创业点子从何而来?——Paul Graham 的经典方法论
Paul Graham 在 2005 年 Startup School 的演讲中,颠覆了人们对创业点子的常见认知:好点子并非凭空闪现的百万美元想法,而是一个错误的起始问题。他强调,创业成功的公司大多与最初想法大相径庭,初始想法的真正价值在于引导你发现真正的问题。要产生好问题,需要两条:熟悉前沿技术(如大学环境),以及与志同道合的朋友持续讨论。他提出“逆风而行”原则——选择能最大化未来选项的工作,而不是高薪但封堵成长的工作。具体方法包括:从自己觉得无法忍受的问题入手(如他做垃圾邮件过滤器的经历)、将奢侈品变成大众商品(成本和易用性)、以及最自然的方式——做自己感兴趣的黑客项目并和朋友分享。文章还讨论了创业退出策略(以被收购为目标)、避开单一买家陷阱等。适合所有想创业的技术人员阅读。
How do you get good ideas for startups? That's probably the number one question people ask me. I'd like to reply with another question: why do people think it's hard to come up with ideas for startups? That might seem a stupid thing to ask. Why do they think it's hard? If people can't do it, then it is hard, at least for them. Right? Well, maybe not. What people usually say is not that they can't think of ideas, but that they don't have any. That's not quite the same thing. It could be the reason they don't have any is that they haven't tried to generate them. I think this is often the case. I think people believe that coming up with ideas for startups is very hard-- that it must be very hard-- and so they don't try do to it. They assume ideas are like miracles: they either pop into your head or they don't.
如何获得好的创业点子?这大概是我最常被问到的问题。我想用另一个问题来回答:为什么人们认为想出创业点子很难?这听起来可能是个愚蠢的问题。为什么他们觉得难?如果他们做不到,那确实很难,至少对他们来说是这样,对吧?嗯,也许不是。人们通常说的不是他们想不出点子,而是他们没有任何点子。这两者并不完全相同。可能他们没有点子的原因是他们根本没尝试过去产生点子。我认为情况往往如此。我认为人们相信想出创业点子非常困难——它一定非常困难——所以他们不去尝试。他们假设点子就像奇迹:要么突然出现在你脑中,要么就根本不会出现。
I also have a theory about why people think this. They overvalue ideas. They think creating a startup is just a matter of implementing some fabulous initial idea. And since a successful startup is worth millions of dollars, a good idea is therefore a million dollar idea. If coming up with an idea for a startup equals coming up with a million dollar idea, then of course it's going to seem hard. Too hard to bother trying. Our instincts tell us something so valuable would not be just lying around for anyone to discover. Actually, startup ideas are not million dollar ideas, and here's an experiment you can try to prove it: just try to sell one. Nothing evolves faster than markets. The fact that there's no market for startup ideas suggests there's no demand. Which means, in the narrow sense of the word, that startup ideas are worthless.
关于人们为什么这样想,我也有一个理论。他们高估了点子的价值。他们认为创办一家创业公司只是实现某个绝妙的初始想法的问题。既然一家成功的创业公司价值数百万美元,那么一个好的点子自然就是百万美元的点子。如果想到一个创业点子等于想到一个百万美元的点子,那当然会显得很难。难到不值得去尝试。我们的直觉告诉我们,如此有价值的东西不可能随便被人发现。实际上,创业点子并非百万美元的点子,这里有一个你可以尝试的实验来证明:试着卖掉一个点子。没有什么比市场进化得更快。没有创业点子的市场这一事实表明没有需求。这意味着,从狭义上讲,创业点子一文不值。
The fact is, most startups end up nothing like the initial idea. It would be closer to the truth to say the main value of your initial idea is that, in the process of discovering it's broken, you'll come up with your real idea. The initial idea is just a starting point-- not a blueprint, but a question. It might help if they were expressed that way. Instead of saying that your idea is to make a collaborative, web-based spreadsheet, say: could one make a collaborative, web-based spreadsheet? A few grammatical tweaks, and a woefully incomplete idea becomes a promising question to explore. There's a real difference, because an assertion provokes objections in a way a question doesn't. If you say: I'm going to build a web-based spreadsheet, then critics-- the most dangerous of which are in your own head-- will immediately reply that you'd be competing with Microsoft, that you couldn't give people the kind of UI they expect, that users wouldn't want to have their data on your servers, and so on. A question doesn't seem so challenging. It becomes: let's try making a web-based spreadsheet and see how far we get. And everyone knows that if you tried this you'd be able to make something useful. Maybe what you'd end up with wouldn't even be a spreadsheet. Maybe it would be some kind of new spreadsheet-like collaboration tool that doesn't even have a name yet. You wouldn't have thought of something like that except by implementing your way toward it. Treating a startup idea as a question changes what you're looking for. If an idea is a blueprint, it has to be right. But if it's a question, it can be wrong, so long as it's wrong in a way that leads to more ideas. One valuable way for an idea to be wrong is to be only a partial solution. When someone's working on a problem that seems too big, I always ask: is there some way to bite off some subset of the problem, then gradually expand from there? That will generally work unless you get trapped on a local maximum, like 1980s-style AI, or C.
