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保罗·格雷厄姆:最可怕的创业点子,正是最大的机会

原文 www.paulgraham.com 收录 2026-07-07 15:43 阅读 21 min
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保罗·格雷厄姆指出,越是野心勃勃的创业点子越容易让人产生恐惧和回避。他列举了几个这样的点子:取代 Google 的新搜索引擎、替代电子邮件的待办协议、瓦解大学教育垄断、互联网影视、下一个苹果、通过自动并行化编译器重振摩尔定律,以及持续自动医疗诊断。这些点子之所以被忽视,正是因为它们太宏大,威胁到人的身份认同。他建议不要正面硬攻,而是从小处着手,用看似无害的产品渗透,等对手反应过来时已成定局。

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§ 1

Frighteningly Ambitious Startup Ideas

令人恐惧的宏伟创业想法

§ 2

March 2012

One of the more surprising things I've noticed while working on Y Combinator is how frightening the most ambitious startup ideas are. In this essay I'm going to demonstrate this phenomenon by describing some. Any one of them could make you a billionaire. That might sound like an attractive prospect, and yet when I describe these ideas you may notice you find yourself shrinking away from them.

Don't worry, it's not a sign of weakness. Arguably it's a sign of sanity. The biggest startup ideas are terrifying. And not just because they'd be a lot of work. The biggest ideas seem to threaten your identity: you wonder if you'd have enough ambition to carry them through.

There's a scene in Being John Malkovich where the nerdy hero encounters a very attractive, sophisticated woman. She says to him: Here's the thing: If you ever got me, you wouldn't have a clue what to do with me.

That's what these ideas say to us.

This phenomenon is one of the most important things you can understand about startups.

[1] You'd expect big startup ideas to be attractive, but actually they tend to repel you. And that has a bunch of consequences. It means these ideas are invisible to most people who try to think of startup ideas, because their subconscious filters them out. Even the most ambitious people are probably best off approaching them obliquely.

[1] It's also one of the most important things VCs fail to understand about startups. Most expect founders to walk in with a clear plan for the future, and judge them based on that. Few consciously realize that in the biggest successes there is the least correlation between the initial plan and what the startup eventually becomes.

2012年3月

在Y Combinator工作期间,我注意到的较令人惊讶的事情之一是,最雄心勃勃的创业想法有多么令人恐惧。在这篇文章中,我将通过描述一些想法来展示这一现象。其中任何一个都能让你成为亿万富翁。这听起来可能很有吸引力,但当我描述这些想法时,你可能会发现自己正不由自主地退缩。

别担心,这不是软弱的表现。可以说,这是理智的表现。最大的创业想法是可怕的。不仅仅是因为它们需要大量的工作。最大的想法似乎威胁着你的身份:你会怀疑自己是否有足够的雄心去实现它们。

电影《成为约翰·马尔科维奇》中有一个场景,书呆子主角遇到了一位非常迷人、世故的女人。她对他说:事情是这样的:如果你真的得到了我,你会不知道拿我怎么办。

这些想法对我们说的就是同样的话。

这一现象是你需要理解的关于创业最重要的事情之一。

[1] 你会认为宏大的创业想法应该很有吸引力,但实际上它们往往会让你排斥。而这带来了一系列后果。这意味着这些想法对大多数试图想出创业点子的人来说是隐形的,因为他们的潜意识会将其过滤掉。即使是最雄心勃勃的人,也许也最好以迂回的方式接近它们。

[1] 这也是风险投资人未能理解创业的至关重要的一点。大多数人期望创始人带着清晰的未来计划走进来,并据此评判他们。很少有人意识到,在最大的成功案例中,初始计划与最终创业结果之间的相关性最小。

§ 3
  1. A New Search Engine

The best ideas are just on the right side of impossible. I don't know if this one is possible, but there are signs it might be. Making a new search engine means competing with Google, and recently I've noticed some cracks in their fortress.

The point when it became clear to me that Microsoft had lost their way was when they decided to get into the search business. That was not a natural move for Microsoft. They did it because they were afraid of Google, and Google was in the search business. But this meant (a) Google was now setting Microsoft's agenda, and (b) Microsoft's agenda consisted of stuff they weren't good at.

Microsoft : Google :: Google : Facebook.

