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后证书时代:绩效如何取代文凭

原文 www.paulgraham.com 收录 2026-07-07 15:58 阅读 14 min
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本文探讨美国社会从依赖学历证书到更重视实际绩效的转变。作者追溯证书制度的历史,指出其初衷是阻止权力直接代际传递,但补习班等成为漏洞。更优的解决方案是让社会由更多小型组织构成,从而直接衡量绩效,使证书的重要性下降。文章分析了初创企业和雅皮士现象的兴起,认为小型组织使得个人能力直接接受市场检验,大型组织因此被迫改革薪酬制度。这一趋势在20世纪末加速,并可能持续下去。适合对社会趋势、组织演变及人才评价机制感兴趣的读者。

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§ 1

§ 2

After Credentials

凭证之后

§ 3

December 2008A few months ago I read a New York Times article on South Korean cram schools that said

Admission to the right university can make or break an ambitious young South Korean.

A parent added: "In our country, college entrance exams determine 70 to 80 percent of a person's future."

It was striking how old fashioned this sounded. And yet when I was in high school it wouldn't have seemed too far off as a description of the US. Which means things must have been changing here.The course of people's lives in the US now seems to be determined less by credentials and more by performance than it was 25 years ago. Where you go to college still matters, but not like it used to.

What happened?

2008年12月。几个月前,我读到《纽约时报》一篇关于韩国补习班的文章,其中写道:

考入一所好大学可以成就或毁掉一个雄心勃勃的韩国年轻人。

一位家长补充道: “在韩国,大学入学考试决定了一个人未来70%到80%的命运。”

这段话听起来格外老派。然而,在我上高中时,这番话用来描述美国也相差不远。这意味着美国的情况一定在发生变化。与25年前相比,现在美国人生的轨迹似乎更少由凭证决定,更多由实际表现决定。你上什么大学仍然重要,但不像过去那样了。

发生了什么?

§ 4

Judging people by their academic credentials was in its time an advance. The practice seems to have begun in China, where starting in 587 candidates for the imperial civil service had to take an exam on classical literature.

[1] It was also a test of wealth, because the knowledge it tested was so specialized that passing required years of expensive training. But though wealth was a necessary condition for passing, it was not a sufficient one. By the standards of the rest of the world in 587, the Chinese system was very enlightened. Europeans didn't introduce formal civil service exams till the nineteenth century, and even then they seem to have been influenced by the Chinese example.

按学术凭证评判人,在当时是一种进步。这种做法似乎始于中国:从587年起,帝国文官候选者必须参加一场古典文学考试。[1] 它同时也是对财富的考验,因为考试所需的知识非常专业,需要通过多年昂贵的培训才能掌握。不过,尽管财富是及格的必要条件,却不是充分条件。以587年世界其他地区的标准来看,中国的制度非常开明。欧洲直到19世纪才引入正式的文官考试,而且似乎也受到了中国的影响。

§ 5

Before credentials, government positions were obtained mainly by family influence, if not outright bribery. It was a great step forward to judge people by their performance on a test. But by no means a perfect solution. When you judge people that way, you tend to get cram schools — which they did in Ming China and nineteenth century England just as much as in present day South Korea.

在凭证出现之前,政府职位主要靠家庭背景获得,甚至直接贿赂。通过考试表现来评判人是一大进步,但绝非完美解决方案。当你以这种方式评判人时,往往会催生补习班——明朝中国、19世纪的英格兰和当今韩国都出现了这种情况。

§ 6

What cram schools are, in effect, is leaks in a seal. The use of credentials was an attempt to seal off the direct transmission of power between generations, and cram schools represent that power finding holes in the seal. Cram schools turn wealth in one generation into credentials in the next.

It's hard to beat this phenomenon, because the schools adjust to suit whatever the tests measure. When the tests are narrow and predictable, you get cram schools on the classic model, like those that prepared candidates for Sandhurst (the British West Point) or the classes American students take now to improve their SAT scores. But as the tests get broader, the schools do too. Preparing a candidate for the Chinese imperial civil service exams took years, as prep school does today. But the raison d'etre of all these institutions has been the same: to beat the system.

