时,有点像做贼心虚。只要有人奇怪地看你一眼,你就会想“天哪,他们知道了。”
这些警报几乎总是假的:
那些初看起来像竞争对手和威胁的公司,当你真正审视时,通常根本不是。即使他们在同一领域运营,他们的目标也不同。
人们对竞争对手反应过度的一个原因是他们高估了想法。如果想法真的是关键,那么拥有相同想法的竞争对手才是真正的威胁。但通常执行才是重要的:
所有因看到新竞争对手出现而产生的恐慌,几周后都会忘记。最终还是要看自己的产品和对市场的切入方式。
即使竞争对手获得了大量关注,这一点也普遍成立。
依赖博主好评的竞争对手并不是真正的赢家,他们可能会迅速从地图上消失。你最终需要的是消费者。
炒作不会带来满意的用户,至少对于像技术这样复杂的东西来说不会。
- It's Hard to Get Users
A lot of founders complained about how hard it was to get users, though.
I had no idea how much time and effort needed to go into attaining users.
This is a complicated topic. When you can't get users, it's hard to say whether the problem is lack of exposure, or whether the product's simply bad. Even good products can be blocked by switching or integration costs:
Getting people to use a new service is incredibly difficult. This is especially true for a service that other companies can use, because it requires their developers to do work. If you're small, they don't think it is urgent. [4]
The sharpest criticism of YC came from a founder who said we didn't focus enough on customer acquisition:
YC preaches "make something people want" as an engineering task, a never ending stream of feature after feature until enough people are happy and the application takes off. There's very little focus on the cost of customer acquisition.
This may be true; this may be something we need to fix, especially for applications like games. If you make something where the challenges are mostly technical, you can rely on word of mouth, like Google did. One founder was surprised by how well that worked for him:
There is an irrational fear that no one will buy your product. But if you work hard and incrementally make it better, there is no need to worry.
But with other types of startups you may win less by features and more by deals and marketing.
- 获取用户很难
然而,很多创始人抱怨获取用户有多困难。
我完全不知道要获得用户需要投入多少时间和精力。
这是一个复杂的话题。当你无法获得用户时,很难说问题在于曝光不足还是产品本身就差。即使是好产品也可能因为切换成本或集成成本而受阻:
让人们使用一项新服务极其困难。对于其他公司可以使用的服务来说尤其如此,因为它需要他们的开发者做工作。如果你是小公司,他们不会认为这很紧急。[4]
对YC最尖锐的批评来自一位创始人,他说我们没有足够关注客户获取:
YC宣扬“做出人们想要的东西”是一项工程任务,一个永无止境的特性流,直到足够多人满意并应用起飞。对客户获取的成本关注很少。
这可能是真的;这可能是我们需要解决的问题,尤其是对于游戏这类应用。如果你打造的东西主要挑战是技术性的,你可以依靠口碑,就像Google那样。一位创始人惊讶于这对他的效果:
有一种非理性的恐惧,认为没有人会买你的产品。但如果你努力工作并逐步改进它,就无需担心。
但在其他类型的创业公司中,你可能更少通过特性取胜,而更多通过交易和营销。
- Expect the Worst with Deals
Deals fall through. That's a constant of the startup world. Startups are powerless, and good startup ideas generally seem wrong. So everyone is nervous about closing deals with you, and you have no way to make them.
This is particularly true with investors:
In retrospect, it would have been much better if we had operated under the assumption that we would never get any additional outside investment. That would have focused us on finding revenue streams early.
My advice is generally pessimistic. Assume you won't get money, and if someone does offer you any, assume you'll never get any more.
If someone offers you money, take it. You say it a lot, but I think it needs even more emphasizing. We had the opportunity to raise a lot more money than we did last year and I wish we had.
Why do founders ignore me? Mostly because they're optimistic by nature. The mistake is to be optimistic about things you can't control. By all means be optimistic about your ability to make something great. But you're asking for trouble if you're optimistic about big companies or investors.