事实是,大多数创业公司的最终形态与最初的设想截然不同。更接近真相的说法是,初始想法的主要价值在于,在发现它行不通的过程中,你会找到真正的想法。初始想法只是一个起点——不是蓝图,而是一个问题。如果这样表述可能会更有帮助。不要说你的想法是做一个协作式的在线电子表格,而是说:能否做一个协作式的在线电子表格?稍微改动一下语法,一个极不完整的想法就变成了一个值得探索的问题。这两者有本质区别,因为断言会引发反对,而问题不会。如果你说“我要做一个在线电子表格”,那么批评者——其中最危险的是你脑子里的那个——会立即反驳:你要和微软竞争,你无法提供用户期望的界面类型,用户不希望把数据放在你的服务器上,等等。而一个问题看起来就没那么有挑战性了。它变成:我们来试试做一个在线电子表格,看看能做到什么程度。每个人都知道,如果你尝试了,你一定能做出一些有用的东西。也许最终得到的东西甚至不是电子表格。也许它会是某种类似电子表格的新型协作工具,连名字都还没有。除非你通过实现逐步推进,否则你不会想到这样的东西。把创业点子视为问题会改变你所寻找的东西。如果点子是一张蓝图,它必须是正确的。但如果它是一个问题,它可以错,只要它错的方式能带来更多想法。一个点子出错的一种有价值的方式是它只是一个部分解。当有人在一个看起来太大的问题上工作时,我总是问:有没有办法先啃下问题的一个子集,然后从那里逐步扩展?这通常行得通,除非你陷入局部最大值,比如1980年代风格的人工智能或C语言。
So far, we've reduced the problem from thinking of a million dollar idea to thinking of a mistaken question. That doesn't seem so hard, does it? To generate such questions you need two things: to be familiar with promising new technologies, and to have the right kind of friends. New technologies are the ingredients startup ideas are made of, and conversations with friends are the kitchen they're cooked in. Universities have both, and that's why so many startups grow out of them. They're filled with new technologies, because they're trying to produce research, and only things that are new count as research. And they're full of exactly the right kind of people to have ideas with: the other students, who will be not only smart but elastic-minded to a fault. The opposite extreme would be a well-paying but boring job at a big company. Big companies are biased against new technologies, and the people you'd meet there would be wrong too. In an essay I wrote for high school students, I said a good rule of thumb was to stay upwind-- to work on things that maximize your future options. The principle applies for adults too, though perhaps it has to be modified to: stay upwind for as long as you can, then cash in the potential energy you've accumulated when you need to pay for kids. I don't think people consciously realize this, but one reason downwind jobs like churning out Java for a bank pay so well is precisely that they are downwind. The market price for that kind of work is higher because it gives you fewer options for the future. A job that lets you work on exciting new stuff will tend to pay less, because part of the compensation is in the form of the new skills you'll learn. Grad school is the other end of the spectrum from a coding job at a big company: the pay's low but you spend most of your time working on new stuff. And of course, it's called "school," which makes that clear to everyone, though in fact all jobs are some percentage school. The right environment for having startup ideas need not be a university per se. It just has to be a situation with a large percentage of school. It's obvious why you want exposure to new technology, but why do you need other people? Can't you just think of new ideas yourself? The empirical answer is: no. Even Einstein needed people to bounce ideas off. Ideas get developed in the process of explaining them to the right kind of person. You need that resistance, just as a carver needs the resistance of the wood. This is one reason Y Combinator has a rule against investing in startups with only one founder. Practically every successful company has at least two. And because startup founders work under great pressure, it's critical they be friends. I didn't realize it till I was writing this, but that may help explain why there are so few female startup founders. I read on the Internet (so it must be true) that only 1.7% of VC-backed startups are founded by women. The percentage of female hackers is small, but not that small. So why the discrepancy? When you realize that successful startups tend to have multiple founders who were already friends, a possible explanation emerges. People's best friends are likely to be of the same sex, and if one group is a minority in some population, pairs of them will be a minority squared.