补习班实际上是密封圈上的漏洞。使用凭证是为了阻断代际权力的直接传递,而补习班则代表了权力正在寻找密封圈的缺口。补习班将上一代的财富转化为下一代的凭证。

这种现象很难被击败,因为补习班会根据考试内容进行调整。当考试范围狭窄且可预测时,就会产生经典的补习班模式,比如为桑赫斯特(英国西点军校)培养考生的辅导班,或者美国学生为提高SAT成绩而参加的课程。但随着考试范围变广,补习班也随之扩展。培养一位中国帝国文官考试的考生需要数年时间,就像今天的预科学校一样。但这些机构的根本目的始终如一:击败体制。

§ 7

History suggests that, all other things being equal, a society prospers in proportion to its ability to prevent parents from influencing their children's success directly. It's a fine thing for parents to help their children indirectly — for example, by helping them to become smarter or more disciplined, which then makes them more successful. The problem comes when parents use direct methods: when they are able to use their own wealth or power as a substitute for their children's qualities.

Parents will tend to do this when they can. Parents will die for their kids, so it's not surprising to find they'll also push their scruples to the limits for them. Especially if other parents are doing it.

Sealing off this force has a double advantage. Not only does a society get "the best man for the job," but parents' ambitions are diverted from direct methods to indirect ones — to actually trying to raise their kids well.

But we should expect it to be very hard to contain parents' efforts to obtain an unfair advantage for their kids. We're dealing with one of the most powerful forces in human nature. We shouldn't expect naive solutions to work, any more than we'd expect naive solutions for keeping heroin out of a prison to work.

历史表明,在其他条件相同的情况下,社会繁荣程度与其阻止父母直接影响子女成功的能力成正比。父母间接帮助孩子是好事——例如,帮助他们变得更聪明或更自律,从而获得成功。问题在于父母使用直接方法:用自身的财富或权力替代孩子的品质。

父母只要有机会就会这样做。父母可以为孩子去死,因此他们为孩子突破道德底线也不足为奇,尤其是当其他父母也在这样做时。

阻断这种力量有双重好处:不仅能让社会“人尽其才”,还能将父母的野心从直接手段转向间接手段——真正努力把孩子培养好。

但我们必须预料到,要遏制父母为子女谋取不正当优势的努力极其困难。我们面对的是人性中最强大的力量之一。我们不应期望简单的解决方案能奏效,就像不能指望简单的方法能阻止海洛因进入监狱一样。

§ 8

The obvious way to solve the problem is to make credentials better. If the tests a society uses are currently hackable, we can study the way people beat them and try to plug the holes. You can use the cram schools to show you where most of the holes are. They also tell you when you're succeeding in fixing them: when cram schools become less popular.

解决问题的一个明显方法是改进凭证。如果社会使用的考试目前容易被钻空子,我们可以研究人们如何作弊,并试图堵住漏洞。补习班会告诉你大部分漏洞在哪里。它们也会告诉你何时成功修复了漏洞:当补习班不再受欢迎时。

§ 9

A more general solution would be to push for increased transparency, especially at critical social bottlenecks like college admissions. In the US this process still shows many outward signs of corruption. For example, legacy admissions. The official story is that legacy status doesn't carry much weight, because all it does is break ties: applicants are bucketed by ability, and legacy status is only used to decide between the applicants in the bucket that straddles the cutoff. But what this means is that a university can make legacy status have as much or as little weight as they want, by adjusting the size of the bucket that straddles the cutoff.

By gradually chipping away at the abuse of credentials, you could probably make them more airtight. But what a long fight it would be. Especially when the institutions administering the tests don't really want them to be airtight.

一个更通用的解决方案是推动更大程度的透明化,尤其是在大学录取等关键社会瓶颈环节。在美国,这一过程仍然显示出许多腐败的外在迹象。例如,校友子女优先录取。官方说法是,校友身份并不占很大权重,因为它只用于打破平局:申请者按能力分档,校友身份仅用于决定那些处于录取线边缘的申请者。但这意味着,大学可以通过调整边缘档的大小,随心所欲地赋予校友身份或多或少的影响力。

通过逐步消除对凭证的滥用,你或许能让它们变得更严密。但这将是一场持久战,尤其是当组织考试的机构并不真正希望它们变得严密时。

§ 10

Fortunately there's a better way to prevent the direct transmission of power between generations. Instead of trying to make credentials harder to hack, we can also make them matter less.