- 对交易做最坏打算
交易会告吹。这是创业世界的一个常数。创业公司很无力,好的创业想法通常看起来不对劲。所以每个人都对与你达成交易感到紧张,而你无法强迫他们。
对投资者来说尤其如此:
回想起来,如果我们假设永远不会获得任何额外的外部投资,情况会好得多。那会促使我们更早地寻找收入来源。
我的建议总体上是悲观的。假设你不会拿到钱,如果有人给你钱,假设你永远不会再拿到更多。
如果有人给你钱,就收下。你经常这么说,但我认为需要更加强调。我们去年有机会筹到比实际更多的钱,我希望我们当时那么做了。
为什么创始人忽视我的建议?主要是因为他们天生乐观。错误在于对无法控制的事情保持乐观。尽管可以对你做出伟大产品的能力保持乐观。但如果你对大公司或投资者乐观,那你是在自找麻烦。
- Investors Are Clueless
A lot of founders mentioned how surprised they were by the cluelessness of investors:
They don't even know about the stuff they've invested in. I met some investors that had invested in a hardware device and when I asked them to demo the device they had difficulty switching it on.
Angels are a bit better than VCs, because they usually have startup experience themselves:
VC investors don't know half the time what they are talking about and are years behind in their thinking. A few were great, but 95% of the investors we dealt with were unprofessional, didn't seem to be very good at business or have any kind of creative vision. Angels were generally much better to talk to.
Why are founders surprised that VCs are clueless? I think it's because they seem so formidable.
The reason VCs seem formidable is that it's their profession to. You get to be a VC by convincing asset managers to trust you with hundreds of millions of dollars. How do you do that? You have to seem confident, and you have to seem like you understand technology. [5]
- 投资者一无所知
很多创始人提到他们对投资者的无知感到惊讶:
他们甚至不了解自己投资的东西。我遇到一些投资者,他们投资了一个硬件设备,当我要求他们演示该设备时,他们连开机都困难。
天使投资人比VC稍好,因为他们通常自己有创业经验:
VC投资者有一半时间不知道自己在说什么,他们的思想落后好几年。少数很棒,但我们打交道的95%的投资者都不专业,看起来不太懂业务,也没有任何创造性的远见。天使投资人通常好聊得多。
为什么创始人惊讶于VC的无知?我认为是因为他们看起来如此令人生畏。
VC看起来令人生畏的原因是这是他们的职业。要成为VC,你必须说服资产管理者将数亿美元托付给你。你怎么做到?你必须显得自信,并且必须显得你懂技术。[5]
- You May Have to Play Games
Because investors are so bad at judging you, you have to work harder than you should at selling yourself. One founder said the thing that surprised him most was
The degree to which feigning certitude impressed investors.
This is the thing that has surprised me most about YC founders' experiences. This summer we invited some of the alumni to talk to the new startups about fundraising, and pretty much 100% of their advice was about investor psychology. I thought I was cynical about VCs, but the founders were much more cynical.
A lot of what startup founders do is just posturing. It works.
VCs themselves have no idea of the extent to which the startups they like are the ones that are best at selling themselves to VCs. [6] It's exactly the same phenomenon we saw a step earlier. VCs get money by seeming confident to LPs, and founders get money by seeming confident to VCs.
- 你可能需要玩些把戏
因为投资者太不善于判断你,你必须比本应做的更努力地推销自己。一位创始人说最让他意外的是
假装确定能打动投资者的程度。
这是我对YC创始人经历最惊讶的一点。今年夏天我们邀请了一些校友与新创业公司谈论融资,他们的建议几乎100%是关于投资者心理。我以为自己对VC已经很愤世嫉俗了,但创始人们更加愤世嫉俗。
很多创业公司创始人做的事情只是装腔作势。而且有效。
VC自己完全不知道,他们喜欢的创业公司恰恰是最擅长向VC推销自己的那些。[6]这和我们之前一步看到的完全相同。VC通过向LP显得自信来获得资金,创始人通过向VC显得自信来获得资金。
- Luck Is a Big Factor
With two such random linkages in the path between startups and money, it shouldn't be surprising that luck is a big factor in deals. And yet a lot of founders are surprised by it.