到目前为止,我们已经把问题从“想出一个百万美元的点子”缩小到“想出一个错误的问题”。这似乎不那么难了,对吧?要产生这样的问题,你需要两样东西:熟悉有前景的新技术,以及有合适的朋友。新技术是创业点子的原料,而与朋友交谈则是烹制点子的厨房。大学两者兼备,这就是为什么这么多创业公司从大学里诞生。大学里充满了新技术,因为他们致力于产出研究,而只有新的东西才算研究。而且,大学里恰好有最适合一起想点子的人:其他学生,他们不仅聪明,而且思维弹性极大。相反的情况是在一家大公司做一份高薪但无聊的工作。大公司对新技术有偏见,你在那里遇到的人也不对。在我为高中生写的一篇文章中,我说一个好的经验法则是“顺风”——做那些能最大化你未来选择的事情。这个原则也适用于成年人,不过可能需要修改为:尽可能长时间地顺风而行,然后在你需要为养孩子买单时,兑现你积累的势能。我认为人们没有意识到这一点,但像在银行为Java编写代码这样的“下风”工作之所以报酬高,恰恰是因为它们处于下风。这种工作的市场价格更高,因为它让你未来的选择更少。一份能让你从事激动人心新事物的工作往往薪水较低,因为部分报酬是以你将学到的新技能的形式体现的。研究生院与大公司的编码工作处于频谱的另一端:薪水低,但大部分时间都在研究新东西。当然,它被称为“学校”,这让所有人都清楚这一点,尽管实际上所有工作都带有一定比例的“学校”成分。产生创业想法的合适环境不一定是大学本身。它只需要是一个“学校”占比很高的情况。你为什么要接触新技术是显而易见的,但为什么需要其他人?你不能自己想到新点子吗?经验答案是:不能。连爱因斯坦都需要与人碰撞想法。想法是在向合适的人解释的过程中发展出来的。你需要那种阻力,就像雕刻师需要木材的阻力一样。这就是为什么Y Combinator有一条规则,不投资只有一个创始人的创业公司。几乎每一家成功的公司都至少有两个创始人。而且因为创业者在巨大压力下工作,他们必须是朋友,这一点至关重要。直到我在写这篇文章时我才意识到,但这可能有助于解释为什么女性创业者这么少。我在网上读到(所以它一定是真的)只有1.7%的风险投资支持的创业公司是由女性创立的。女性黑客的比例很小,但没小到那个程度。那么为什么会有这种差异?当你意识到成功的创业公司往往有多个早已是朋友的创始人时,一个可能的解释就出现了。人们最好的朋友很可能是同性,如果一个群体在某个群体中是少数,那么成对的两个少数就会是少数中的少数。
What these groups of co-founders do together is more complicated than just sitting down and trying to think of ideas. I suspect the most productive setup is a kind of together-alone-together sandwich. Together you talk about some hard problem, probably getting nowhere. Then, the next morning, one of you has an idea in the shower about how to solve it. He runs eagerly to to tell the others, and together they work out the kinks. What happens in that shower? It seems to me that ideas just pop into my head. But can we say more than that? Taking a shower is like a form of meditation. You're alert, but there's nothing to distract you. It's in a situation like this, where your mind is free to roam, that it bumps into new ideas. What happens when your mind wanders? It may be like doodling. Most people have characteristic ways of doodling. This habit is unconscious, but not random: I found my doodles changed after I started studying painting. I started to make the kind of gestures I'd make if I were drawing from life. They were atoms of drawing, but arranged randomly. [2] Perhaps letting your mind wander is like doodling with ideas. You have certain mental gestures you've learned in your work, and when you're not paying attention, you keep making these same gestures, but somewhat randomly. In effect, you call the same functions on random arguments. That's what a metaphor is: a function applied to an argument of the wrong type. Conveniently, as I was writing this, my mind wandered: would it be useful to have metaphors in a programming language? I don't know; I don't have time to think about this. But it's convenient because this is an example of what I mean by habits of mind. I spend a lot of time thinking about language design, and my habit of always asking "would x be useful in a programming language" just got invoked. If new ideas arise like doodles, this would explain why you have to work at something for a while before you have any. It's not just that you can't judge ideas till you're an expert in a field. You won't even generate ideas, because you won't have any habits of mind to invoke. Of course the habits of mind you invoke on some field don't have to be derived from working in that field. In fact, it's often better if they're not. You're not just looking for good ideas, but for good new ideas, and you have a better chance of generating those if you combine stuff from distant fields. As hackers, one of our habits of mind is to ask, could one open-source