Let's think about what credentials are for. What they are, functionally, is a way of predicting performance. If you could measure actual performance, you wouldn't need them.

So why did they even evolve? Why haven't we just been measuring actual performance? Think about where credentialism first appeared: in selecting candidates for large organizations. Individual performance is hard to measure in large organizations, and the harder performance is to measure, the more important it is to predict it. If an organization could immediately and cheaply measure the performance of recruits, they wouldn't need to examine their credentials. They could take everyone and keep just the good ones.

Large organizations can't do this. But a bunch of small organizations in a market can come close. A market takes every organization and keeps just the good ones. As organizations get smaller, this approaches taking every person and keeping just the good ones. So all other things being equal, a society consisting of more, smaller organizations will care less about credentials.

幸运的是,有更好的方法可以防止代际权力直接传递。与其试图让凭证更难被钻空子,我们也可以降低凭证的重要性。

想想凭证的用途。从功能上讲,它们是预测表现的一种方式。如果你能直接衡量实际表现,就不需要凭证了。

那么,凭证为什么会演变出来?为什么我们不直接衡量实际表现?想想凭证主义最初出现的地方:在大型组织选拔候选人时。在大型组织中,个人表现很难衡量;表现越难衡量,预测表现就越重要。如果组织能够立即且低成本地衡量新人的表现,它们就不需要审查凭证了。它们可以接纳所有人,只留下优秀者。

大型组织做不到这一点。但市场中众多小型组织可以近似做到。市场会筛选组织,只留下好的。随着组织变小,这近似于筛选每个人,只留下好的。因此,在其他条件相同的情况下,一个由更多、更小组织组成的社会,对凭证的重视程度会更低。

§ 11

That's what's been happening in the US. That's why those quotes from Korea sound so old fashioned. They're talking about an economy like America's a few decades ago, dominated by a few big companies. The route for the ambitious in that sort of environment is to join one and climb to the top. Credentials matter a lot then. In the culture of a large organization, an elite pedigree becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

This doesn't work in small companies. Even if your colleagues were impressed by your credentials, they'd soon be parted from you if your performance didn't match, because the company would go out of business and the people would be dispersed.

In a world of small companies, performance is all anyone cares about. People hiring for a startup don't care whether you've even graduated from college, let alone which one. All they care about is what you can do. Which is in fact all that should matter, even in a large organization. The reason credentials have such prestige is that for so long the large organizations in a society tended to be the most powerful. But in the US at least they don't have the monopoly on power they once did, precisely because they can't measure (and thus reward) individual performance. Why spend twenty years climbing the corporate ladder when you can get rewarded directly by the market?

I realize I see a more exaggerated version of the change than most other people. As a partner at an early stage venture funding firm, I'm like a jumpmaster shoving people out of the old world of credentials and into the new one of performance. I'm an agent of the change I'm seeing. But I don't think I'm imagining it. It was not so easy 25 years ago for an ambitious person to choose to be judged directly by the market. You had to go through bosses, and they were influenced by where you'd been to college.

美国正在发生这种情况。这就是为什么那些来自韩国的引述听起来如此老派。他们描述的是一种几十年前美国那样的经济,由几家大公司主导。在这种环境中,雄心勃勃的路径就是加入一家大公司并爬到顶层。那时凭证非常重要。在大型组织的文化中,精英背景会成为自我实现的预言。

这在小公司行不通。即使你的同事对你的凭证印象深刻,如果你的表现不匹配,他们很快就会抛弃你,因为公司会倒闭,人们会散伙。

在小公司的世界里,所有人只关心表现。创业公司的招聘人员不在乎你是否大学毕业,更不用说哪个大学了。他们只在乎你能做什么。这其实就是唯一重要的东西,即使在大型组织中也应如此。凭证之所以享有如此声望,是因为长期以来社会中大组织往往最有权势。但在美国,至少它们不再像过去那样垄断权力,恰恰是因为它们无法衡量(从而也就无法奖励)个人表现。既然可以直接从市场获得回报,何必花二十年爬企业阶梯?