I didn't realize how much of a role luck plays and how much is outside of our control.
If you think about famous startups, it's pretty clear how big a role luck plays. Where would Microsoft be if IBM insisted on an exclusive license for DOS?
Why are founders fooled by this? Business guys probably aren't, but hackers are used to a world where skill is paramount, and you get what you deserve.
When we started our startup, I had bought the hype of the startup founder dream: that this is a game of skill. It is, in some ways. Having skill is valuable. So is being determined as all hell. But being lucky is the critical ingredient.
Actually the best model would be to say that the outcome is the product of skill, determination, and luck. No matter how much skill and determination you have, if you roll a zero for luck, the outcome is zero.
These quotes about luck are not from founders whose startups failed. Founders who fail quickly tend to blame themselves. Founders who succeed quickly don't usually realize how lucky they were. It's the ones in the middle who see how important luck is.
- 运气是重要因素
在创业和资金之间存在两个如此随机的连接点,运气在交易中是重要因素也就不足为奇了。但很多创始人仍然对此感到惊讶。
我没有意识到运气扮演了多大的角色,有多少事情超出了我们的控制。
如果你想想那些著名的创业公司,运气的作用有多明显。如果IBM坚持对DOS的独家许可,微软会是什么样子?
为什么创始人被这个愚弄?生意人可能不会,但黑客习惯于一个技能至上的世界,你得到你应得的。
当我们开始创业时,我接受了创业创始人梦的宣传:这是一场技能的游戏。在某些方面确实如此。拥有技能很有价值。拼命决心也很有价值。但运气才是关键成分。
实际上,最好的模型是说结果是技能、决心和运气的乘积。无论你拥有多少技能和决心,如果你运气为零,结果就是零。
这些关于运气的引用并非来自创业失败的创始人。快速失败的创始人往往责备自己。快速成功的创始人通常没有意识到自己有多幸运。正是那些处于中间的人看到了运气有多重要。
- The Value of Community
A surprising number of founders said what surprised them most about starting a startup was the value of community. Some meant the micro-community of YC founders:
The immense value of the peer group of YC companies, and facing similar obstacles at similar times.
which shouldn't be that surprising, because that's why it's structured that way. Others were surprised at the value of the startup community in the larger sense:
How advantageous it is to live in Silicon Valley, where you can't help but hear all the cutting-edge tech and startup news, and run into useful people constantly.
The specific thing that surprised them most was the general spirit of benevolence:
One of the most surprising things I saw was the willingness of people to help us. Even people who had nothing to gain went out of their way to help our startup succeed.
and particularly how it extended all the way to the top:
The surprise for me was how accessible important and interesting people are. It's amazing how easily you can reach out to people and get immediate feedback.
This is one of the reasons I like being part of this world. Creating wealth is not a zero-sum game, so you don't have to stab people in the back to win.
- 社区的价值
相当数量的创始人说,创业中最让他们惊讶的是社区的价值。有些人指的是YC创始人的微社区:
YC公司同伴群体的巨大价值,以及在相似时间面对相似障碍。
这并不那么令人惊讶,因为这正是它如此构建的原因。其他人则惊讶于更广泛意义上的创业社区的价值:
生活在硅谷多么有利,你不可能不听到所有前沿技术和创业新闻,不断遇到有用的人。
最让他们惊讶的具体事情是普遍的善意精神:
我看到的最令人惊讶的事情之一是人们愿意帮助我们。即使那些无利可图的人也尽力帮助我们的创业成功。
尤其是这种帮助一直延伸到顶层:
让我惊讶的是,重要和有趣的人是多么容易接近。令人惊奇的是,你可以轻松地联系到他们并获得即时反馈。
这是我喜欢成为这个世界一部分的原因之一。创造财富不是零和游戏,所以你不需要在背后捅刀子才能获胜。
- You Get No Respect
There was one surprise founders mentioned that I'd forgotten about: that outside the startup world, startup founders get no respect.
In social settings, I found that I got a lot more respect when I said, "I worked on Microsoft Office" instead of "I work at a small startup you've never heard of called x."
