Be Good
In this essay, Paul Graham argues that startups should operate like charities: focus on making something people want, not on making money early. Using examples like Craigslist, Google's early days, and Microsoft's initial benevolence, he shows that being good provides three key advantages: boosts morale (users become a 'tamagotchi' that keeps you going through tough times), attracts help from others (investors, users, and top hackers who are idealistic), and serves as a stateless decision compass (just do what's best for users). He suggests 'don't be evil' is not enough; aim to be good as a practical strategy, not a moral stance. This is a classic piece for tech entrepreneurs.




April 2008(This essay is derived from a talk at the 2008 Startup School.)
About a month after we started Y Combinator we came up with the phrase that became our motto: Make something people want. We've learned a lot since then, but if I were choosing now that's still the one I'd pick.
Another thing we tell founders is not to worry too much about the business model, at least at first. Not because making money is unimportant, but because it's so much easier than building something great.
A couple weeks ago I realized that if you put those two ideas together, you get something surprising. Make something people want. Don't worry too much about making money. What you've got is a description of a charity.
When you get an unexpected result like this, it could either be a bug or a new discovery. Either businesses aren't supposed to be like charities, and we've proven by reductio ad absurdum that one or both of the principles we began with is false. Or we have a new idea.
I suspect it's the latter, because as soon as this thought occurred to me, a whole bunch of other things fell into place.
2008年4月(本文源自2008年Startup School的一次演讲)
大约在Y Combinator成立一个月后,我们想出了后来成为座右铭的那句话:做出人们想要的东西。自那以后我们学到了很多,但如果现在让我选择,我仍然会选这一句。
我们告诉创始人的另一件事是:别太担心商业模式,至少一开始别太担心。不是因为赚钱不重要,而是因为它比打造伟大的东西容易得多。
几周前我意识到,把这两个想法放在一起,你会得到令人惊讶的结果。做出人们想要的东西。别太担心赚钱。你得到的其实是对慈善机构的描述。
当你得到这样一个意外结果时,它要么是一个错误,要么是一个新发现。要么企业本不该像慈善机构那样,而我们通过反证法证明我们最初的两个原则中有一个或两个是错的;要么我们有了一个新想法。
我怀疑是后者,因为当这个念头第一次出现时,许多其他东西立刻变得合理了。
Examples
For example, Craigslist. It's not a charity, but they run it like one. And they're astoundingly successful. When you scan down the list of most popular web sites, the number of employees at Craigslist looks like a misprint. Their revenues aren't as high as they could be, but most startups would be happy to trade places with them.
In Patrick O'Brian's novels, his captains always try to get upwind of their opponents. If you're upwind, you decide when and if to engage the other ship. Craigslist is effectively upwind of enormous revenues. They'd face some challenges if they wanted to make more, but not the sort you face when you're tacking upwind, trying to force a crappy product on ambivalent users by spending ten times as much on sales as on development. [1]
I'm not saying startups should aim to end up like Craigslist. They're a product of unusual circumstances. But they're a good model for the early phases.
Google looked a lot like a charity in the beginning. They didn't have ads for over a year. At year 1, Google was indistinguishable from a nonprofit. If a nonprofit or government organization had started a project to index the web, Google at year 1 is the limit of what they'd have produced.
Back when I was working on spam filters I thought it would be a good idea to have a web-based email service with good spam filtering. I wasn't thinking of it as a company. I just wanted to keep people from getting spammed. But as I thought more about this project, I realized it would probably have to be a company. It would cost something to run, and it would be a pain to fund with grants and donations.
That was a surprising realization. Companies often claim to be benevolent, but it was surprising to realize there were purely benevolent projects that had to be embodied as companies to work.
I didn't want to start another company, so I didn't do it. But if someone had, they'd probably be quite rich now. There was a window of about two years when spam was increasing rapidly but all the big email services had terrible filters. If someone had launched a new, spam-free mail service, users would have flocked to it.
Notice the pattern here? From either direction we get to the same spot. If you start from successful startups, you find they often behaved like nonprofits. And if you start from ideas for nonprofits, you find they'd often make good startups.