x? For example, what if you made an open-source operating system? A fine idea, but not very novel. Whereas if you ask, could you make an open-source play? you might be onto something. Are some kinds of work better sources of habits of mind than others? I suspect harder fields may be better sources, because to attack hard problems you need powerful solvents. I find math is a good source of metaphors-- good enough that it's worth studying just for that. Related fields are also good sources, especially when they're related in unexpected ways. Everyone knows computer science and electrical engineering are related, but precisely because everyone knows it, importing ideas from one to the other doesn't yield great profits. It's like importing something from Wisconsin to Michigan. Whereas (I claim) hacking and painting are also related, in the sense that hackers and painters are both makers, and this source of new ideas is practically virgin territory.
这些联合创始人一起做的事情比简单地坐下来试图想点子要复杂得多。我怀疑最高效的模式是一种“一起-独处-一起”的三明治模式。一起讨论某个难题,可能毫无进展。然后,第二天早上,有一个人在淋浴时想到了如何解决它的点子。他急切地跑去告诉其他人,然后他们一起解决细节问题。淋浴时发生了什么?在我看来,点子就是突然出现在脑海中的。但我们能说得更多吗?淋浴就像一种冥想状态。你保持清醒,但没有什么能分散你的注意力。正是在这种状态下,你的思绪自由漫游,才会碰撞出新的想法。当你的思绪漫游时,会发生什么?这可能就像涂鸦。大多数人有独特的涂鸦方式。这种习惯是无意识的,但并非随机:我发现我开始学习绘画后,我的涂鸦发生了变化。我开始做出如果写生时会做的那些手势。它们是绘画的原子,但随机排列。[2] 也许让思绪漫游就像用想法涂鸦。你拥有工作中习得的某些思维习惯,当你注意力不集中时,你会继续做这些相同的动作,但有点随机。实际上,你是在随机的参数上调用相同的函数。这就是隐喻:将函数应用于错误的参数类型。恰巧,在我写这段话时,我的思绪漫游了:在编程语言中加入隐喻是否有用?我不知道;我没有时间思考这个。但这很合适,因为这正是我所说的思维习惯的例子。我花了很多时间思考语言设计,而我总是问“x在编程语言中有用吗”这个习惯就这样被调用了。如果新想法像涂鸦一样出现,这就能解释为什么你必须在一个领域工作一段时间后才能产生想法。不仅仅是因为在你成为某个领域的专家之前你无法判断想法,而是你甚至不会产生想法,因为你没有可调用的思维习惯。当然,你在某个领域调用的思维习惯不必源自那个领域的工作。事实上,往往不是更好。你不仅是在寻找好想法,而是在寻找好的新想法,如果你结合来自遥远领域的东西,你更有可能产生这些想法。作为黑客,我们的一种思维习惯是问:能否开源化x?例如,如果你制作一个开源操作系统会怎样?一个好主意,但不够新颖。而如果你问:能否制作一个开源戏剧?你可能会发现一些有意思的东西。某些类型的工作是否比其他工作更能成为思维习惯的源泉?我怀疑更难的领域可能是更好的源泉,因为解决难题需要强大的溶剂。我发现数学是隐喻的好来源——好到值得为了这个目的去学习它。相关领域也是好来源,尤其是当它们以意想不到的方式关联时。每个人都知道计算机科学和电气工程是相关的,但正因为每个人都知道,从一个领域向另一个领域引入想法不会带来巨大的收益。这就像从威斯康星州进口商品到密歇根州。而(我声称)黑客和绘画也是相关的,因为黑客和画家都是创造者,这个新想法的来源几乎是一片处女地。
In theory you could stick together ideas at random and see what you came up with. What if you built a peer-to-peer dating site? Would it be useful to have an automatic book? Could you turn theorems into a commodity? When you assemble ideas at random like this, they may not be just stupid, but semantically ill-formed. What would it even mean to make theorems a commodity? You got me. I didn't think of that idea, just its name. You might come up with something useful this way, but I never have. It's like knowing a fabulous sculpture is hidden inside a block of marble, and all you have to do is remove the marble that isn't part of it. It's an encouraging thought, because it reminds you there is an answer, but it's not much use in practice because the search space is too big. I find that to have good ideas I need to be working on some problem. You can't start with randomness. You have to start with a problem, then let your mind wander just far enough for new ideas to form. In a way, it's harder to see problems than their solutions. Most people prefer to remain in denial about problems. It's obvious why: problems are irritating. They're problems! Imagine if people in 1700 saw their lives the way we'd see them. It would have been unbearable. This denial is such a powerful force that, even when presented with possible solutions, people often prefer to believe they wouldn't work. I saw this phenomenon when I worked on spam filters. In 2002, most people preferred to ignore spam, and most