That does not by itself mean there's room for a new search engine, but lately when using Google search I've found myself nostalgic for the old days, when Google was true to its own slightly aspy self. Google used to give me a page of the right answers, fast, with no clutter. Now the results seem inspired by the Scientologist principle that what's true is what's true for you. And the pages don't have the clean, sparse feel they used to. Google search results used to look like the output of a Unix utility. Now if I accidentally put the cursor in the wrong place, anything might happen.

The way to win here is to build the search engine all the hackers use. A search engine whose users consisted of the top 10,000 hackers and no one else would be in a very powerful position despite its small size, just as Google was when it was that search engine. And for the first time in over a decade the idea of switching seems thinkable to me.

Since anyone capable of starting this company is one of those 10,000 hackers, the route is at least straightforward: make the search engine you yourself want. Feel free to make it excessively hackerish. Make it really good for code search, for example. Would you like search queries to be Turing complete? Anything that gets you those 10,000 users is ipso facto good.

Don't worry if something you want to do will constrain you in the long term, because if you don't get that initial core of users, there won't be a long term. If you can just build something that you and your friends genuinely prefer to Google, you're already about 10% of the way to an IPO, just as Facebook was (though they probably didn't realize it) when they got all the Harvard undergrads.

  1. 新的搜索引擎

最好的想法恰好位于不可能的边缘。我不知道这个想法是否可行,但有迹象表明它可能可行。做一个新的搜索引擎意味着与谷歌竞争,最近我注意到他们的堡垒出现了一些裂缝。

当微软决定进入搜索业务时,我意识到他们已经迷失了方向。这对微软来说并不是一个自然的举动。他们这样做是因为害怕谷歌,而谷歌在做搜索。但这意味着(a)谷歌现在在制定微软的议程,(b)微软的议程由他们不擅长的事情组成。

微软之于谷歌,就像谷歌之于Facebook。

这本身并不意味着新搜索引擎还有空间,但最近在使用谷歌搜索时,我发现自己怀念过去的日子,那时谷歌忠于其有点自闭症的本色。谷歌过去会给我一页正确的答案,速度快,没有杂乱。现在的结果似乎受到了山达基教原则的启发:对你来说真实的就是真实的。而且页面不再有以前那种干净、稀疏的感觉。谷歌搜索结果过去看起来像Unix工具的输出。现在,如果我意外将光标放错位置,任何事都可能发生。

赢的方法是构建所有黑客都使用的搜索引擎。一个用户群是顶尖的1万名黑客、没有其他人的搜索引擎,即使规模小也会处于非常强大的位置,就像谷歌当年那样。十多年来,我第一次觉得切换搜索引擎是可能的。

由于有能力创办这家公司的人正是那1万名黑客之一,所以路线至少是直接的:做出你自己想要的搜索引擎。随意让它过于黑客化。例如,让它非常擅长代码搜索。你希望搜索查询是图灵完备的吗?任何能让你获得那1万用户的东西都是好事。

不要担心你想做的东西长期会限制你,因为如果你得不到最初的用户核心,就不会有长期。如果你能构建一些你和你的朋友真正更喜欢的东西,你就已经离IPO走了大约10%的路,就像Facebook(尽管他们可能没意识到)当他们赢得所有哈佛本科生时那样。

§ 4
  1. Replace Email

Email was not designed to be used the way we use it now. Email is not a messaging protocol. It's a todo list. Or rather, my inbox is a todo list, and email is the way things get onto it. But it is a disastrously bad todo list.

I'm open to different types of solutions to this problem, but I suspect that tweaking the inbox is not enough, and that email has to be replaced with a new protocol. This new protocol should be a todo list protocol, not a messaging protocol, although there is a degenerate case where what someone wants you to do is: read the following text.

As a todo list protocol, the new protocol should give more power to the recipient than email does. I want there to be more restrictions on what someone can put on my todo list. And when someone can put something on my todo list, I want them to tell me more about what they want from me. Do they want me to do something beyond just reading some text? How important is it? (There obviously has to be some mechanism to prevent people from saying everything is important.) When does it have to be done?

This is one of those ideas that's like an irresistible force meeting an immovable object. On one hand, entrenched protocols are impossible to replace. On the other, it seems unlikely that people in 100 years will still be living in the same email hell we do now. And if email is going to get replaced eventually, why not now?