例子
例如Craigslist。它不是一个慈善机构,但他们像经营慈善一样经营它,而且惊人地成功。当你浏览最受欢迎网站的列表时,Craigslist的员工数量看起来像印刷错误。他们的收入本可以更高,但大多数初创公司都愿意与它交换位置。
在Patrick O'Brian的小说中,船长们总是设法抢占对手的上风。如果你在上风,你就能决定何时以及是否与对方交战。Craigslist实际上处于巨大收入的上风。如果他们想赚更多钱会面临一些挑战,但不是那种逆风航行时所面对的挑战——试图通过花在销售上的费用十倍于开发来强迫三心二意的用户接受劣质产品。[1]
我不是说初创公司应该以成为Craigslist为目标。他们是特殊环境的产物,但他们是早期阶段的好榜样。
Google一开始看起来很像慈善机构。他们一年多没有广告。在第一年,Google与非营利组织无异。如果一个非营利组织或政府机构启动了一个索引网络的项目,Google第一年的成果就是他们所能达到的极限。
当我研究垃圾邮件过滤器时,我认为提供一个带良好垃圾邮件过滤的网页邮件服务是个好主意。我并没有把它当公司来想。我只是想阻止人们收到垃圾邮件。但当我深入思考这个项目时,我意识到它很可能必须是一家公司。运营它需要成本,而通过资助和捐赠来支持它会很麻烦。
这是一个令人惊讶的领悟。公司常常声称自己是仁慈的,但令人惊讶的是,有些纯粹仁慈的项目必须通过公司形式才能运作。
我不想再创办一家公司,所以没有去做。但如果有人做了,他们现在可能相当富有。有大约两年的窗口期,垃圾邮件迅速增长,而所有大型邮件服务的过滤器都很糟糕。如果有人推出一个新的、无垃圾邮件的邮件服务,用户会蜂拥而至。
注意到规律了吗?从两个方向我们都能到达同一个点。如果你从成功的初创公司出发,你会发现它们常常表现得像非营利组织;如果你从非营利组织的想法出发,你会发现它们常常能做成好的初创公司。
Power
How wide is this territory? Would all good nonprofits be good companies? Possibly not. What makes Google so valuable is that their users have money. If you make people with money love you, you can probably get some of it. But could you also base a successful startup on behaving like a nonprofit to people who don't have money? Could you, for example, grow a successful startup out of curing an unfashionable but deadly disease like malaria?
I'm not sure, but I suspect that if you pushed this idea, you'd be surprised how far it would go. For example, people who apply to Y Combinator don't generally have much money, and yet we can profit by helping them, because with our help they could make money. Maybe the situation is similar with malaria. Maybe an organization that helped lift its weight off a country could benefit from the resulting growth.
I'm not proposing this is a serious idea. I don't know anything about malaria. But I've been kicking ideas around long enough to know when I come across a powerful one.
One way to guess how far an idea extends is to ask yourself at what point you'd bet against it. The thought of betting against benevolence is alarming in the same way as saying that something is technically impossible. You're just asking to be made a fool of, because these are such powerful forces. [2]
For example, initially I thought maybe this principle only applied to Internet startups. Obviously it worked for Google, but what about Microsoft? Surely Microsoft isn't benevolent? But when I think back to the beginning, they were. Compared to IBM they were like Robin Hood. When IBM introduced the PC, they thought they were going to make money selling hardware at high prices. But by gaining control of the PC standard, Microsoft opened up the market to any manufacturer. Hardware prices plummeted, and lots of people got to have computers who couldn't otherwise have afforded them. It's the sort of thing you'd expect Google to do.
Microsoft isn't so benevolent now. Now when one thinks of what Microsoft does to users, all the verbs that come to mind begin with F. [3] And yet it doesn't seem to pay. Their stock price has been flat for years. Back when they were Robin Hood, their stock price rose like Google's. Could there be a connection?
You can see how there would be. When you're small, you can't bully customers, so you have to charm them. Whereas when you're big you can maltreat them at will, and you tend to, because it's easier than satisfying them. You grow big by being nice, but you can stay big by being mean.
You get away with it till the underlying conditions change, and then all your victims escape. So "Don't be evil" may be the most valuable thing Paul Buchheit made for Google, because it may turn out to be an elixir of corporate youth. I'm sure they find it constraining, but think how valuable it will be if it saves them from lapsing into the fatal laziness that afflicted Microsoft and IBM.
The curious thing is, this elixir is freely available to any other company. Anyone can adopt "Don't be evil." The catch is that people will hold you to it. So I don't think you're going to see record labels or tobacco companies using this discovery.