of those who didn't preferred to believe the heuristic filters then available were the best you could do. I found spam intolerable, and I felt it had to be possible to recognize it statistically. And it turns out that was all you needed to solve the problem. The algorithm I used was ridiculously simple. Anyone who'd really tried to solve the problem would have found it. It was just that no one had really tried to solve the problem. [3] Let me repeat that recipe: finding the problem intolerable and feeling it must be possible to solve it. Simple as it seems, that's the recipe for a lot of startup ideas.
理论上,你可以随机组合想法,看看会得到什么。如果你建立一个点对点约会网站会怎样?拥有一本会自动更新的书有用吗?你能把定理变成商品吗?当你这样随机组合想法时,它们可能不仅是愚蠢的,而且在语义上就不通顺。“把定理变成商品”到底是什么意思?你问住我了。我没有想到那个想法,只想到了它的名字。你可能会这样得到一些有用的东西,但我从未成功过。这就像知道一块大理石中隐藏着一尊精美的雕像,你所要做的就是去掉不属于它的部分。这是一个令人鼓舞的想法,因为它提醒你答案就在那里,但在实践中没什么用,因为搜索空间太大了。我发现要产生好想法,我需要正在解决某个问题。你不能从随机开始。你必须从一个问题开始,然后让你的思绪漫游到刚好足够远的地方,以便形成新想法。在某种程度上,发现问题比找到解决方案更难。大多数人宁愿对问题视而不见。原因很明显:问题令人烦恼。它们就是问题!想象一下,如果1700年的人们像我们一样看待他们的生活,那将是无法忍受的。这种否认的力量如此强大,以至于即使提供了可能的解决方案,人们也常常宁愿相信它们行不通。我在做垃圾邮件过滤工作时看到了这种现象。2002年,大多数人宁愿忽略垃圾邮件,而那些不忽略的人大多相信当时可用的启发式过滤器已经是最好的了。我觉得垃圾邮件无法忍受,并且感到必须有可能通过统计方法来识别它。结果证明,这就是解决问题所需的一切。我用的算法简单得可笑。任何真正尝试解决问题的人都会发现它。只是没有人真正去尝试解决这个问题。[3] 让我重复一下这个配方:发现这个问题无法忍受,并且觉得它一定可以被解决。看似简单,但这正是许多创业点子的配方。
So far most of what I've said applies to ideas in general. What's special about startup ideas? Startup ideas are ideas for companies, and companies have to make money. And the way to make money is to make something people want. Wealth is what people want. I don't mean that as some kind of philosophical statement; I mean it as a tautology. So an idea for a startup is an idea for something people want. Wouldn't any good idea be something people want? Unfortunately not. I think new theorems are a fine thing to create, but there is no great demand for them. Whereas there appears to be great demand for celebrity gossip magazines. Wealth is defined democratically. Good ideas and valuable ideas are not quite the same thing; the difference is individual tastes. But valuable ideas are very close to good ideas, especially in technology. I think they're so close that you can get away with working as if the goal were to discover good ideas, so long as, in the final stage, you stop and ask: will people actually pay for this? Only a few ideas are likely to make it that far and then get shot down; RPN calculators might be one example. One way to make something people want is to look at stuff people use now that's broken. Dating sites are a prime example. They have millions of users, so they must be promising something people want. And yet they work horribly. Just ask anyone who uses them. It's as if they used the worse-is-better approach but stopped after the first stage and handed the thing over to marketers. Of course, the most obvious breakage in the average computer user's life is Windows itself. But this is a special case: you can't defeat a monopoly by a frontal attack. Windows can and will be overthrown, but not by giving people a better desktop OS. The way to kill it is to redefine the problem as a superset of the current one. The problem is not, what operating system should people use on desktop computers? but how should people use applications? There are answers to that question that don't even involve desktop computers. Everyone thinks Google is going to solve this problem, but it is a very subtle one, so subtle that a company as big as Google might well get it wrong. I think the odds are better