Partly this is because the rest of the world just doesn't get startups, and partly it's yet another consequence of the fact that most good startup ideas seem bad:
If you pitch your idea to a random person, 95% of the time you'll find the person instinctively thinks the idea will be a flop and you're wasting your time (although they probably won't say this directly).
Unfortunately this extends even to dating:
It surprised me that being a startup founder does not get you more admiration from women.
I did know about that, but I'd forgotten.
- 你得不到尊重
还有一个创始人提到而我已经忘记的意外:在创业世界之外,创业创始人得不到尊重。
在社交场合,我发现当我说“我在Microsoft Office工作过”时,得到的尊重远多于说“我在一家你没听说过的小创业公司x工作”。
部分原因是外界根本不理解创业,部分原因是大多数好的创业想法看起来都很糟糕:
如果你向一个随机的人推销你的想法,95%的情况下你会发现那个人本能地认为这个想法会失败,你在浪费时间(尽管他们可能不会直接说出来)。
不幸的是,这甚至延伸到约会:
让我惊讶的是,作为一名创业创始人并没有让你从女性那里获得更多赞赏。
我确实知道这一点,但我忘了。
- Things Change as You Grow
The last big surprise founders mentioned is how much things changed as they grew. The biggest change was that you got to program even less:
Your job description as technical founder/CEO is completely rewritten every 6-12 months. Less coding, more managing/planning/company building, hiring, cleaning up messes, and generally getting things in place for what needs to happen a few months from now.
In particular, you now have to deal with employees, who often have different motivations:
I knew the founder equation and had been focused on it since I knew I wanted to start a startup as a 19 year old. The employee equation is quite different so it took me a while to get it down.
Fortunately, it can become a lot less stressful once you reach cruising altitude:
I'd say 75% of the stress is gone now from when we first started. Running a business is so much more enjoyable now. We're more confident. We're more patient. We fight less. We sleep more.
I wish I could say it was this way for every startup that succeeded, but 75% is probably on the high side.
- 随着成长,一切都在变
创始人提到的最后一个大意外是,随着公司成长,很多东西都变了。最大的变化是你编程的机会更少了:
作为技术创始人/CEO,你的工作描述每6-12个月完全重写一次。更少编程,更多管理/规划/公司建设、招聘、清理烂摊子,以及通常为几个月后需要发生的事情做好准备。
特别是,你现在必须与员工打交道,他们通常有不同的动机:
我从19岁知道我想创业时就理解了创始人公式,并一直专注于它。员工公式完全不同,所以我花了一段时间才弄清楚。
幸运的是,一旦你进入巡航高度,压力可以大大减少:
可以说,我们现在的压力比刚开始时减少了75%。经营生意现在愉快多了。我们更自信,更耐心,争吵更少,睡眠更多。
我希望我可以对每一个成功的创业公司都说如此,但75%可能还是偏高的。
There were a few other patterns, but these were the biggest. One's first thought when looking at them all is to ask if there's a super-pattern, a pattern to the patterns.
I saw it immediately, and so did a YC founder I read the list to. These are supposed to be the surprises, the things I didn't tell people. What do they all have in common? They're all things I tell people. If I wrote a new essay with the same outline as this that wasn't summarizing the founders' responses, everyone would say I'd run out of ideas and was just repeating myself.
What is going on here?
When I look at the responses, the common theme is that starting a startup was like I said, but way more so. People just don't seem to get how different it is till they do it. Why? The key to that mystery is to ask, how different from what? Once you phrase it that way, the answer is obvious: from a job. Everyone's model of work is a job. It's completely pervasive. Even if you've never had a job, your parents probably did, along with practically every other adult you've met.
Unconsciously, everyone expects a startup to be like a job, and that explains most of the surprises. It explains why people are surprised how carefully you have to choose cofounders and how hard you have to work to maintain your relationship. You don't have to do that with coworkers. It explains why the ups and downs are surprisingly extreme. In a job there is much more damping. But it also explains why the good times are surprisingly good: most people can't imagine such freedom. As you go down the list, almost all the surprises are surprising in how much a startup differs from a job.