力量
这个领域有多广?所有好的非营利组织都能成为好公司吗?可能不是。Google如此有价值的原因在于他们的用户有钱。如果你让有钱的人爱上你,你很可能能从他们那里得到一些钱。但是,你能否通过向没有钱的人表现得像非营利组织来建立一家成功的初创公司?例如,你能通过治疗一种不流行但致命的疾病(如疟疾)来发展出一家成功的初创公司吗?
我不确定,但我怀疑如果你推动这个想法,你会惊讶于它能走多远。例如,申请Y Combinator的人通常没有很多钱,但我们仍然可以通过帮助他们获利,因为借助我们的帮助,他们可以赚钱。也许疟疾的情况类似。也许一个帮助国家减轻疟疾负担的组织可以从随之而来的增长中获益。
我不是在说这是一个严肃的想法。我对疟疾一无所知。但我已经琢磨想法够久了,知道什么时候遇到了一个强大的想法。
猜测一个想法能延伸多远的方法之一是问自己:在什么情况下你会赌它失败?赌善意失败的想法令人不安,就像说某件事在技术上不可能一样。你只是在自取其辱,因为这些都是如此强大的力量。[2]
例如,起初我以为这个原则只适用于互联网初创公司。显然它对Google有效,但微软呢?微软肯定不仁慈吧?但当我回想刚开始时,他们是仁慈的。与IBM相比,他们就像罗宾汉。当IBM推出个人电脑时,他们以为可以通过高价销售硬件来赚钱。但通过控制PC标准,微软向任何制造商开放了市场。硬件价格暴跌,很多人得以拥有原本买不起的电脑。这是你期望Google会做的事情。
现在微软不那么仁慈了。如今想到微软对用户做的事,所有能想到的动词都以“F”开头。[3] 然而这似乎并不划算。他们的股价多年来一直持平。当他们还是罗宾汉时,他们的股价像Google一样上涨。这之间有关系吗?
你可以看出其中的联系。当你还小时,你不能欺负客户,所以你不得不取悦他们。而当你变大时,你可以随意虐待他们,而且你会倾向于这样做,因为这比满足他们更容易。你靠友善做大,但你可以靠刻薄保持大。
你一直这样做,直到根本条件发生变化,然后你所有的受害者都逃走了。所以“不作恶”可能是Paul Buchheit为Google创造的最有价值的东西,因为它可能成为企业青春的灵药。我确信他们觉得它约束人,但设想一下,如果它使他们免于陷入困扰微软和IBM的致命懒惰,那该有多宝贵。
奇怪的是,这种灵药对其他任何公司都是免费可得的。任何人都可以采用“不作恶”。但问题在于人们会以此要求你。所以我不认为你会看到唱片公司或烟草公司使用这个发现。
Morale
There's a lot of external evidence that benevolence works. But how does it work? One advantage of investing in a large number of startups is that you get a lot of data about how they work. From what we've seen, being good seems to help startups in three ways: it improves their morale, it makes other people want to help them, and above all, it helps them be decisive.
Morale is tremendously important to a startup—so important that morale alone is almost enough to determine success. Startups are often described as emotional roller-coasters. One minute you're going to take over the world, and the next you're doomed. The problem with feeling you're doomed is not just that it makes you unhappy, but that it makes you stop working. So the downhills of the roller-coaster are more of a self fulfilling prophecy than the uphills. If feeling you're going to succeed makes you work harder, that probably improves your chances of succeeding, but if feeling you're going to fail makes you stop working, that practically guarantees you'll fail.
Here's where benevolence comes in. If you feel you're really helping people, you'll keep working even when it seems like your startup is doomed. Most of us have some amount of natural benevolence. The mere fact that someone needs you makes you want to help them. So if you start the kind of startup where users come back each day, you've basically built yourself a giant tamagotchi. You've made something you need to take care of.
Blogger is a famous example of a startup that went through really low lows and survived. At one point they ran out of money and everyone left. Evan Williams came in to work the next day, and there was no one but him. What kept him going? Partly that users needed him. He was hosting thousands of people's blogs. He couldn't just let the site die.
There are many advantages of launching quickly, but the most important may be that once you have users, the tamagotchi effect kicks in. Once you have users to take care of, you're forced to figure out what will make them happy, and that's actually very valuable information.
The added confidence that comes from trying to help people can also help you with investors. One of the founders of Chatterous told me recently that he and his cofounder had decided that this service was something the world needed, so they were going to keep working on it no matter what, even if they had to move back to Canada and live in their parents' basements.
Once they realized this, they stopped caring so much what investors thought about them. They still met with them, but they weren't going to die if they didn't get their money. And you know what? The investors got a lot more interested. They could sense that the Chatterouses were going to do this startup with or without them.