If you do it right, you may be able to avoid the usual chicken and egg problem new protocols face, because some of the most powerful people in the world will be among the first to switch to it. They're all at the mercy of email too.

Whatever you build, make it fast. GMail has become painfully slow.

[2] If you made something no better than GMail, but fast, that alone would let you start to pull users away from GMail. GMail is slow because Google can't afford to spend a lot on it. But people will pay for this. I'd have no problem paying $50 a month. Considering how much time I spend in email, it's kind of scary to think how much I'd be justified in paying. At least $1000 a month. If I spend several hours a day reading and writing email, that would be a cheap way to make my life better.

[2] This sentence originally read "GMail is painfully slow." Thanks to Paul Buchheit for the correction.

  1. 取代电子邮件

电子邮件并非设计成我们现在使用的方式。电子邮件不是消息协议。它是一个待办事项列表。或者说,我的收件箱是一个待办事项列表,而电子邮件是事情进入列表的方式。但这是一个糟糕透顶的待办事项列表。

我对于解决这个问题的各种方案持开放态度,但我怀疑仅仅调整收件箱是不够的,电子邮件必须被一个新协议取代。 这个新协议应该是一个待办事项列表协议,而不是消息协议,尽管存在一个退化情况:某人想让你做的事情就是阅读以下文本。

作为待办事项列表协议,新协议应该给接收方比电子邮件更多的权力。我希望对别人能在我待办事项列表上放什么有更多限制。当有人能放东西时,我希望他们告诉我更多关于他们想从我这里得到什么。他们是想让我做一些超越阅读文本的事情吗?有多重要?(显然必须有机制防止每个人都说事情重要。)什么时候必须完成?

这是一个像是不可抗力遇上不可移动物体的想法。一方面,根深蒂固的协议不可能被取代。另一方面,100年后的人似乎不太可能仍然生活在今天我们忍受的电子邮件地狱中。如果电子邮件最终会被取代,为什么不现在呢?

如果你做对了,你也许能避免新协议通常面临的先有鸡还是先有蛋的问题,因为一些世界上最有权势的人将是最早切换的人。他们也受制于电子邮件。

无论你构建什么,让它快。Gmail已经变得慢得令人痛苦。

[2] 如果你做一个不比Gmail好但速度快的产品,仅此一点就能让你开始从Gmail拉走用户。Gmail慢是因为谷歌无法在上面花太多钱。但人们会为此付费。我每月付50美元都没有问题。考虑到我花在邮件上的时间,想想我付多少才合理就有点可怕。至少每月1000美元。如果我每天花几个小时读写邮件,这将是改善生活的一个廉价方式。

[2] 这句话最初写的是“Gmail慢得令人痛苦”。感谢Paul Buchheit的纠正。

§ 5
  1. Replace Universities

People are all over this idea lately, and I think they're onto something. I'm reluctant to suggest that an institution that's been around for a millennium is finished just because of some mistakes they made in the last few decades, but certainly in the last few decades US universities seem to have been headed down the wrong path. One could do a lot better for a lot less money.

I don't think universities will disappear. They won't be replaced wholesale. They'll just lose the de facto monopoly on certain types of learning that they once had. There will be many different ways to learn different things, and some may look quite different from universities. Y Combinator itself is arguably one of them.

Learning is such a big problem that changing the way people do it will have a wave of secondary effects. For example, the name of the university one went to is treated by a lot of people (correctly or not) as a credential in its own right. If learning breaks up into many little pieces, credentialling may separate from it. There may even need to be replacements for campus social life (and oddly enough, YC even has aspects of that).

You could replace high schools too, but there you face bureaucratic obstacles that would slow down a startup. Universities seem the place to start.