than 50-50 that the Windows killer-- or more accurately, Windows transcender-- will come from some little startup. Another classic way to make something people want is to take a luxury and make it into a commmodity. People must want something if they pay a lot for it. And it is a very rare product that can't be made dramatically cheaper if you try. This was Henry Ford's plan. He made cars, which had been a luxury item, into a commodity. But the idea is much older than Henry Ford. Water mills transformed mechanical power from a luxury into a commodity, and they were used in the Roman empire. Arguably pastoralism transformed a luxury into a commodity. When you make something cheaper you can sell more of them. But if you make something dramatically cheaper you often get qualitative changes, because people start to use it in different ways. For example, once computers get so cheap that most people can have one of their own, you can use them as communication devices. Often to make something dramatically cheaper you have to redefine the problem. The Model T didn't have all the features previous cars did. It only came in black, for example. But it solved the problem people cared most about, which was getting from place to place.
到目前为止,我所说的内容大多适用于一般的想法。创业点子有什么特别之处?创业点子是为了公司而生的想法,而公司必须赚钱。赚钱的方法是做出人们想要的东西。财富就是人们想要的东西。我这不是什么哲学声明,我是在说一个同义反复。所以创业点子就是关于人们想要的东西的想法。难道任何好想法不都是人们想要的东西吗?不幸的是,并非如此。我认为新定理是很好的创造物,但人们对它们没有巨大的需求。而人们对名人八卦杂志似乎有巨大的需求。财富是由大众定义的。好的想法和有价值的想法并不完全相同;区别在于个人品味。但有价值的想法非常接近好想法,尤其是在技术领域。我认为它们如此接近,以至于你可以假装目标就是发现好想法,只要在最后阶段你停下来问:人们真的会为此付钱吗?只有少数想法能走到那一步然后被枪毙;RPN计算器可能是一个例子。做出人们想要的东西的一种方法是看看人们现在使用的哪些东西是坏的。约会网站就是一个典型的例子。它们有数百万用户,所以它们肯定承诺了人们想要的东西。然而它们运行得糟透了。随便问问使用它们的人。就好像它们采用了“更糟则更好”的方法,但在第一阶段后就停止了,然后把东西交给了营销人员。当然,普通计算机用户生活中最明显的坏东西就是Windows本身。但这是一个特例:你不能通过正面进攻击败垄断。Windows可以被而且将会被打倒,但不是通过给人们一个更好的桌面操作系统。打败它的方法是把问题重新定义为当前问题的超集。问题不是“人们应该在桌面电脑上使用什么操作系统?”,而是“人们应该如何使用应用程序?”这个问题的答案甚至不涉及桌面电脑。每个人都认为谷歌会解决这个问题,但这是一个非常微妙的问题,微妙到像谷歌这样的大公司也可能会搞错。我认为Windows的终结者——或者更准确地说,Windows的超越者——来自某个小创业公司的概率大于50%。另一个制造人们想要的东西的经典方法是将奢侈品变成普通商品。如果人们花大价钱买某样东西,那他们一定是想要它。而且很少有产品是你在尝试之后不能大幅降价的。这就是亨利·福特的计划。他把汽车这种奢侈品变成了普通商品。但这个想法比亨利·福特古老得多。水车把机械动力从奢侈品变成了普通商品,它们在罗马帝国时期就被使用了。可以说,畜牧业也把奢侈品变成了普通商品。当你把东西变得更便宜时,你可以卖出更多。但如果你把东西变得极其便宜,你往往会得到质的变化,因为人们开始以不同的方式使用它。例如,一旦电脑变得足够便宜,大多数人都能拥有一台,你就可以把它们当作通讯设备。通常,要大幅降低成本,你必须重新定义问题。T型车没有之前汽车的所有功能。例如,它只有黑色。但它解决了人们最关心的问题:从一处到另一处。
One of the most useful mental habits I know I learned from Michael Rabin: that the best way to solve a problem is often to redefine it. A lot of people use this technique without being consciously aware of it, but Rabin was spectacularly explicit. You need a big prime number? Those are pretty expensive. How about if I give you a big number that only has a 10 to the minus 100 chance of not being prime? Would that do? Well, probably; I mean, that's probably smaller than the chance that I'm imagining all this anyway. Redefining the problem is a particularly juicy heuristic when you have competitors, because it's so hard for rigid-minded people to follow. You can work in plain sight and they don't realize the danger. Don't worry about us. We're just working on search. Do one thing and do it well, that's our motto. Making things cheaper is actually a subset of a more general technique: making things easier. For a long time it was most of making things easier, but now that the things we build are so complicated, there's another rapidly growing subset: making things easier to use. This is an area where there's great room for improvement. What you want to be able to