If you're really committed and your startup is cheap to run, you become very hard to kill. And practically all startups, even the most successful, come close to death at some point. So if doing good for people gives you a sense of mission that makes you harder to kill, that alone more than compensates for whatever you lose by not choosing a more selfish project.
士气
有很多外部证据表明善意是有效的。但它是如何起作用的呢?投资大量初创公司的一个好处是,你能获得大量关于它们如何运作的数据。根据我们的观察,做好事似乎以三种方式帮助初创公司:提升士气、让其他人愿意帮助它们,以及最重要的是,帮助它们果断决策。
士气对初创公司至关重要——重要到仅凭士气就几乎足以决定成败。初创公司常被描述为情感过山车。前一分钟你还要接管世界,下一分钟你就完蛋了。感觉自己完蛋了的问题不仅在于让你不快乐,还在于让你停止工作。所以过山车的下坡比上坡更容易自我实现。如果你感觉要成功而更努力地工作,那可能会提高成功几率;但如果你感觉要失败而停止工作,那几乎就注定会失败。
这正是善意发挥作用的地方。如果你觉得自己真的在帮助别人,即使看起来你的初创公司要完蛋了,你也会继续工作。我们大多数人都有一定程度的天然善意。仅仅是有人需要你这回事就会让你想帮助他们。所以如果你创办的那种初创公司是用户每天都回来的,那么你基本上给自己建了一个巨大的电子宠物。你创造了一个需要你照顾的东西。
Blogger是一个著名的例子,它经历了极低的低谷并存活下来。有一次他们用完了钱,所有人都离开了。Evan Williams第二天来上班,发现只剩他一个人。是什么让他坚持下去?部分原因是用户需要他。他托管着成千上万人的博客。他不能就这么让网站死掉。
快速推出有很多好处,但最重要的可能是:一旦你有了用户,电子宠物效应就开始了。一旦你有用户需要照顾,你就被迫去弄清楚什么能让他们高兴,而这实际上是非常有价值的信息。
努力帮助别人带来的额外信心也能帮助你在投资者面前更有底气。Chatterous的一位创始人最近告诉我,他和联合创始人决定,这个服务是世界需要的,所以他们无论如何都会继续做下去,即使不得不搬回加拿大住在地下室里。
一旦他们意识到这一点,就不再那么在意投资者对他们的看法。他们仍然会见投资者,但如果拿不到钱,他们也不会死。你知道吗?投资者变得更有兴趣了。他们能感觉到,无论有没有他们,Chatterous都会做这个初创公司。
如果你真的投入且你的初创公司运营成本低,你就变得很难被击倒。而实际上所有初创公司,即使是最成功的,在某个时刻都接近过死亡。所以如果为人们做好事给了你一种使命感和更强韧性,那么仅此一点就足以弥补你因选择不那么自私的项目而可能失去的任何东西。
Help
Another advantage of being good is that it makes other people want to help you. This too seems to be an inborn trait in humans.
One of the startups we've funded, Octopart, is currently locked in a classic battle of good versus evil. They're a search site for industrial components. A lot of people need to search for components, and before Octopart there was no good way to do it. That, it turned out, was no coincidence.
Octopart built the right way to search for components. Users like it and they've been growing rapidly. And yet for most of Octopart's life, the biggest distributor, Digi-Key, has been trying to force them take their prices off the site. Octopart is sending them customers for free, and yet Digi-Key is trying to make that traffic stop. Why? Because their current business model depends on overcharging people who have incomplete information about prices. They don't want search to work.
The Octoparts are the nicest guys in the world. They dropped out of the PhD program in physics at Berkeley to do this. They just wanted to fix a problem they encountered in their research. Imagine how much time you could save the world's engineers if they could do searches online. So when I hear that a big, evil company is trying to stop them in order to keep search broken, it makes me really want to help them. It makes me spend more time on the Octoparts than I do with most of the other startups we've funded. It just made me spend several minutes telling you how great they are. Why? Because they're good guys and they're trying to help the world.
If you're benevolent, people will rally around you: investors, customers, other companies, and potential employees. In the long term the most important may be the potential employees. I think everyone knows now that good hackers are much better than mediocre ones. If you can attract the best hackers to work for you, as Google has, you have a big advantage. And the very best hackers tend to be idealistic. They're not desperate for a job. They can work wherever they want. So most want to work on things that will make the world better.