  1. 取代大学

最近人们都在讨论这个想法,我认为他们发现了什么。我不愿意暗示一个存在了千年的机构仅仅因为过去几十年犯的一些错误就完了,但可以肯定的是,过去几十年美国大学似乎走错了路。用更少的钱可以做得更好。

我不认为大学会消失。它们不会被整体取代。它们只是会失去曾经在某些学习类型上的事实垄断。将会有许多不同的学习方式,有些可能看起来与大学截然不同。Y Combinator本身可以说就是其中之一。

学习是一个如此大的问题,改变人们的学习方式将带来一波次级效应。例如,很多人(无论正确与否)将一个人上过的大学名称本身当作一种凭证。如果学习分解成许多小块,凭证可能会与之分离。甚至可能需要替代校园社交生活(奇怪的是,YC甚至在这方面也有体现)。

你也能取代高中,但那里你会面临官僚障碍,会拖慢创业公司。大学似乎是起点。

§ 6
  1. Internet Drama

Hollywood has been slow to embrace the Internet. That was a mistake, because I think we can now call a winner in the race between delivery mechanisms, and it is the Internet, not cable.

A lot of the reason is the horribleness of cable clients, also known as TVs. Our family didn't wait for Apple TV. We hated our last TV so much that a few months ago we replaced it with an iMac bolted to the wall. It's a little inconvenient to control it with a wireless mouse, but the overall experience is much better than the nightmare UI we had to deal with before.

Some of the attention people currently devote to watching movies and TV can be stolen by things that seem completely unrelated, like social networking apps. More can be stolen by things that are a little more closely related, like games. But there will probably always remain some residual demand for conventional drama, where you sit passively and watch as a plot happens. So how do you deliver drama via the Internet? Whatever you make will have to be on a larger scale than Youtube clips. When people sit down to watch a show, they want to know what they're going to get: either part of a series with familiar characters, or a single longer "movie" whose basic premise they know in advance.

There are two ways delivery and payment could play out. Either some company like Netflix or Apple will be the app store for entertainment, and you'll reach audiences through them. Or the would-be app stores will be too overreaching, or too technically inflexible, and companies will arise to supply payment and streaming a la carte to the producers of drama. If that's the way things play out, there will also be a need for such infrastructure companies.

  1. 互联网戏剧

好莱坞对接受互联网反应缓慢。这是一个错误,因为我认为现在我们可以宣布传输机制竞赛的赢家:是互联网,而不是有线电视。

很大一部分原因在于有线电视客户端(也就是电视)的糟糕体验。我们家没有等待Apple TV。我们太讨厌上一台电视了,几个月前把它换成了固定在墙上的iMac。用无线鼠标控制有点不方便,但整体体验比之前噩梦般的用户界面好多了。

目前人们花在看电影和电视上的注意力,有一部分可以被看似完全不相关的东西(如社交网络应用)抢走。更多可以被更相关的东西(如游戏)抢走。但可能总会有一些对传统剧情片的需求:你被动地坐着,观看情节展开。那么如何通过互联网提供剧情片呢?你做的任何东西都必须比YouTube片段规模更大。当人们坐下来看节目时,他们想知道会得到什么:要么是有熟悉角色的系列剧的一部分,要么是一部更长的“电影”,其基本前提他们事先知道。

分发和支付有两种可能的方式。要么像Netflix或苹果这样的公司成为娱乐的应用商店,你通过他们接触观众。要么潜在的应用商店过于强势或技术上过于僵化,会出现公司为剧情片制作商提供点对点的支付和流媒体服务。如果事情这样发展,也需要这样的基础设施公司。

§ 7
  1. The Next Steve Jobs

I was talking recently to someone who knew Apple well, and I asked him if the people now running the company would be able to keep creating new things the way Apple had under Steve Jobs. His answer was simply "no." I already feared that would be the answer. I asked more to see how he'd qualify it. But he didn't qualify it at all. No, there will be no more great new stuff beyond whatever's currently in the pipeline. Apple's revenues may continue to rise for a long time, but as Microsoft shows, revenue is a lagging indicator in the technology business.

So if Apple's not going to make the next iPad, who is? None of the existing players. None of them are run by product visionaries, and empirically you can't seem to get those by hiring them. Empirically the way you get a product visionary as CEO is for him to found the company and not get fired. So the company that creates the next wave of hardware is probably going to have to be a startup.

I realize it sounds preposterously ambitious for a startup to try to become as big as Apple. But no more ambitious than it was for Apple to become as big as Apple, and they did it. Plus a startup taking on this problem now has an advantage the original Apple didn't: the example of Apple. Steve Jobs has shown us what's possible. That helps would-be successors both directly, as Roger Bannister did, by showing how much better you can do than people did before, and indirectly, as Augustus did, by lodging the idea in users' minds that a single person could unroll the future for them.