我意识到,我观察到的变化比大多数人更夸张。作为一家早期风险投资公司的合伙人,我就像一名跳伞长,把人们从凭证的旧世界推入表现的新世界。我是我所见变化的推动者。但我认为我没有凭空想象。25年前,一个雄心勃勃的人要选择直接接受市场评判并不容易。你必须经过老板,而老板又受你大学背景的影响。

§ 12

What made it possible for small organizations to succeed in America? I'm still not entirely sure. Startups are certainly a large part of it. Small organizations can develop new ideas faster than large ones, and new ideas are increasingly valuable.

But I don't think startups account for all the shift from credentials to measurement. My friend Julian Weber told me that when he went to work for a New York law firm in the 1950s they paid associates far less than firms do today. Law firms then made no pretense of paying people according to the value of the work they'd done. Pay was based on seniority. The younger employees were paying their dues. They'd be rewarded later.

The same principle prevailed at industrial companies. When my father was working at Westinghouse in the 1970s, he had people working for him who made more than he did, because they'd been there longer.

Now companies increasingly have to pay employees market price for the work they do. One reason is that employees no longer trust companies to deliver deferred rewards: why work to accumulate deferred rewards at a company that might go bankrupt, or be taken over and have all its implicit obligations wiped out? The other is that some companies broke ranks and started to pay young employees large amounts. This was particularly true in consulting, law, and finance, where it led to the phenomenon of yuppies. The word is rarely used today because it's no longer surprising to see a 25 year old with money, but in 1985 the sight of a 25 year old professional able to afford a new BMW was so novel that it called forth a new word.

The classic yuppie worked for a small organization. He didn't work for General Widget, but for the law firm that handled General Widget's acquisitions or the investment bank that floated their bond issues.

Startups and yuppies entered the American conceptual vocabulary roughly simultaneously in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I don't think there was a causal connection. Startups happened because technology started to change so fast that big companies could no longer keep a lid on the smaller ones. I don't think the rise of yuppies was inspired by it; it seems more as if there was a change in the social conventions (and perhaps the laws) governing the way big companies worked. But the two phenomena rapidly fused to produce a principle that now seems obvious: paying energetic young people market rates, and getting correspondingly high performance from them.

At about the same time the US economy rocketed out of the doldrums that had afflicted it for most of the 1970s. Was there a connection? I don't know enough to say, but it felt like it at the time. There was a lot of energy released.

是什么让小型组织在美国得以成功?我仍然不完全确定。初创企业肯定是重要原因。小型组织能比大型组织更快地开发新想法,而新想法越来越有价值。

但我认为初创企业并不能完全解释从凭证到衡量的转变。我的朋友Julian Weber告诉我,20世纪50年代他进入纽约一家律师事务所时,助理的薪酬远低于今天。那时的律师事务所根本不假装按工作价值付薪。薪酬基于资历。年轻员工在“交学费”,以后会得到回报。

同样的原则在工业企业中盛行。20世纪70年代我父亲在西屋电气工作时,手下有些人赚得比他多,因为他们资历更深。

如今,企业越来越必须按市场价支付员工所做工作的报酬。一个原因是员工不再信任企业会兑现延迟的回报:为什么要在一家可能破产或被收购、所有隐性义务一笔勾销的公司积累延迟回报?另一个原因是,一些公司打破了惯例,开始向年轻员工支付高额薪酬。咨询、法律和金融行业尤其如此,导致了雅皮士现象。这个词今天很少用了,因为看到25岁的年轻人有钱已不稀奇,但在1985年,看到一个25岁的专业人士买得起宝马还是如此新奇,以至于催生了一个新词。

典型的雅皮士为小型组织工作。他不是为通用电器公司工作,而是为处理通用电器收购案的律所或为其发行债券的投资银行工作。

初创企业和雅皮士大约在20世纪70年代末80年代初同时进入美国的观念词汇库。我认为它们之间没有因果关系。初创企业的兴起是因为技术变化如此之快,大公司再也无法压制小公司。我不认为雅皮士的兴起受到初创企业的启发;更像是管理大公司运作方式的社会惯例(或许还有法律)发生了变化。但这两个现象迅速融合,产生了一个现在看来显而易见的原理:按市场价付薪给精力充沛的年轻人,并从他们那里获得相应的高绩效。

大约在同一时间,美国经济从困扰了整个70年代大部分时间的低迷中迅速反弹。这之间有联系吗?我知道的不足以断言,但当时感觉确实如此。大量能量被释放出来。

§ 13

Countries worried about their competitiveness are right to be concerned about the number of startups started within them. But they would do even better to examine the underlying principle. Do they let energetic young people get paid market rate for the work they do? The young are the test, because when people aren't rewarded according to performance, they're invariably rewarded according to seniority instead.