帮助
做好事的另一个好处是,它让其他人愿意帮助你。这似乎也是人类天生的特质。
我们资助的初创公司之一 Octopart 目前正陷入一场经典的善恶之战。他们是一个工业零件搜索网站。很多人需要搜索零件,而在 Octopart 之前,没有好的方法。结果发现,这并非巧合。
Octopart 建立了正确的搜索方式。用户喜欢它,并且发展迅速。然而在 Octopart 的大部分时间里,最大的分销商 Digi-Key 一直试图强迫他们从网站上删除价格信息。Octopart 免费为他们输送客户,但 Digi-Key 却试图阻止这些流量。为什么?因为他们的商业模式依赖于对价格信息不全的人收取过高费用。他们不希望搜索有效。
Octopart 的人是世界上最好的人。他们从伯克利物理学的博士项目中退学来做这个。他们只是想解决研究中遇到的一个问题。想象一下,如果工程师能在线搜索,能为全世界的工程师节省多少时间。所以当我听说一家大而邪恶的公司为了保持搜索不灵而来阻止他们时,我真的很想帮助他们。这让我花在 Octopart 上的时间比我资助的大多数其他初创公司都多。刚才我花了几分钟告诉你他们有多棒。为什么?因为他们是好人,他们试图帮助世界。
如果你仁慈,人们会围绕在你身边:投资者、客户、其他公司以及潜在员工。从长远来看,最重要的可能是潜在员工。我想现在大家都知道,优秀的黑客比平庸的好得多。如果你能吸引最优秀的黑客为你工作,就像 Google 那样,你就有很大优势。而最优秀的黑客往往是有理想主义的。他们不拼命找工作。他们想去哪就去哪。所以大多数人希望从事能让世界变得更美好的工作。
Compass
But the most important advantage of being good is that it acts as a compass. One of the hardest parts of doing a startup is that you have so many choices. There are just two or three of you, and a thousand things you could do. How do you decide?
Here's the answer: Do whatever's best for your users. You can hold onto this like a rope in a hurricane, and it will save you if anything can. Follow it and it will take you through everything you need to do.
It's even the answer to questions that seem unrelated, like how to convince investors to give you money. If you're a good salesman, you could try to just talk them into it. But the more reliable route is to convince them through your users: if you make something users love enough to tell their friends, you grow exponentially, and that will convince any investor.
Being good is a particularly useful strategy for making decisions in complex situations because it's stateless. It's like telling the truth. The trouble with lying is that you have to remember everything you've said in the past to make sure you don't contradict yourself. If you tell the truth you don't have to remember anything, and that's a really useful property in domains where things happen fast.
For example, Y Combinator has now invested in 80 startups, 57 of which are still alive. (The rest have died or merged or been acquired.) When you're trying to advise 57 startups, it turns out you have to have a stateless algorithm. You can't have ulterior motives when you have 57 things going on at once, because you can't remember them. So our rule is just to do whatever's best for the founders. Not because we're particularly benevolent, but because it's the only algorithm that works on that scale.
When you write something telling people to be good, you seem to be claiming to be good yourself. So I want to say explicitly that I am not a particularly good person. When I was a kid I was firmly in the camp of bad. The way adults used the word good, it seemed to be synonymous with quiet, so I grew up very suspicious of it.
You know how there are some people whose names come up in conversation and everyone says "He's such a great guy?" People never say that about me. The best I get is "he means well." I am not claiming to be good. At best I speak good as a second language.
So I'm not suggesting you be good in the usual sanctimonious way. I'm suggesting it because it works. It will work not just as a statement of "values," but as a guide to strategy, and even a design spec for software. Don't just not be evil. Be good.
指南针
但做好事最重要的好处是它充当了指南针。创业最难的部分之一是你有太多选择。只有两三个人,却有一千件事可以做。你如何决定?