[3]Now Steve is gone there's a vacuum we can all feel. If a new company led boldly into the future of hardware, users would follow. The CEO of that company, the "next Steve Jobs," might not measure up to Steve Jobs. But he wouldn't have to. He'd just have to do a better job than Samsung and HP and Nokia, and that seems pretty doable.

[3] Roger Bannister is famous as the first person to run a mile in under 4 minutes. But his world record only lasted 46 days. Once he showed it could be done, lots of others followed. Ten years later Jim Ryun ran a 3:59 mile as a high school junior.

  1. 下一个史蒂夫·乔布斯

最近我和一位熟悉苹果的人聊天,我问他现在运营公司的人能否像乔布斯时代那样持续创造新东西。他的回答只是一个简单的“不”。我早已担心答案会是这样。我问更多是为了看他如何限定条件。但他根本没有限定条件。不,除了当前在研的之外,不会再有伟大的新产品。苹果的收入可能会长期增长,但正如微软所展示的,收入是科技行业的滞后指标。

那么,如果苹果不会做出下一个iPad,谁会呢?现有玩家中没有一个。它们都不是由产品远见者运营的,而且经验表明你似乎无法通过雇佣获得这样的人。经验表明,让产品远见者担任CEO的方式是他创立公司并一直留任。所以创造下一波硬件的公司很可能必须是一家初创公司。

我意识到,一家初创公司试图变得和苹果一样大听起来荒谬至极。但这并不比当初苹果变得和苹果一样大更荒谬,而它们做到了。此外,现在接手这个问题的初创公司有一个原始苹果没有的优势:苹果的例子。史蒂夫·乔布斯向我们展示了什么是可能的。这直接帮助了潜在继任者(就像罗杰·班尼斯特那样,展示了你能比以前的人做得多好),也间接帮助了(就像奥古斯都那样,在用户心中植入了“一个人可以为他们展开未来”的想法)。

[3]现在史蒂夫不在了,我们都能感受到一个真空。如果一家新公司大胆地引领硬件未来,用户会跟随。那家公司的CEO,即“下一个史蒂夫·乔布斯”,可能比不上乔布斯。但他不必如此。他只需要做得比三星、惠普和诺基亚更好,这似乎相当可行。

[3] 罗杰·班尼斯特以第一个在4分钟内跑完一英里而闻名。但他的世界纪录只保持了46天。一旦他展示了这是可能的,许多其他人跟随。十年后,吉姆·莱恩作为一名高二学生跑出了3分59秒的一英里。

§ 8
  1. Bring Back Moore's Law

The last 10 years have reminded us what Moore's Law actually says. Till about 2002 you could safely misinterpret it as promising that clock speeds would double every 18 months. Actually what it says is that circuit densities will double every 18 months. It used to seem pedantic to point that out. Not any more. Intel can no longer give us faster CPUs, just more of them.

This Moore's Law is not as good as the old one. Moore's Law used to mean that if your software was slow, all you had to do was wait, and the inexorable progress of hardware would solve your problems. Now if your software is slow you have to rewrite it to do more things in parallel, which is a lot more work than waiting.

It would be great if a startup could give us something of the old Moore's Law back, by writing software that could make a large number of CPUs look to the developer like one very fast CPU. There are several ways to approach this problem. The most ambitious is to try to do it automatically: to write a compiler that will parallelize our code for us. There's a name for this compiler, the sufficiently smart compiler, and it is a byword for impossibility. But is it really impossible? Is there no configuration of the bits in memory of a present day computer that is this compiler? If you really think so, you should try to prove it, because that would be an interesting result. And if it's not impossible but simply very hard, it might be worth trying to write it. The expected value would be high even if the chance of succeeding was low.

The reason the expected value is so high is web services. If you could write software that gave programmers the convenience of the way things were in the old days, you could offer it to them as a web service. And that would in turn mean that you got practically all the users.

Imagine there was another processor manufacturer that could still translate increased circuit densities into increased clock speeds. They'd take most of Intel's business. And since web services mean that no one sees their processors anymore, by writing the sufficiently smart compiler you could create a situation indistinguishable from you being that manufacturer, at least for the server market.

The least ambitious way of approaching the problem is to start from the other end, and offer programmers more parallelizable Lego blocks to build programs out of, like Hadoop and MapReduce. Then the programmer still does much of the work of optimization.