All it takes is a few beachheads in your economy that pay for performance. Measurement spreads like heat. If one part of a society is better at measurement than others, it tends to push the others to do better. If people who are young but smart and driven can make more by starting their own companies than by working for existing ones, the existing companies are forced to pay more to keep them. So market rates gradually permeate every organization, even the government.

[3]The measurement of performance will tend to push even the organizations issuing credentials into line. When we were kids I used to annoy my sister by ordering her to do things I knew she was about to do anyway. As credentials are superseded by performance, a similar role is the best former gatekeepers can hope for. Once credential granting institutions are no longer in the self-fulfilling prophecy business, they'll have to work harder to predict the future.

担心竞争力的国家关注国内初创企业数量是对的。但更好的是审视其根本原则:他们是否允许精力充沛的年轻人按市场价获得报酬?年轻人是试金石,因为当人们不按绩效获得回报时,他们必然按资历获得回报。

只需在经济中建立几个按绩效付薪的滩头阵地。衡量会像热量一样扩散。如果社会中某个部分比其它部分更擅长衡量,它往往会推动其它部分做得更好。如果年轻、聪明且富有干劲的人通过创办自己的公司比给现有公司打工赚得更多,现有公司就不得不支付更高薪酬来留住他们。因此,市场价格逐渐渗透到每个组织,甚至政府。

[3] 绩效衡量甚至会将颁发凭证的组织推向正轨。小时候,我经常烦我妹妹,命令她去做我知道她正要去做的事。随着绩效取代凭证,过去的守门人所能期望的最好角色也不过如此。一旦授予凭证的机构不再从事自我实现的预言业务,它们就必须更努力地预测未来。

§ 14

Credentials are a step beyond bribery and influence. But they're not the final step. There's an even better way to block the transmission of power between generations: to encourage the trend toward an economy made of more, smaller units. Then you can measure what credentials merely predict.

No one likes the transmission of power between generations — not the left or the right. But the market forces favored by the right turn out to be a better way of preventing it than the credentials the left are forced to fall back on.

The era of credentials began to end when the power of large organizations peaked in the late twentieth century. Now we seem to be entering a new era based on measurement. The reason the new model has advanced so rapidly is that it works so much better. It shows no sign of slowing.

凭证是超越贿赂和关系的一步,但并非最后一步。有一种更好的方式可以阻止代际权力传递:鼓励经济向更多、更小的单元发展。这样你就可以直接衡量凭证仅仅预测的东西。

没有人喜欢代际权力传递——无论是左派还是右派。但事实证明,右派青睐的市场力量比左派被迫依赖的凭证更能有效防止这种情况。

凭证时代在20世纪末大组织权力达到顶峰时开始终结。现在我们似乎正在进入一个基于衡量的新时代。新模式之所以发展如此迅速,是因为它效果好得多,并且没有放缓的迹象。

§ 15

[1] Miyazaki, Ichisada (Conrad Schirokauer trans.), China's Examination Hell: The Civil Service Examinations of Imperial China, Yale University Press, 1981.Scribes in ancient Egypt took exams, but they were more the type of proficiency test any apprentice might have to pass.

[1] 宫崎市定著,康拉德·希罗考尔译,《中国的考试地狱:帝国中国的文官考试》,耶鲁大学出版社,1981年。古埃及的抄写员也参加考试,但更像是任何学徒都需通过的技能测试。

§ 16

[2] When I say the raison d'etre of prep schools is to get kids into better colleges, I mean this in the narrowest sense. I'm not saying that's all prep schools do, just that if they had zero effect on college admissions there would be far less demand for them.

[2] 当我说预科学校的根本目的是让孩子进入更好的大学时,我指的是最狭义的含义。我不是说预科学校只做这一件事,只是说如果它们对大学录取完全没有影响,对它们的需求会小得多。

§ 17

[3] Progressive tax rates will tend to damp this effect, however, by decreasing the difference between good and bad measurers.

[3] 然而,累进税率会通过缩小优秀测量者与糟糕测量者之间的差距,来抑制这种效果。

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