答案是:做对用户最有利的事。你可以像在飓风中抓住一根绳子一样抓住它,如果有什么能救你的话,它就能。跟随它,它会带你度过你需要做的一切。
它甚至是回答看似无关的问题的方法,比如如何说服投资者给你钱。如果你是一个好的推销员,你可以试着说服他们。但更可靠的途径是通过用户来证明:如果你做出用户爱到足以告诉朋友的东西,你会呈指数增长,这能说服任何投资者。
在复杂情况下做决策时,做好事是一种特别有用的策略,因为它无状态。就像说真话。说谎的麻烦在于你必须记住你过去说的每一句话,以确保不自相矛盾。如果你说真话,你什么都不用记,这在快速变化的情境中是一个非常有用的特性。
例如,Y Combinator 现在投资了80家初创公司,其中57家仍然活着(其余已死、合并或被收购)。当你试图给57家初创公司提供建议时,你必须有一个无状态算法。当你同时处理57件事时,你不能有隐藏动机,因为你记不住它们。所以我们的规则就是做对创始人最有利的事。不是因为我们特别仁慈,而是因为这是唯一能在那种规模下运行的算法。
当你写东西告诉人们要善良时,你似乎在声称自己善良。所以我要明确地说,我不是一个特别善良的人。小时候我属于“坏”那一派。成年人使用“好”这个词的方式,似乎等同于“安静”,所以我从小就对它非常怀疑。
你知道有些人,他们的名字在谈话中被提起时,每个人都说“他是个很棒的人”?人们从来不会那样说我。我得到的最好评价是“他本意是好”。我不声称自己善良。充其量我只是把善良作为第二语言来说。
所以我不是建议你用通常那种道貌岸然的方式去善良。我建议它,是因为它有效。它不仅会作为“价值观”的声明起作用,还会作为战略指南,甚至作为软件的设计规范。不要仅仅不作恶。要善良。
[1] Fifty years ago it would have seemed shocking for a public company not to pay dividends. Now many tech companies don't. The markets seem to have figured out how to value potential dividends. Maybe that isn't the last step in this evolution. Maybe markets will eventually get comfortable with potential earnings. (VCs already are, and at least some of them consistently make money.)
I realize this sounds like the stuff one used to hear about the "new economy" during the Bubble. Believe me, I was not drinking that kool-aid at the time. But I'm convinced there were some good ideas buried in Bubble thinking. For example, it's ok to focus on growth instead of profits—but only if the growth is genuine. You can't be buying users; that's a pyramid scheme. But a company with rapid, genuine growth is valuable, and eventually markets learn how to value valuable things.
[1] 五十年前,上市公司不支付股息会令人震惊。现在许多科技公司不付股息。市场似乎已经学会了如何评估潜在股息。也许这不是进化的最后一步。也许市场最终会接受潜在收益。(风险投资人已经接受了,并且至少其中一些持续赚钱。)
我意识到这听起来像泡沫时期人们听到的关于“新经济”的说法。相信我,我当时没有喝那种迷魂汤。但我确信泡沫思维中埋藏了一些好想法。例如,专注于增长而不是利润是可以的——但前提是增长是真实的。你不能购买用户;那是金字塔骗局。但一家拥有快速、真实增长的公司是有价值的,最终市场会学会如何评估有价值的东西。
[2] The idea of starting a company with benevolent aims is currently undervalued, because the kind of people who currently make that their explicit goal don't usually do a very good job.
It's one of the standard career paths of trustafarians to start some vaguely benevolent business. The problem with most of them is that they either have a bogus political agenda or are feebly executed. The trustafarians' ancestors didn't get rich by preserving their traditional culture; maybe people in Bolivia don't want to either. And starting an organic farm, though it's at least straightforwardly benevolent, doesn't help people on the scale that Google does.
Most explicitly benevolent projects don't hold themselves sufficiently accountable. They act as if having good intentions were enough to guarantee good effects.
[2] 以仁慈为目标创办公司的想法目前被低估了,因为当前那些以此为目标的人通常做得很差。
信托基金会创始人后代的标准职业路径之一是创办某种模糊的慈善事业。大多数问题在于它们要么有虚假的政治议程,要么执行不力。信托基金后代的祖先并不是通过保存传统文化致富的;也许玻利维亚人也不想那样。而创办一个有机农场,虽然至少是直接的慈善,但帮助人的规模无法与Google相比。
大多数明确慈善的项目没有让自己足够负责任。他们表现得好像有好意图就足以保证好结果。
[3] Users dislike their new operating system so much that they're starting petitions to save the old one. And the old one was nothing special. The hackers within Microsoft must know in their hearts that if the company really cared about users they'd just advise them to switch to OSX.
[3] 用户非常讨厌他们的新操作系统,以至于开始请愿保留旧版本。而旧版本也没什么特别。微软内部的极客们心里一定清楚,如果公司真的关心用户,就应该建议他们改用OSX。
Thanks to Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Jessica Livingston, and Robert Morris for reading drafts of this.
感谢 Trevor Blackwell、Paul Buchheit、Jessica Livingston 和 Robert Morris 阅读本文草稿。