There's an intriguing middle ground where you build a semi-automatic weapon—where there's a human in the loop. You make something that looks to the user like the sufficiently smart compiler, but inside has people, using highly developed optimization tools to find and eliminate bottlenecks in users' programs. These people might be your employees, or you might create a marketplace for optimization.

An optimization marketplace would be a way to generate the sufficiently smart compiler piecemeal, because participants would immediately start writing bots. It would be a curious state of affairs if you could get to the point where everything could be done by bots, because then you'd have made the sufficiently smart compiler, but no one person would have a complete copy of it.

I realize how crazy all this sounds. In fact, what I like about this idea is all the different ways in which it's wrong. The whole idea of focusing on optimization is counter to the general trend in software development for the last several decades. Trying to write the sufficiently smart compiler is by definition a mistake. And even if it weren't, compilers are the sort of software that's supposed to be created by open source projects, not companies. Plus if this works it will deprive all the programmers who take pleasure in making multithreaded apps of so much amusing complexity. The forum troll I have by now internalized doesn't even know where to begin in raising objections to this project. Now that's what I call a startup idea.

  1. 恢复摩尔定律

过去10年提醒了我们摩尔定律的真正含义。直到大约2002年,你可以安全地将其误解为主频每18个月翻倍。实际上,它说的是电路密度每18个月翻倍。过去指出这点似乎显得学究气。但现在不同了。英特尔再也无法给我们更快的CPU,只能给更多核。

这种摩尔定律不如以前的好。过去的摩尔定律意味着如果你的软件慢,你只需要等待,硬件不可阻挡的进步会解决你的问题。现在如果你的软件慢,你必须重写它以做更多并行的事情,这比等待工作量大得多。

如果一家初创公司能通过编写让大量CPU看起来像单个极快CPU的软件,给我们带回一些旧摩尔定律的好处,那就太好了。有几种方法可以解决这个问题。最雄心勃勃的方法是尝试自动完成:编写一个能自动并行化我们代码的编译器。这个编译器有一个名字:“足够聪明的编译器”,它几乎是不可能的代名词。但真的不可能吗?在当今计算机的内存中,就没有一块比特配置是这种编译器吗?如果你真的这么认为,你应该尝试证明它,因为那会是一个有趣的结果。如果并非不可能但非常困难,那么尝试编写它也许是值得的。即使成功几率很低,期望值也很高。

期望值如此高的原因是Web服务。如果你能编写出给程序员带来过去便利的软件,你可以将其作为Web服务提供给他们。那意味着你实际上得到了所有用户。

想象一下,如果还有另一家处理器制造商能够将增加的电路密度转化为增加的主频。它们会抢走英特尔的大部分业务。由于Web服务意味着没人再看到他们的处理器,通过编写足够聪明的编译器,你可以创造出与你自己就是那家制造商无法区分的情况,至少在服务器市场是这样。

最不雄心勃勃的方法是反其道而行之,为程序员提供更易并行化的乐高积木来构建程序,比如Hadoop和MapReduce。这样程序员仍然要做大部分优化工作。

有一个有趣的中庸之道:构建一种半自动武器——人在回路中。你做出一个看起来像足够聪明的编译器的东西,但内部有人类,使用高度优化的工具来发现并消除用户程序中的瓶颈。这些人可以是你的员工,或者你可以创建一个优化市场。

优化市场将是逐步生成足够聪明的编译器的一种方式,因为参与者会立即开始编写机器人。如果能达到所有事情都由机器人完成的地步,那将是一种奇异的状况,因为那时你就做出了足够聪明的编译器,但没有一个人拥有它的完整副本。

我意识到这一切听起来有多疯狂。事实上,我喜欢这个想法的是它错在的各种不同方式。整个专注于优化的想法与过去几十年软件开发的总体趋势相反。尝试编写足够聪明的编译器按定义就是一个错误。即使它不是,编译器是应该由开源项目而不是公司创造的软件。此外,如果这成功了,它会剥夺所有以制作多线程应用为乐的程序员那么多有趣的复杂性。我内化的论坛喷子甚至不知从何开始对这个项目提出反对意见。这才是我称之为创业想法的东西。

§ 9
  1. Ongoing Diagnosis

But wait, here's another that could face even greater resistance: ongoing, automatic medical diagnosis.