say about technology is: it just works. How often do you say that now? Simplicity takes effort-- genius, even. The average programmer seems to produce UI designs that are almost willfully bad. I was trying to use the stove at my mother's house a couple weeks ago. It was a new one, and instead of physical knobs it had buttons and an LED display. I tried pressing some buttons I thought would cause it to get hot, and you know what it said? "Err." Not even "Error." "Err." You can't just say "Err" to the user of a stove. You should design the UI so that errors are impossible. And the boneheads who designed this stove even had an example of such a UI to work from: the old one. You turn one knob to set the temperature and another to set the timer. What was wrong with that? It just worked. It seems that, for the average engineer, more options just means more rope to hang yourself. So if you want to start a startup, you can take almost any existing technology produced by a big company, and assume you could build something way easier to use.
我知道的最有用的思维习惯之一是从迈克尔·拉宾那里学来的:解决问题的最佳方法通常是重新定义问题。很多人无意识地使用这个技巧,但拉宾极其明确地说过。你需要一个大素数?那些很贵。如果我给你一个大数,它只有10的负100次方的概率不是素数,这样可以吗?嗯,大概吧;我的意思是,这个概率可能比我凭空想象这一切的概率还要小。当你面临竞争对手时,重新定义问题尤其是一个多汁的启发式方法,因为思维僵化的人很难跟上。你可以在他们眼皮底下工作,而他们意识不到危险。别担心我们,我们只是在研究搜索。一次做好一件事,这是我们的座右铭。降低成本实际上是一个更通用技巧的子集:让事情变得更简单。很长一段时间里,这几乎是让事情变简单的全部,但现在我们构建的东西如此复杂,另一个快速增长的子集是:让东西更容易使用。这个领域有很大的改进空间。你希望用来描述技术的词是:它只管工作。你现在多久这样说一次?简洁需要努力——甚至需要天才。普通程序员似乎会做出几乎故意糟糕的UI设计。几周前我试图用我妈妈家的炉子。那是个新炉子,没有物理旋钮,而是按钮和LED显示屏。我按了一些我认为能加热的按钮,你知道它显示什么吗?"Err"。甚至不是"Error",而是"Err"。你不能对炉子的用户只说"Err"。你应该设计出不可能出错的UI。而设计这个炉子的傻瓜们甚至有一个现成的例子:旧炉子。你转动一个旋钮设置温度,转动另一个设置定时器。那有什么问题?它只管工作。对于普通工程师来说,更多的选项只是意味着更多的绳子来吊死自己。所以如果你想创办一家公司,你可以选择几乎任何大公司生产的现有技术,并假定你能造出更容易使用的东西。
Success for a startup approximately equals getting bought. You need some kind of exit strategy, because you can't get the smartest people to work for you without giving them options likely to be worth something. Which means you either have to get bought or go public, and the number of startups that go public is very small. If success probably means getting bought, should you make that a conscious goal? The old answer was no: you were supposed to pretend that you wanted to create a giant, public company, and act surprised when someone made you an offer. Really, you want to buy us? Well, I suppose we'd consider it, for the right price. I think things are changing. If 98% of the time success means getting bought, why not be open about it? If 98% of the time you're doing product development on spec for some big company, why not think of that as your task? One advantage of this approach is that it gives you another source of ideas: look at big companies, think what they should be doing, and do it yourself. Even if they already know it, you'll probably be done faster. Just be sure to make something multiple acquirers will want. Don't fix Windows, because the only potential acquirer is Microsoft, and when there's only one acquirer, they don't have to hurry. They can take their time and copy you instead of buying you. If you want to get market price, work on something where there's competition. If an increasing number of startups are created to do product development on spec, it will be a natural counterweight to monopolies. Once some type of technology is captured by a monopoly, it will only evolve at big company rates instead of startup rates, whereas alternatives will evolve with especial speed. A free market interprets monopoly as damage and routes around it.