You probably can't overcome anything so pervasive as the model of work you grew up with. So the best solution is to be consciously aware of that. As you go into a startup, you'll be thinking "everyone says it's really extreme." Your next thought will probably be "but I can't believe it will be that bad." If you want to avoid being surprised, the next thought after that should be: "and the reason I can't believe it will be that bad is that my model of work is a job."
还有其他一些模式,但以上是最大的。看到所有这些,人的第一反应是问是否存在一个超级模式,即模式中的模式。
我立刻发现了它,我向一位YC创始人宣读这份清单时他也发现了。这些本应是意外,是我没有告诉过人们的事情。它们的共同点是什么?它们全都是我告诉过人们的事情。如果我按照同样的提纲写一篇新文章,而不是总结创始人的回复,每个人都会说我创意枯竭,只是在重复自己。
这是怎么回事?
当我审视这些回复时,共同的主题是:创业就像我说过的那样,但程度要深得多。人们似乎只有亲身经历后才能理解它有多么不同。为什么?解开这个谜团的关键是问:和什么不同?一旦你这样提问,答案就显而易见了:和一份工作不同。每个人的工作模型都是一份工作。这无处不在。即使你从没上过班,你的父母很可能上过,你遇到的其他成年人也几乎都上过。
无意识中,每个人都期望创业像一份工作,这解释了大部分的意外。它解释了为什么人们惊讶于必须如此谨慎地选择联合创始人并努力维护关系——你不需要对同事这样做。它解释了为什么起伏如此剧烈——工作中存在更多的缓冲。但这也解释了为什么好时光好得惊人——大多数人无法想象这样的自由。当你逐一检查列表,几乎所有的意外都源于创业与工作之间的巨大差异。
你大概无法克服像你从小习得的工作模型这样普遍的东西。所以最好的办法是自觉地意识到这一点。当你进入创业时,你会想“每个人都说这真的很极端”。你的下一个想法可能是“但我无法相信它会那么糟”。如果你想避免意外,接下来的想法应该是:“我无法相信它会那么糟的原因是我的工作模型是一份工作。”
Notes
[1] Graduate students might understand it. In grad school you always feel you should be working on your thesis. It doesn't end every semester like classes do.
[2] The best way for a startup to engage with slow-moving organizations is to fork off separate processes to deal with them. It's when they're on the critical path that they kill you—when you depend on closing a deal to move forward. It's worth taking extreme measures to avoid that.
[3] This is a variant of Reid Hoffman's principle that if you aren't embarrassed by what you launch with, you waited too long to launch.
[4] The question to ask about what you've built is not whether it's good, but whether it's good enough to supply the activation energy required.
[5] Some VCs seem to understand technology because they actually do, but that's overkill; the defining test is whether you can talk about it well enough to convince limited partners.
[6] This is the same phenomenon you see with defense contractors or fashion brands. The dumber the customers, the more effort you expend on the process of selling things to them rather than making the things you sell.
注释
[1] 研究生可能理解这一点。在研究生院,你总是感觉应该在做论文。它不像课程那样每学期结束。
[2] 创业公司应对缓慢组织的最佳方法是分出独立的流程来处理它们。当它们处于关键路径上时才会致命——当你依赖达成交易来推进时。值得采取极端措施来避免这种情况。
[3] 这是里德·霍夫曼原则的变体:如果你发布的东西不让自己感到尴尬,那你就发布得太晚了。
[4] 关于你构建的东西,要问的问题不是它好不好,而是它是否好到足以提供所需的活化能。
[5] 有些VC看起来懂技术是因为他们确实懂,但这是超额能力;决定性测试是你是否能足够好地谈论它来说服有限合伙人。
[6] 这和你看到国防承包商或时尚品牌的现象一样。客户越愚蠢,你就越要在销售过程上下功夫,而不是在制造产品上。
Thanks: to Jessica Livingston for reading drafts of this, and to all the founders who responded to my email.
感谢:Jessica Livingston审阅了本文草稿,以及所有回复我邮件的创始人。