One of my tricks for generating startup ideas is to imagine the ways in which we'll seem backward to future generations. And I'm pretty sure that to people 50 or 100 years in the future, it will seem barbaric that people in our era waited till they had symptoms to be diagnosed with conditions like heart disease and cancer.

For example, in 2004 Bill Clinton found he was feeling short of breath. Doctors discovered that several of his arteries were over 90% blocked and 3 days later he had a quadruple bypass. It seems reasonable to assume Bill Clinton has the best medical care available. And yet even he had to wait till his arteries were over 90% blocked to learn that the number was over 90%. Surely at some point in the future we'll know these numbers the way we now know something like our weight. Ditto for cancer. It will seem preposterous to future generations that we wait till patients have physical symptoms to be diagnosed with cancer. Cancer will show up on some sort of radar screen immediately.

(Of course, what shows up on the radar screen may be different from what we think of now as cancer. I wouldn't be surprised if at any given time we have ten or even hundreds of microcancers going at once, none of which normally amount to anything.)

A lot of the obstacles to ongoing diagnosis will come from the fact that it's going against the grain of the medical profession. The way medicine has always worked is that patients come to doctors with problems, and the doctors figure out what's wrong. A lot of doctors don't like the idea of going on the medical equivalent of what lawyers call a "fishing expedition," where you go looking for problems without knowing what you're looking for. They call the things that get discovered this way "incidentalomas," and they are something of a nuisance.

For example, a friend of mine once had her brain scanned as part of a study. She was horrified when the doctors running the study discovered what appeared to be a large tumor. After further testing, it turned out to be a harmless cyst. But it cost her a few days of terror. A lot of doctors worry that if you start scanning people with no symptoms, you'll get this on a giant scale: a huge number of false alarms that make patients panic and require expensive and perhaps even dangerous tests to resolve. But I think that's just an artifact of current limitations. If people were scanned all the time and we got better at deciding what was a real problem, my friend would have known about this cyst her whole life and known it was harmless, just as we do a birthmark.

There is room for a lot of startups here. In addition to the technical obstacles all startups face, and the bureaucratic obstacles all medical startups face, they'll be going against thousands of years of medical tradition. But it will happen, and it will be a great thing—so great that people in the future will feel as sorry for us as we do for the generations that lived before anaesthesia and antibiotics.

  1. 持续诊断

但等等,还有一个可能面临更大阻力:持续的自动医疗诊断。

我生成创业想法的一个技巧是想象未来几代人会觉得我们多么落后。我很确定,对于50年或100年后的人来说,我们这一代人等到出现症状才被诊断出心脏病和癌症等疾病,这简直是野蛮。

例如,2004年比尔·克林顿感到气短。医生发现他的几条动脉堵塞超过90%,三天后他做了四重搭桥手术。我们可以合理假设比尔·克林顿能获得最好的医疗护理。即便如此,他也必须等到动脉堵塞超过90%才知道这个数字。未来某个时候,我们一定会像现在知道体重那样知道这些数字。癌症也一样。未来几代人会觉得我们等到患者出现身体症状才诊断出癌症是荒谬的。癌症会立刻出现在某种雷达屏幕上。

(当然,雷达屏幕上出现的可能与我们现在认为的癌症不同。我不惊讶于在任何给定时间我们都有十个甚至上百个微小癌症同时存在,但通常没有一个会发展成问题。)

持续诊断的许多障碍来自它与医学界的习惯相悖。医学的传统运作方式是患者带着问题来找医生,医生找出问题。很多医生不喜欢进行医学上相当于律师所说的“钓鱼执法”——在你不知道寻找什么的情况下主动寻找问题。他们称这样发现的东西为“偶发瘤”,这些是麻烦事。

例如,我有个朋友曾因一项研究而扫描大脑。当研究医生发现似乎有一个大肿瘤时,她吓坏了。进一步测试后,发现是一个无害的囊肿。但这让她恐惧了好几天。很多医生担心,如果你开始扫描无症状的人,你会大规模地遇到这种情况:大量误报让患者恐慌,需要昂贵甚至危险的检查来解决。但我认为这只是当前局限性的产物。如果人们一直接受扫描并且我们更擅长判断什么是真正的问题,我朋友会一生都知道这个囊肿并知道它是无害的,就像我们知道一个胎记一样。