创业公司的成功约等于被收购。你需要某种退出策略,因为你无法在不给最聪明的人提供可能有价值的期权的情况下让他们为你工作。这意味着你要么被收购,要么上市,而上市的创业公司数量非常少。如果成功很可能意味着被收购,你应该把它作为有意识的目标吗?过去的答案是否定的:你应该假装想创建一家大型上市公司,并在有人出价时表现得惊讶。真的吗?你想收购我们?嗯,我想我们会考虑的,只要价格合适。我认为情况正在改变。如果98%的情况下成功意味着被收购,为什么不开诚布公呢?如果98%的情况下你是在为某家大公司做产品开发,为什么不想着这就是你的任务?这种方法的一个优点是它提供了另一个想法来源:看看大公司,想想他们应该做什么,然后你自己去做。即使他们自己已经知道,你可能也会做得更快。只是要确保做的东西多个收购方会想要。不要修补Windows,因为唯一的潜在收购方是微软,而且当只有一个收购方时,他们不着急。他们可以慢慢来,复制你而不是收购你。如果你想得到市场价,就做那些有竞争的事情。如果越来越多的创业公司专门为收购而做产品开发,这将自然成为对垄断的制衡。一旦某种技术被垄断捕获,它只能以公司速度而非创业速度演进,而替代方案将以特别快的速度进化。自由市场将垄断视为损害并绕开它。
The most productive way to generate startup ideas is also the most unlikely-sounding: by accident. If you look at how famous startups got started, a lot of them weren't initially supposed to be startups. Lotus began with a program Mitch Kapor wrote for a friend. Apple got started because Steve Wozniak wanted to build microcomputers, and his employer, Hewlett-Packard, wouldn't let him do it at work. Yahoo began as David Filo's personal collection of links. This is not the only way to start startups. You can sit down and consciously come up with an idea for a company; we did. But measured in total market cap, the build-stuff-for-yourself model might be more fruitful. It certainly has to be the most fun way to come up with startup ideas. And since a startup ought to have multiple founders who were already friends before they decided to start a company, the rather surprising conclusion is that the best way to generate startup ideas is to do what hackers do for fun: cook up amusing hacks with your friends. It seems like it violates some kind of conservation law, but there it is: the best way to get a "million dollar idea" is just to do what hackers enjoy doing anyway.
产生创业点子最高效的方式也是最不可能听起来的方式:意外。如果你看看那些著名创业公司是如何起步的,很多一开始并不是打算做成公司的。莲花公司始于米奇·卡普为朋友写的一个程序。苹果公司的诞生是因为史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克想制造微型计算机,而他的雇主惠普不让他上班时干这个。雅虎始于大卫·费罗的个人链接收藏。这不是创办公司的唯一方式。你可以坐下来有意识地想出一个公司点子;我们就是这样做的。但按总市值衡量,为自己做东西的模式可能更有成果。它肯定是想出创业点子最有乐趣的方式。而且既然创业公司应该有多个创始人在决定创办公司之前就是朋友,那么相当惊人的结论是:产生创业点子最好的方式就是做黑客们喜欢做的事情:和朋友们一起捣鼓有趣的hack。这似乎违反某种守恒定律,但事实就是如此:获得“百万美元点子”的最佳方式就是做黑客们本来就很享受的事情。