这里有很多创业空间。 除了所有初创公司面临的技术障碍和所有医疗初创公司面临的官僚障碍,他们还将与数千年的医疗传统相悖。但这将会发生,而且将是伟大的事情——如此伟大,以至于未来的人会像我们同情麻醉和抗生素出现之前的人们一样同情我们。

§ 10

Tactics

Let me conclude with some tactical advice. If you want to take on a problem as big as the ones I've discussed, don't make a direct frontal attack on it. Don't say, for example, that you're going to replace email. If you do that you raise too many expectations. Your employees and investors will constantly be asking "are we there yet?" and you'll have an army of haters waiting to see you fail. Just say you're building todo-list software. That sounds harmless. People can notice you've replaced email when it's a fait accompli.

[4]Empirically, the way to do really big things seems to be to start with deceptively small things. Want to dominate microcomputer software? Start by writing a Basic interpreter for a machine with a few thousand users. Want to make the universal web site? Start by building a site for Harvard undergrads to stalk one another.

Empirically, it's not just for other people that you need to start small. You need to for your own sake. Neither Bill Gates nor Mark Zuckerberg knew at first how big their companies were going to get. All they knew was that they were onto something. Maybe it's a bad idea to have really big ambitions initially, because the bigger your ambition, the longer it's going to take, and the further you project into the future, the more likely you'll get it wrong.

I think the way to use these big ideas is not to try to identify a precise point in the future and then ask yourself how to get from here to there, like the popular image of a visionary. You'll be better off if you operate like Columbus and just head in a general westerly direction. Don't try to construct the future like a building, because your current blueprint is almost certainly mistaken. Start with something you know works, and when you expand, expand westward.

The popular image of the visionary is someone with a clear view of the future, but empirically it may be better to have a blurry one.

[4] If you want to be the next Apple, maybe you don't even want to start with consumer electronics. Maybe at first you make something hackers use. Or you make something popular but apparently unimportant, like a headset or router. All you need is a bridgehead. Thanks to Sam Altman, Trevor Blackwell, Paul Buchheit, Patrick Collison, Aaron Iba, Jessica Livingston, Robert Morris, Harj Taggar and Garry Tan for reading drafts of this.

战术

最后让我给一些战术建议。如果你想解决像我所讨论的那么大的问题,不要直接正面进攻。例如,不要说你要取代电子邮件。如果你那样说,你会抬高太多期望。你的员工和投资者会不断问“我们到了吗?”,而且会有一大群讨厌者等着看你失败。就说你在构建待办事项列表软件。那听起来无害。当木已成舟时,人们自然会注意到你取代了电子邮件。

[4]经验表明,做真正大事的方式似乎是从看似微小的事情开始。想主导微型计算机软件?先从为只有几千用户的机器编写Basic解释器开始。想做通用的网站?先为哈佛本科生搭建一个互相追踪的网站。

经验表明,从小处着手不仅是为了别人,也是为了你自己。比尔·盖茨和马克·扎克伯格最初都不知道他们的公司会变得多大。他们只知道自己在做一件有意义的事。也许最初就有极其宏大的野心不是一个好主意,因为野心越大,所需时间越长,你预想的未来越远,越可能出错。

我认为利用这些宏大想法的方式不是像流行的远见者形象那样,试图确定未来的精确点然后问自己如何从现在到达那里。你最好像哥伦布那样行动,只是朝着一个大致向西的方向前进。不要像建造建筑那样构建未来,因为你当前的蓝图几乎肯定是错误的。从你知道有效的东西开始,当你扩张时,向西方扩张。

流行的远见者形象是对未来有清晰视野的人,但经验表明,模糊的视野可能更好。

[4] 如果你想成为下一个苹果,也许你甚至不想从消费电子产品开始。也许一开始你做一些黑客用的东西。或者你做一些流行但看似不重要的事情,比如耳机或路由器。你所需要的只是一个桥头堡。 感谢Sam Altman、Trevor Blackwell、Paul Buchheit、Patrick Collison、Aaron Iba、Jessica Livingston、Robert Morris、Harj Taggar和Garry Tan阅读本文草稿。

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